Judgment

To judge, in Latin judicare, is to say the law, jus dicere, whence juris-dictio. The above sentence is a possible answer to the question: what is judging? It spells out what the word to judge says, by recalling the history from which the word originates. Why would anyone ask this question? How helpful is such an answer? Everyone knows what it is to judge. Only on the ground of such self-evidence could there be that unabating debate on the \u27 justification of particular judgments, which is the day to day business of lawyering. Only because the question can be passed over can there be controversy regarding the forms and limits of adjudication in general, a preoccupation without which jurisprudence would seem to lose its main occupation. Why ask the question? Precisely because the matter is self-evident. As soon as we examine it a little, confusion begins to set in all over. Monsieur Jourdain likely would be flattered if he knew that logicians employ the word \u27Judgment in its widest sense to designate propositions of all kinds: He has been judging all along, and therefore knows already how to do it. Even Kant follows this usage when he says that we can reduce all acts of the understanding to judgments, and goes on to propose a table that classifies all possible forms of judment into four groups of three (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, * A 67- pages of the same star editions). Could it be that almost all speaking is a saying of law? A little later in the same treatise, however, Kant restricts the sense of \u27Judgment to the act of subsuming under rules, that is, of distinguishing whether something falls under a given rule or not (casus datae legis) (id. A 132-34, B 171-74). This sense is borrowed from lawyerly usage, not from logic, for, as Kant shows, logic has nothing to say regarding this operation. There are, and there can be, no rules regarding the application of rules. If Kant is right, a sizable part of what we take to be law, and almost all jurisprudence, are nothing but a futile striving to overcome this essential unruliness of judgment. How can it be that the saying of law is lawless

How European Union Membership Can Undermine the Rule of Law in Emerging Democracies

The European Union views the spread of economic prosperity and rule of law to countries emerging from dictatorship as among its primary goals when considering countries as candidates for membership. Existing literature often suggests that EU membership confers significant benefits on the accession countries, and these countries are willing to undergo costly and difficult reforms to reap these benefits. Through strict membership conditions, member states force accession countries to commit to democracy. Drawing on theoretical work in the fields of law, politics, and economics, this article reassesses the conventional wisdom. It argues that, under certain conditions, the reforms required of would-be members could have the perverse effect of undermining the establishment of legitimate law in transitional democracies. Using an agent-based model, the article elucidates a theory in which placing laws on the books around which no societal consensus exists can create perverse incentives for citizens and government officials and may lead to an erosion of the rule of law

The Local Role in Homeland Security

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/73848/1/j.1540-5893.2005.00236.x.pd

Hukum responsif : pilihan di mas transisi = law & society in transition : toward responsive law

xi, 96 h

Hukum Responsif; pilihan dimasa transisi

xi.; 96 hal.; ill.; 19 c

Hukum responsif

viii, 176 p. ; 20,5 cm

Administrative justice : advocacy and change in a government agency /

Includes bibliographical references