The Gradual Erosion of the Social Security Function of Customary Land Tenure Arrangements in Lineage-Based Societies

Land tenure, Informal insurance , Equity, Common property

Political Instrumentalization of Religion: The Case of Islam

The question as to whether religion can block economic development and institutional change assumes particular importance today because of the rise of Islamist movements and the disappointing economic performances in the lands of Islam. This paper starts from a critical examination of the thesis of Bernard Lewis according to which the lack of separation between religion and politics creates particular difficulties on the way to modern economic growth in these lands. It is argued that (1) Lewis’ thesis conceals the critical fact that, even when political and religious functions appear to be merged, religion is the handmaiden rather than the master of politics; (2) the influence of religion increases when the state falls into crisis, owing to its impotence or excessive absolutism; (3) because the Islamic frame of reference provides political rulers with a cheap default option when they are contested, they rarely undertake the much-needed reforms of the country’s institutions; (4) this way of escape is all the more attractive to contested rulers as Islamist movements, born of the internal situation as well as of the international environment, accuse them of un-Islamic behaviour. An obscurantist deadlock is thereby created, which is aggravated by the inability of major Western countries to take an enlightened route in dealing with major issues confronting Middle Eastern countries.religion, political manipulation, ideology, Islam, fundamentalism

Political Instrumentalisation of Islam, Persistent Autocracies, and Obscurantist Deadlock

The empirical literature has established a strong link between the fact of being a Muslim-dominated country and indicators of political performance and democracy. This suggests the possible existence of a relation between religion, Islam in this instance, and societal characteristics. Bernard Lewis and others have actually argued the case for such a relation, pointing to aspects of the Islamic religion and culture that make the advent of democracy especially difficult. These arguments fall into the general idea of the Clash of civilisations put forward by Samuel Huntington. In this paper, we discuss this sort of argument and show that there is a systematic misconception about the true nature of the relationship between Islam and politics: far from being merged into the religious realm, politics tends to dominate religion. Because of the particular characteristics of Is-lam, namely, the lack of a centralised religious authority structure and the great variability of interpretations of the Islamic law, there is a risk of an obscurantist deadlock in the form of a vicious process whereby both the ruler and his political opponents try to outbid each other by using the religious idiom. This risk looms particularly large in crisis situations accentuated by international factors.

Allocating and Enforcing Property Rights in Land: Informal versus Formal Mechanisms in Subsaharan Africa

The standard view of economists is that formalisation of private rights in land is a prerequisite of economic growth, especially so in conditions of acute population pressure and agricultutal commercialisation. That stage has been reached in many regions of the African continent, hence the recommendation that land rights be duly registered by a central authority acting on behalf of the state. An alternative view, more prevalent among social scientists, claims that, far from being bypassed by evolving scarcity circumstances, the informal (customary) land tenure system is capable of adjusting itself to the needs of a modern agriculture while at the same time ensuring a more equitable access to land for those whose livelihood narrowly depends upon it. This paper aims at assessing these two views by carefully looking at the arguments advanced by their respective upholders as well as by taking stock of the most recent empirical evidence available to test their validity. It will be shown that the first view is not as solidly grounded as it may seem at first sight, yet the second view must be duly qualified to allow for serious inter-community failures of the 'indigenous order' solution.

Transformation of the Family under Rising Land Pressure: A Theoretical Essay

If we understand well the individualization of land tenure rules under conditions of growing land scarcity and increased market integration, much less is known about the mode of evolution of the farm-cum-family units possessing the land. Inspired by first-hand evidence from West Africa, this paper argues that these units undergo the same process of individualization governed by the same forces as property rights in land. It provides a simple theoretical account of the coexistence of different forms of family when farms are heterogenous in land endowments and technology is stagnant. The paper also offers analytical insights into the sequence following which such forms succeed each other.patriarchal family, land division, Africa

The Effect of Land Scarcity on Farm Structure: Empirical Evidence from Mali

We analyze the individualization of farm units in Mali in the sense of a transformation of purely collective farms into mixed units in which private plots coexist with collective fields. While a moral-hazard-in-team problem plagues production on the latter, a dilemma arises insofar as the household head extracts his income form it. The head thus faces a trade-off between efficiency and capture. We show, within the framework of a patriarchal farm household model, that the choice is tilted toward private plot as land becomes more scarce. On the basis of first hand data collected in Southern Mali, we test and confirm the above prediction. Moreover, the relationship between land scarcity and the presence of individual plots holds only when there are at least one married couple (besides the head) within the household. The explanation we put forward is that the presence or suspicion of labour-shirking on the collective field arise only when there are interferences by in-laws and differences in the size of conjugal units.

On the Feasibility of Power and Status Ranking in Traditional Setups

This paper aims at a better understanding of the conditions under which unequal rank or power positions may get permanently established through asymmetric gift exchange when a gift brings pride to the donor and shame to the recipient. Such a framework matches numerous observations reported in the sociological and anthropological literature dealing with patronage relations in traditional setups. A central result derived from our model is that an asymmetric gift exchange equilibrium can occur only if the importance attached to social shame by a recipient is smaller than that attached to social esteem by a donor. Moreover, if this (necessary) condition is fulfilled, an asymmetric gift exchange will take place only if the recipient's productivity is neither too high nor too low. Finally, the possibility of a parasitic response of the gift recipient is more likely to be observed when the donee's sensitivity to social shame is low, or when his productivity is high.Social esteem; status; power; patronage; gift exchange

Elite Capture Through Information Distortion: Uniformly Distributed Signal

Common wisdom as well as well-grounded analytical arguments suggest that stronger punishment of deviant behavior meted out by a principal typically prompts the agents to better conform with his objectives. Addressing the specific issue of donor-beneficiary relationships in the context of participatory development programs, we nevertheless show that greater tolerance on the part of donors may, under certain conditions, favor rather than hurt the interests of the poor. Also, greater uncertainty surrounding the donor's knowledge regarding the poor's preference may have the same paradoxical effect. Critical features of our framework are: (i) communities are heterogeneous and dominated by the local elite in dealing with external agencies, (ii) the elite choose the project proposed to the donor strategically, knowing that the latter has a certain amount of tolerance toward elite capture and an imperfect knowledge of the poor's priorities.community-driven development, aid effectiveness, elite capture, corruption, preference targeting.

Transformation of the Family under Rising Land Pressure: A Theoretical Essay

If we understand well the individualization of land tenure rules under conditions of growing land scarcity and increased market integration, much less is known about the mode of evolution of the farm-cum-family units possessing the land. Inspired by first-hand evidence from West Africa, this paper argues that these units undergo the same process of individualization governed by the same forces as property rights in land. It provides a simple theoretical account of the coexistence of different forms of family when farms are heterogenous in land endowments and technology is stagnant. The paper also offers analytical insights into the sequence following which such forms succeed each other.