When the Predictive Brain Meets the Hard Problem of Consciousness

When we say that a theory is able to account for our subjective experience, we only mean that this theory implies (i.e., predicts) that our subjective experience is indeed as it is. Several thought experiments suggest that current theories are unable to make such predictions. For example, if we had never seen the colour red in our life, these theories would not allow us to deduce (i.e., predict) what the colour red looks like. This well-known problem is often called the hard problem of consciousness (HPC). In this paper, we address this problem through the lens of the epistemological hypothesis. Under the epistemological hypothesis, the HPC no longer reflects the inability of our theories to predict first- person observations; it reflects our inability to deduce what these theories imply regarding first-person observations. The HPC then becomes an epistemological problem: If we are unable to deduce what a theory implies regarding first-person observations, how can we know whether a theory is able to account for first-person observations? The purpose of the current paper is to develop a method for solving this epistemological problem. We implement this method in the theoretical framework of predictive processing (PP)

"Unique system" approach of (meta)cognition

Il existe aujourd’hui un large consensus sur le fait que le système cognitif est capabled’avoir des activités sur lui-même, on parle de métacognition. Si plusieurs travaux se sontintéressés aux mécanismes qui sous-tendent cette métacognition, à notre connaissance,aucun ne l’a fait dans une perspective « sensorimotrice et intégrative » du fonctionne-ment cognitif comme celle que nous proposons. Ainsi, la thèse que nous défendons dansce travail est la suivante : l’information métacognitive, notamment la fluence, possèdestrictement le même statut que l’information cognitive (i.e., sensorielle et motrice). Dansun premier chapitre, nous proposons un modèle de la cognition respectant ce principe.Ensuite, dans les deux chapitres suivants, nous mettons à l’épreuve notre hypothèse parle biais d’expériences et de simulations effectuées à l’aide du modèle mathématique quenous avons élaboré. Ces travaux ont porté plus précisément sur des phénomènes liés à troispossibilités originales prédites par notre hypothèse : la possibilité de méta-métacognition,la possibilité d’intégration entre information sensorielle et information métacognitive, etla possibilité d’abstraction métacognitive.There is today a broad consensus that the cognitive system is capable of having acti-vities on itself, we are talking about metacognition. Although several studies have focusedon the mechanisms underlying this metacognition, to our knowledge, none has done so ina "sensorimotor and integrative" perspective of cognitive functioning such as the one wepropose. Thus, the thesis we defend in this work is the following : metacognitive infor-mation, especially fluency, has strictly the same status as any cognitive information (i.e.,sensory and motor). In a first chapter, we propose a model of cognition respecting thisprinciple. Then, in the next two chapters, we test our hypothesis through experimentsand simulations using the mathematical model we have developed. This work focusedmore specifically on phenomena related to three original possibilities predicted by ourhypothesis : the possibility of meta-metacognition, the possibility of integration betweensensory information and metacognitive information, and the possibility of metacognitiveabstraction

Effect of an unrelated fluent action on word recognition: a case of motor discrepancy

International audienceIt is now well established that motor fluency affects cognitive processes, including memory. In two experiments participants learned a list of words and then performed a recognition task. The original feature of our procedure is that before judging the words they had to perform a fluent gesture (i.e., typing a letter dyad). The dyads comprised letters located on either the right or left side of the keyboard. Participants typed dyads with their right or left index finger; the required movement was either very small (dyad composed of adjacent letters, Experiment 1) or slightly larger (dyad composed of letters separated by one key, experiment 2). The results show that when the gesture was performed in the ipsilateral space the probability of recognizing a word increased (to a lesser extent it is the same with the dominant hand, experiment 2). Moreover, a binary regression logistic highlighted that the probability of recognizing a word was proportional to the speed by which the gesture was performed. These results are discussed in terms of a feeling of familiarity emerging from motor discrepancy

Modeling an enactivist multiple-trace memory. ATHENA: A fractal model of human memory

International audienceGlobal-matching models of memory argue that knowledge emerges from the interaction between presented cues and traces of past experiences. But these models generally rely on the use of independent episodic traces, unable to account for global interactions between learned situations (see Versace et al., 2009). Enactivism (Varela, 1993) could theoretically take advantage of an inter-dependent processing of traces to account for abstraction processing using only sensorimotor covariances (Hutto & Myin, 2012), but no mathematical formalization of an enactivist memory has yet been proposed. In this paper, we propose the ATHENA model as an enactivist mathematical formalization of Act-In theories (Versace et al., 2014) within MINERVA2 (Hintzman, 1986) non-specific traces: ATHENA is a fractal model which keeps track of former processes that led to the emergence of knowledge, and is therefore able to process contextual processes (abstraction manipulation). We present three simulations designed to test ATHENA’s ability to construct, learn, and manipulate emergent abstractions

Does banana spontaneously activate yellow color? Color-related concepts help with color discrimination

Color is a critical part of objects representation as well as critical cue for re cognizing objects. However, it is less clear how people represent color in memory. The present study aimed at investigating this issue . We designed a procedure based on short - term sensory memory load procedure mixed with a color - priming paradigm. Participants learn ed three visual stimuli (either non - words – lexical load condition - or visual - shapes – visual - shape load condition). Then, they perform ed a color discrimination task on colored patch (e.g., a yellow patch) . Each target was preceded by a color - related concept word either congruent (e.g., word “banana”) or not (e.g., word “lettuce”). Finally, they performed a recognition task either on non - words or on visual - shapes depending on the memory load condition) . We showe d that color - priming effect was selectively disrupted in visual - shape load condition. We interpreted this finding as a n evidence that automatic modal simulations occur during access to the meaning of color – related concept

A Phelipanche ramosa KAI2 protein perceives strigolactones and isothiocyanates enzymatically

International audiencePhelipanche ramosa is an obligate root-parasitic weed that threatens major crops in central Europe. In order to germinate, it must perceive various structurally divergent host-exuded signals, including isothiocyanates (ITCs) and strigolactones (SLs). However, the receptors involved are still uncharacterized. Here, we identify five putative SL receptors in P. ramosa and show that PrKAI2d3 is involved in the stimulation of seed germination. We demonstrate the high plasticity of PrKAI2d3, which allows it to interact with different chemicals, including ITCs. The SL perception mechanism of PrKAI2d3 is similar to that of endogenous SLs in non-parasitic plants. We provide evidence that PrKAI2d3 enzymatic activity confers hypersensitivity to SLs. Additionally, we demonstrate that methylbutenolide-OH binds PrKAI2d3 and stimulates P. ramosa germination with bioactivity comparable to that of ITCs. This study demonstrates that P. ramosa has extended its signal perception system during evolution, a fact that should be considered for the development of specific and efficient biocontrol methods