Labor Market Institutions, Wages and Investment

Labor market institutions, via their effect on the wage structure, affect the investmentdecisions of firms in labor markets with frictions. This observation helps explain rising wageinequality in the US, but a relatively stable wage structure in Europe in the 1980s. Thesedifferent trends are the result of different investment decisions by firms for the jobs typicallyheld by less skilled workers. Firms in Europe have more incentives to invest in less skilledworkers, because minimum wages or union contracts mandate that relatively high wages haveto be paid to these workers. I report some empirical evidence for investments in training andphysical capital across the Atlantic, which is roughly in line with this theoretical reasoning.Frictional labor markets, human capital, changes in wage inequality

Individual income, incomplete information, and aggregate consumption

In this paper I study a model of life-cycle consumption in which individuals react optimally to their own income process but ignore economy wide information. Since individual income is less persistent than aggregate income consumers will react too little to aggregate income variation. Aggregate consumption will be excessively smooth. Since aggregate information is slowly incorporated into consumption, aggregate consumption will be autocorrelated and correlated with lagged income. The second part of the paper provides empirical evidence on individual and aggregate income processes and calibrates the model using the estimated parameters. The mode predictions roughly correspond to the empirical findings for aggregate consumption data. Allowing for the existence of measurement error in micro income, durables, finite lifetimes of consumers, and advance information improves the predictions of the model. --

Labor Market Institutions, Wages and Investment

Labor market institutions, via their effect on the wage structure, affect the investment decisions of firms in labor markets with frictions. This observation helps explain rising wage inequality in the US, but a relatively stable wage structure in Europe in the 1980s. These different trends are the result of different investment decisions by firms for the jobs typically held by less-skilled workers. Firms in Europe have more incentives to invest in less-skilled workers, because minimum wages or union contracts mandate that relatively high wages have to be paid to these workers. I report some empirical evidence for investments in training and physical capital across the Atlantic, which is roughly in line with this theoretical reasoning.frictional labor markets, human capital, changes in wage inequality

Assimilation and the earnings of guestworkers in Germany

Unlike prototype immigration countries, Germany has attracted a large number of southern Europeans as temporary guestworkers in the 60s and 70s. Nevertheless, many of them have stayed on and intend to remain in Germany. I investigate whether these workers have become successfully integrated into the German labormarket as reflected by their earnings. Analyzing data from the Socioeconomic Panel for the 80s I find that guestworkers earn 20 to 25 percent less than Germans but their earnings do not seem to catch up to the overall mean. This is due to the fact that the guestworkers are almost entirely confined to blue collar positions. Among blue collar workers there is little noticable difference between the earnings of Germans and foreigners. --

Labor Market Institutions, Wages, and Investment

Labor market institutions, via their effect on the wage structure, affect the investment decisions of firms in labor markets with frictions. This observation helps explain rising wage inequality in the US, but a relatively stable wage structure in Europe in the 1980s. These different trends are the result of different investment decisions by firms for the jobs typically held by less skilled workers. Firms in Europe have more incentives to invest in less skilled workers, because minimum wages or union contracts mandate that relatively high wages have to be paid to these workers. I report some empirical evidence for investments in training and physical capital across the Atlantic, which is roughly in line with this theoretical reasoning.