Black markets for foreign exchange, real exchange rates, and inflation : overnight versus gradual reform in sub-Saharan Africa

The black market foreign exchange premium is an important implicit tax on exports, creating a conflict between the fiscal goal of financing government spending with a limited menu of tax instruments and the allocative goal of stimulating exports. In this paper, the premium is solved for in a model that includes the portfolio balance approach to exchange rates, dual exchange markets, and seignorage for financing the fiscal deficit. The steady state and dynamic implications for inflation of floats as a vehicle for unifying official and black market rates are then analyzed. Inflation could rise substantially in the new steady state as the lost revenue from exports is replaced with a higher tax on money. Further, the conditions under which undershooting or overshooting occur are parameterized. The paper is motivated by and illustrated with recent examples from sub - Saharan Africa.Markets and Market Access,Economic Theory&Research,Economic Stabilization,Environmental Economics&Policies,Public Sector Economics&Finance

Public debt in developing countries : has the market-based model worked?

Over the past 25 years, significant levels of public debt and external finance are more likely to have enhanced macroeconomic vulnerability than economic growth in developing countries. This applies not just to countries with a history of high inflation and past default, but also to those in East Asia, with a long tradition of prudent macroeconomic policies and rapid growth. The authors examine why with the help of a conceptual framework drawn from the growth, capital flows, and crisis literature for developing countries with access to the international capital markets (market access countries or MACs). They find that, while the chances of another generalized debt crisis have receded since the turbulence of the late 1990s, sovereign debt is indeed constraining growth in MACs, especially those with debt sustainability problems. Several prominent MACs have sought to address the debt and external finance problem by generating large primary fiscal surpluses, switching to flexible exchange rates, and reforming fiscal and financial institutions. Such country-led initiatives completely dominate attempts to overhaul the international financial architecture or launch new lending instruments, which have so far met with little success. While the initial results of the countries'initiatives have been encouraging, serious questions remain about the viability of the model of market-based external development finance. Beyond crisis resolution, which has received attention in the form of the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, the international financial institutions may need to ramp up their role as providers of stable long-run development finance to MACs instead of exiting from them.

Managing financial integration and capital mobility -- policy lessons from the past two decades

The accumulated experience of emerging markets over the past two decades has laid bare the tenuous links between external financial integration and faster growth, on the one hand, and the proclivity of such integration to fuel costly crises on the other. These crises have not gone without learning. During the 1990s and 2000s, emerging markets converged to the middle ground of the policy space defined by the macroeconomic trilemma, with growing financial integration, controlled exchange rate flexibility, and proactive monetary policy. The OECD countries moved much faster toward financial integration, embracing financial liberalization, opting for a common currency in Europe, and for flexible exchange rates in other OECD countries. Following their crises of 1997-2001, emerging markets added financial stability as a goal, self-insured by building up international reserves, and adopted a public finance approach to financial integration. The global crisis of 2008-2009, which originated in the financial sector of advanced economies, meant that the OECD"overshot"the optimal degree of financial deregulation while the remarkable resilience of the emerging markets validated their public finance approach to financial integration. The story is not over: with capital flowing in droves to emerging markets once again, history could repeat itself without dynamic measures to manage capital mobility as part of a comprehensive prudential regulation effort.Debt Markets,Emerging Markets,Currencies and Exchange Rates,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research

Russia 1998 Revisited: Lessons for Financial Globalization

In 1998, the Russian Federation experienced one of the most severe emerging market crises of the 1997–2001 period. It occurred less than six months after the attainment of single-digit inflation, which was supposed to launch the economy onto a sustainable growth path. This note sets out why that occurred and discusses the lessons learned.Russia, globalization, crisis, inflation, currency, ruble, 1998, savings, financial market, soviet

Financial globalization and the Russian crisis of 1998

Russia had more-or-less completed the privatization of its manufacturing and natural resource sectors by the end of 1997. And in February 1998, the annual inflation rate at last dipped into the single digits. Privatization should have helped with stronger micro-foundations for growth. The conquest of inflation should have cemented macroeconomic credibility, lowered real interest rates, and spurred investment. Instead, Russia suffered a massivepublic debt-exchange rate-banking crisis just six months later, in August 1998. In showing how this turn of events unfolded, the authors focus on the interaction among Russia's deteriorating fiscal fundamentals, its weak micro-foundations of growth and financial globalization. They argue that the expectation of a large official bailout in the final 10 weeks before the meltdown played an important role, with Russia's external debt increasing by $16 billion or 8 percent of post-crisis gross domestic product during this time. The lessons and insights extracted from the 1998 Russian crisis are of general applicability, oil and geopolitics notwithstanding. These include a discussion of when financial globalization might actually hurt and a cutoff in market access might actually help; circumstances in which an official bailout could backfire; and why financial engineering tends to fail when fiscal solvency problems are present.Debt Markets,Emerging Markets,Banks&Banking Reform,Access to Finance,Currencies and Exchange Rates

