10 research outputs found
Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty
The literature has demonstrated that second-price common-value auctions
are sensitive to the presence of asymmetries among bidders. In a
two-bidder model, Bikhchandai [1988. Reputation in repeated
second-price auctions. J. Econ. Theory 46, 97-119] has shown that if it
is common knowledge that one bidder has a disadvantage compared to her
opponent, that bidder (almost surely) never wins the auction. Employing
a similar two-bidder model, this paper shows that this result does not
carry over when one allows for two-sided uncertainty. In such case, in
every equilibrium, the disadvantaged type bidder needs to win the
auction with strictly positive probability. We then solve for the
equilibria in two cases, one with two types and another with a continuum
of types, and we show that they converge to the symmetric equilibria of
the corresponding symmetric auctions. We thus reestablish a lost linkage
in the analysis of common-value and almost-common-value auctions. (c)
2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved
Estimation of the buyer's contract space incorporating learning from experience techniques to the seller's rationale in E-commerce context
An Efficient Negotiation Strategy in E-Commerce Context Based on Simple Ranking Mechanism
The Reliability of Certification: Quality Labels as a Consumer Policy Tool
Given the large number of certification systems in the food industry, it is surprising that there are only a few research approaches to the economics of certification. Certification schemes are used to ensure marketing claims for unobservable quality attributes. Under asymmetric information, process-oriented quality characteristics such as organic farming, animal welfare, or fair trade raise the question of mislabelling. In the long run, only a reliable control procedure can reduce the risk of food scandals. The article presents a model which includes several starting points to enhance the efficiency of certification systems and the corresponding labels. On the whole, tendencies towards price wars on the certification market and considerable differences in performance reveal the necessity of institutional changes. Strategies for reducing auditors’ dependence, intensifying liability, increasing reputation effects, and minimizing audit costs are suggested. Finally, policy implications for public and private monitoring are discussed. Copyright Springer 2005