The communication of first-person thoughts

A discussion of Frege's views concerning the meaning of 'I' and his distinction between the 'I' of soliloquy and the 'I' of conversation

Ambiguous figures and the content of experience

Representationalism is the position that the phenomenal character of an experience is either identical with, or supervenes on, the content of that experience. Many representationalists hold that the relevant content of experience is nonconceptual. I propose a counterexample to this form of representationalism that arises from the phenomenon of Gestalt switching, which occurs when viewing ambiguous figures. First, I argue that one does not need to appeal to the conceptual content of experience or to judgements to account for Gestalt switching. I then argue that experiences of certain ambiguous figures are problematic because they have different phenomenal characters but that no difference in the nonconceptual content of these experiences can be identified. I consider three solutions to this problem that have been proposed by both philosophers and psychologists and conclude that none can account for all the ambiguous figures that pose the problem. I conclude that the onus is on representationalists to specify the relevant difference in content or to abandon their position

Peacocke’s Principle-Based Account of Modality: “Flexibility of Origins” Plus S4

Due to the influence of Nathan Salmon’s views, endorsement of the “flexibility of origins” thesis is often thought to carry a commitment to the denial of S4. This paper rejects the existence of this commitment and examines how Peacocke’s theory of the modal may accommodate flexibility of origins without denying S4. One of the essential features of Peacocke’s account is the identification of the Principles of Possibility, which include the Modal Extension Principle (MEP), and a set of Constitutive Principles. Regarding their modal status, Peacocke argues for the necessity of MEP, but leaves open the possibility that some of the Constitutive Principles be only contingently true. Here, I show that the contingency of the Constitutive Principles is inconsistent with the recursivity of MEP, and this makes the account validate S4. It is also shown that, compatibly with the necessity of the Constitutive Principles, the account can still accommodate intuitions about flexibility of origins. However, the account we end up with once those intuitions are consistently accommodated may not be satisfactory, and this opens up the debate about whether or not artefacts allow for some variation in their origins

The silence of self-knowledge

Gareth Evans famously affirmed an explanatory connection between answering the question whether p and knowing whether one believes that p. This is commonly interpreted in terms of the idea that judging that p constitutes an adequate basis for the belief that one believes that p. This paper formulates and defends an alternative, more modest interpretation, which develops from the suggestion that one can know that one believes that p in judging that p

Personal and sub-personal: a defence of Dennett's early distinction

Since 1969, when Dennett introduced a distinction between personal and sub‐personal levels of explanation, many philosophers have used ‘sub‐personal’ very loosely, and Dennett himself has abandoned a view of the personal level as genuinely autonomous. I recommend a position in which Dennett's original distinction is crucial, by arguing that the phenomenon called mental causation is on view only at the properly personal level. If one retains the commit‐’ ments incurred by Dennett's early distinction, then one has a satisfactory anti‐physicalistic, anti‐dualist philosophy of mind. It neither interferes with the projects of sub‐personal psychology, nor encourages ; instrumentalism at the personal level. People lose sight of Dennett’s personal/sub-personal distinction because they free it from its philosophical moorings. A distinction that serves a philosophical purpose is typically rooted in doctrine; it cannot be lifted out of context and continue to do its work. So I shall start from Dennett’s distinction as I read it in its original context. And when I speak of ‘the distinction’, I mean to point not only towards the terms that Dennett first used to define it but also towards the philosophical setting within which its work was cut out

Novel colours and the content of experience

I propose a counterexample to naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. The counterexample is generated by experiences of novel colours reported by Crane and Piantanida. I consider various replies that a representationalist might make, including whether novel colours could be possible colours of objects and whether one can account for novel colours as one would account for binary colours or colour mixtures. I argue that none of these strategies is successful and therefore that one cannot fully explain the nature of the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences using a naturalistic conception of representation

Planck pre-launch status: HFI beam expectations from the optical optimisation of the focal plane

Planck is a European Space Agency (ESA) satellite, launched in May 2009, which will map the cosmic microwave background anisotropies in intensity and polarisation with unprecedented detail and sensitivity. It will also provide full-sky maps of astrophysical foregrounds. An accurate knowledge of the telescope beam patterns is an essential element for a correct analysis of the acquired astrophysical data. We present a detailed description of the optical design of the High Frequency Instrument (HFI) together with some of the optical performances measured during the calibration campaigns. We report on the evolution of the knowledge of the pre-launch HFI beam patterns when coupled to ideal telescope elements, and on their significance for the HFI data analysis procedure

Really Trying or Merely Trying

We enjoy first-person authority with respect to a certain class of actions: for these actions, we know what we are doing just because we are doing it. This paper first formulates an epistemological principle that captures this authority in terms of trying to act in a way that one has the capacity to act. It then considers a case of effortful action – running a middle distance race – that threatens this principle. And proposes the solution of changing the metaphysics of action: one can keep hold of the idea that we have first-person authority over what we are doing by adopting a disjunctive account of action

AXIOM: advanced X-ray imaging of the magnetosphere

Planetary plasma and magnetic field environments can be studied in two complementary ways—by in situ measurements, or by remote sensing. While the former provide precise information about plasma behaviour, instabilities and dynamics on local scales, the latter offers the global view necessary to understand the overall interaction of the magnetospheric plasma with the solar wind. Some parts of the Earth’s magnetosphere have been remotely sensed, but the majority remains unexplored by this type of measurements. Here we propose a novel and more elegant approach employing remote X-ray imaging techniques, which are now possible thanks to the relatively recent discovery of solar wind charge exchange X-ray emissions in the vicinity of the Earth’s magnetosphere. In this article we describe how an appropriately designed and located X-ray telescope, supported by simultaneous in situ measurements of the solar wind, can be used to image the dayside magnetosphere, magnetosheath and bow shock, with a temporal and spatial resolution sufficient to address several key outstanding questions concerning how the solar wind interacts with the Earth’s magnetosphere on a global level. Global images of the dayside magnetospheric boundaries require vantage points well outside the magnetosphere. Our studies have led us to propose ‘AXIOM: Advanced X-ray Imaging of the Magnetosphere’, a concept mission using a Vega launcher with a LISA Pathfinder-type Propulsion Module to place the spacecraft in a Lissajous orbit around the Earth–Moon L1 point. The model payload consists of an X-ray Wide Field Imager, capable of both imaging and spectroscopy, and an in situ plasma and magnetic field measurement package. This package comprises a Proton-Alpha Sensor, designed to measure the bulk properties of the solar wind, an Ion Composition Analyser, to characterise the minor ion populations in the solar wind that cause charge exchange emission, and a Magnetometer, designed to measure the strength and direction of the solar wind magnetic field. We also show simulations that demonstrate how the proposed X-ray telescope design is capable of imaging the predicted emission from the dayside magnetosphere with the sensitivity and cadence required to achieve the science goals of the mission