India : why fiscal adjustment now

India's growth performance has been impressive over the last two decades. But its sustainability has been in question, first with the 1991 fiscal-balance of payments crisis (BoP), and then again after 1997/98, when fiscal deficits returned to the 10 percent of GDP range and government debt grew. This paper analyzes the deterioration in India's public finances and presents evidence suggesting that, in the absence of a fiscal adjustment, low inflation and high reserves may have been pursued at the expense of long-run growth and poverty reduction. Resolving this inflation-external vulnerability-growth policy trilemma requires fiscal adjustment. In making its case, the paper shows, first, that fiscal fundamentals have weakened after 1997/98 even when compared with the pre-1991 crisis period. This has continued in spite of the recent record lows in interest rates. Second, the fiscal stance is not conducive to long-run growth and poverty reduction because capital spending has been cut to accommodate higher interest payments and other current spending, with expenditures on the social sectors stagnating. Third, without a fiscal adjustment, the debt burden is likely to reach unmanageable levels by the end of the Tenth Plan period. In contrast, a phased adjustment beginning now and focusing on a relatively small set of reforms is likely to improve debt dynamics substantially over the same horizon, while also promoting faster growth and poverty reduction.Banks&Banking Reform,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Stabilization,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Environmental Economics&Policies

Managing Volatility and Crises: A Practitioner's Guide Overview

This overview introduces and summarizes the findings of a practical volume on managing volatility and crises. The interest in these topics stems from the growing recognition that non-linearities tend to magnify the impact of economic volatility leading to large output and economic growth costs, especially in poor countries. In these circumstances, good times do not offset the negative impact of bad times, leading to permanent negative effects. Such asymmetry is often reinforced by incomplete markets, sovereign risk, divisive politics, inefficient taxation, procyclical fiscal policy and weak financial market institutions factors that are more problematic in developing countries. The same fundamental phenomena that make it difficult to cope with volatility also drive crises. Hence, the volume also focuses on the prevention and management of crises. It is a user-friendly compilation of empirical and policy results aimed at development policy practitioners divided into three modules: (i) the basics of volatility and its impact on growth and poverty; (ii) managing volatility along thematic lines, including financial sector and commodity price volatility; and (iii) management and prevention of macroeconomic crises, including a cross-country study, lessons from the debt defaults of the 1980s and 1990s and case studies on Argentina and Russia.

Ownership and corporate control in Poland : why state firms defied the odds

Survey results in Poland indicate that hard budgets and import comeption can spur state firms to adjust even when privatization lags behind. As they examine the underpinning of Polish reform, the authors address the key question of why managers instigated such adjustment. They examine how corporate ownership and control influence the behavior of state firms, as illuminated by the following survey findings and conclusions: (a) Contrary to expectations, state firms took painful adjustment measures. Enterprise managers firmly believed that privatization was coming. This belief led them to manage better, not worse; a private sector based economy means a market for managers and a premium on skilled management. (b) The excess wage tax (the much criticized"Popiwek"scheme) did restrain wage-setting behavior, judging from the wage-setting equations presented by the authors. (c) Essential to the good performance of state industries is an end to open-ended subsidies. Subsidies, rather than helping firms adjust, give them incentives to continue their past behavior and destroy any mechanism of control other claim-holders might have. (d) Commercial banks, the Polish experience shows, can be made to exercise governance over state firms. Without effective takeover mechanisms, withholding funds is their most powerful instrument. That instrument is made powerless if firms, pressured to adjust by banks, can turn to the government themselves. Banks themselves started to respond appropriately- and to play a powerful role in discipline enterprises - only after their own governance and control/incentive mechanisms had been reformed as part of the banking reforms of the fourth quarter of 1991.Economic Theory&Research,Municipal Financial Management,Environmental Economics&Policies,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Banks&Banking Reform

India rising - faster growth, lower indebtedness

Over the past 25 years, India's economy grew at an average real rate of close to 6 percent, with growth rates in recent years accelerating to 9 percent. Yet by 2005-06, the general government debt-to-GDP ratio was 34 percentage points higher than in the 1980s. The authors examine the links between public finances and growth in the post-1991 period. They argue that the main factor in the deterioration of government debt dynamics after the mid-1990s was a reform-induced loss in trade, customs, and financial repression taxes. Over time, these very factors plus lower entry barriers have contributed to stronger microfoundations for growth by increasing competition and hardening budget constraints for firms and financial sector institutions. The authors suggest that the impressive growth acceleration of the past few years, which is now lowering government indebtedness, can be attributed to the lagged effects of these factors, which have taken time to attain a critical mass in view of India's gradual reforms. Similarly, the worsening of public finances during the late 1990s can be attributed to the cumulative effects of tax losses, the negative growth effects of cuts in capital expenditure that were made to offset the tax losses, and a pullback in private investment (hence, growth and taxes), a situation which is now turning around. Insufficient capital expenditures have contributed to the infrastructure gap, which is seen as a constraint especially for rapid growth in manufacturing. The authors discuss ongoing reforms in revenue mobilization and fiscal adjustment at the state level, which if successfully implemented, will result in a better alignment of public finances with growth by generating further fiscal space for infrastructure and other development spending.Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Investment and Investment Climate,Public Sector Economics&Finance,External Debt

Financial Sector Ups and Downs and the Real Sector: Up by the stairs, down by the parachute

We examine how financial expansion and contraction cycles affect the broader economy through their impact on real economic sectors in a panel of countries over 1960–2005. Periods of accelerated growth of the financial sector are more likely to be followed by abrupt financial contractions than are periods of slower financial sector growth. Sharp fluctuations in the financial sector have strongly asymmetric effects, with the majority of real sectors adversely affected by contractions, but not helped by expansions. The adverse effects of financial contractions are transmitted almost exclusively through the financial openness channel, with precautionary foreign exchange reserve holdings serving as a key buffer.