Ockham on Memory and Double Intentionality

Ockham developed two theories to explain the intentionality of memory: one theory that takes previously perceived things to be the objects of memory, and another that takes one’s own earlier acts of perceiving to be the objects of memory. This paper examines both theories, paying particular attention to the reasons that motivated Ockham to give up the first theory in favor of the second. It argues that the second theory is to be understood as a theory of double intentionality. At the core of this theory is the thesis that one directly remembers one’s own acts, and indirectly also the objects of these acts. The paper analyzes the cognitive mechanism that makes this double intentionality possible and examines the causal account that Ockham gave for explaining the emergence of acts of remembering. It emphasizes that he accepted nothing more than a causal chain of acts and habits, thereby offering an ontologically parsimonious theory of memory.Peer Reviewe

Can We Know Substances? Suárez on a Sceptical Puzzle

It has often been said that the knowability of substances became a problem in the early modern period, when anti-Aristotelians doubted that we could know anything more than the sensory qualities that are present to us. This article argues that the late scholastic Aristotelian Francisco Suárez was already aware of this sceptical problem. On his view, substances are really (and not just modally) distinct from the perceivable qualities, and therefore cannot be known through sense perception. The article first examines the metaphysical theory that motivated him to defend this thesis. It then looks at the epistemological consequences he drew from it. Though he rejected direct knowledge of substances, he nevertheless conceded that knowledge can be obtained through a “discursive process”. The article explores this process, spelling out all the cognitive steps it involves. In particular, it analyses Suárez's explanation of how we produce special cognitive devices (the “intelligible species”) that enable us to represent substances. Finally, it assesses Suárez's solution to the knowability problem by comparing it to Locke's solution. It argues that metaphysical rationalism led him to posit substances: we need to accept them as active causes and bearers of qualities, although we have no direct access to them.Peer Reviewe

Emotions and cognitions

Medieval philosophers clearly recognized that emotions are not simply "raw feelings" but complex mental states that include cognitive components. They analyzed these components both on the sensory and on the intellectual level, paying particular attention to the different types of cognition that are involved. This paper focuses on William Ockham and Adam Wodeham, two fourteenth-century authors who presented a detailed account of "sensory passions" and "volitional passions". It intends to show that these two philosophers provided both a structural and a functional analysis of emotions, i.e., they explained the various elements constituting emotions and delineated the causal relations between these elements. Ockham as well as Wodeham emphasized that "sensory passions" are not only based upon cognitions but include a cognitive component and are therefore intentional. In addition, they pointed out that "volitional passions" are based upon a conceptualization and an evaluation of given objects. This cognitivist approach to emotions enabled them to explain the complex phenomenon of emotional conflict, a phenomenon that has its origin in the co-presence of various emotions that involve conflicting evaluations.Peer Reviewe

Is an Analytical Geistesgeschichte Possible? Four Theses

Wie ist es möglich, philosophische Texte analytisch zu erschließen, gleichzeitig aber auch historisch zu kontextualisieren und dadurch analytische Geistesgeschichte zu betreiben? Der Text beantwortet diese Frage, indem er vier Thesen vorstellt. (1) Gemäß der Nominalismus-These müssen einzelne Texte, nicht etwa allgemeine Strömungen oder Ideen, in den Blick genommen werden. (2) Die Relationismus-These besagt, dass diese Texte stets zu anderen Texten in ihrem historischen Kontext in Beziehung zu setzen sind. (3) Die Multiperspektivismus-These betont, dass Texte in verschiedenen Kontexten zu berücksichtigen sind, sodass unterschiedliche Arten von Relationen deutlich werden. (4) Schließlich fordert die Historiographie-These, dass neben den Texten auch die Interpretationsschemata kritisch geprüft werden. Alle vier Thesen werden mit Bezug auf Texte der mittelalterlichen Philosophie erläutert.How is it possible to investigate philosophical texts analytically, but simultaneously to contextualize them historically and thus to pursue an analytic Geistesgeschichte? The following contribution answers this question in four theses: (1) According to the Nominalism-Thesis, individual texts as opposed to general trends or ideas are to be attended to. (2) The Relationism-Thesis holds that these texts are always to be related to other texts within their historical context. (3) The Multi-Perspectivism-Thesis emphasizes the fact that texts in various contexts are to be considered so that different kinds of relation become clear. (4) Finally, the Historiography-Thesis requires that in addition to the texts themselves interpretive schemata are also to be critically examined. All four theses are explicated with reference to medieval philosophy.Peer Reviewe

Cecilia Muratori / Burkhard Dohm (Eds.), Ethical Perspectives on Animals in the Renaissance and Early Modern Period. (Micrologus’ Library, 55.) Firenze, SISMEL – Edizioni del Galluzzo 2013

Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG-geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz frei zugänglich.Peer Reviewe

Was ist eine Person?

Leibniz holds that we cannot give an account of the synchronic and diachronic identity of a person without appealing to a substance. This paper analyses his reasons for this anti-Lockean thesis. It first looks at his theory of substance, paying particular attention to his commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason: the existence of a well-ordered series of mental states cannot be sufficiently explained without reference to a substance. The paper then examines the distinction Leibniz draws between the substance as the “real person” and the “appearing person” that comes into existence through reflexive consciousness. It argues that there can be no appearing person without a real person and looks at the relationship between these two types of person. Leibniz’s distinction is still relevant because it shows that questions concerning the metaphysical constitution of a person need to be carefully distinguished from questions concerning the psychological construction of a personality.Peer Reviewe

Theories in Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy and Medicine

This paper discusses theories of memory as developed by philosophers and medical writers from Graeco-Roman antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Early Modern period. While philosophers had much to say on the nature of memory and recollection, their epistemo- logical role and their relationship to other functions of the soul, medical writers concen- trated on the anatomy, physiology, pathology and indeed the therapeutics of memory and recollection. Yet the close relationship between philosophical and medical approaches was most clearly visible in discussions about the bodily location of memory, where theoretical concepts of the hierarchy of faculties of the soul were connected with clinical observations of memory failure as a result of injury or disease

The Many Virtues of Second Nature : Habitus in Latin Medieval Philosophy

This chapter consists of a systematic introduction to the nature and function of habitus in Latin medieval philosophy. Over the course of this introduction, several topics are treated: the theoretical necessity to posit habitus; their nature; their causal contribution to the production of internal and external acts; how and why habitus can grow and decay; what makes their unity when they can have multiple objects and work in clusters. Finally we examine two specific questions: why intellectual habitus represent a special case that triggered considerable debate; how human beings can be said to be free if their actions are determined by moral habitus

Duns Scotus on Signification

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