719 research outputs found
Exorbitant Jurisdiction
Exorbitant territorial jurisdiction in civil cases comprises those classes of jurisdiction, although exercised validly under a country\u27s rules, that nonetheless are unfair to the defendant because of a lack of significant connection between the sovereign and either the parties or the dispute. The United States, France, and most of the rest of the world exercise a good deal of exorbitant jurisdiction so defined. In the United States, an emphasis on power derived from territoriality has led to jurisdictional restraint in some respects, but has also allowed general jurisdiction based solely on transient physical presence, the attachment of property, or extensive business activities unrelated to the cause of action. In contrast, the civil law\u27s emphasis on fairness has kept France from developing these exorbitant bases of jurisdiction, but has failed to restrain it from asserting general jurisdiction based solely on the plaintiff\u27s nationality. A number of other countries have added some wrinkles to their own brands of exorbitant jurisdiction. We conclude (1) that although the extent, details, and phrasing of the world\u27s exorbitant bases of jurisdiction differ among nations, there appears to be a common core in the nations\u27 urge to disregard defendants\u27 interests in order to give their own people a way to sue at home, if the home country will be able to enforce the resulting judgment locally, and (2) that even though exorbitant jurisdiction is thus understandable, the ultimate goal should remain its elimination by international agreement
Exorbitant Jurisdiction
Exorbitant territorial jurisdiction in civil cases comprises those classes of jurisdiction, although exercised validly under a country\u27s rules, that nonetheless are unfair to the defendant because of a lack of significant connection between the sovereign and either the parties or the dispute. The United States, France, and most of the rest of the world exercise a good deal of exorbitant jurisdiction so defined. In the United States, an emphasis on power derived from territoriality has led to jurisdictional restraint in some respects, but has also allowed general jurisdiction based solely on transient physical presence, the attachment of property, or extensive business activities unrelated to the cause of action. In contrast, the civil law\u27s emphasis on fairness has kept France from developing these exorbitant bases of jurisdiction, but has failed to restrain it from asserting general jurisdiction based solely on the plaintiff\u27s nationality. A number of other countries have added some wrinkles to their own brands of exorbitant jurisdiction. We conclude (1) that although the extent, details, and phrasing of the world\u27s exorbitant bases of jurisdiction differ among nations, there appears to be a common core in the nations\u27 urge to disregard defendants\u27 interests in order to give their own people a way to sue at home, when the forum country will be able to enforce the resulting judgment locally, and (2) that even though exorbitant jurisdiction is thus understandable, the ultimate goal should remain its elimination by international agreement
Exorbitant Jurisdiction
Exorbitant territorial jurisdiction in civil cases comprises those classes of jurisdiction, although exercised validly under a country\u27s rules, that nonetheless are unfair to the defendant because of a lack of significant connection between the sovereign and either the parties or the dispute. The United States, France, and most of the rest of the world exercise a good deal of exorbitant jurisdiction so defined. In the United States, an emphasis on power derived from territoriality has led to jurisdictional restraint in some respects, but has also allowed general jurisdiction based solely on transient physical presence, the attachment of property, or extensive business activities unrelated to the cause of action. In contrast, the civil law\u27s emphasis on fairness has kept France from developing these exorbitant bases of jurisdiction, but has failed to restrain it from asserting general jurisdiction based solely on the plaintiff\u27s nationality. A number of other countries have added some wrinkles to their own brands of exorbitant jurisdiction. We conclude (1) that although the extent, details, and phrasing of the world\u27s exorbitant bases of jurisdiction differ among nations, there appears to be a common core in the nations\u27 urge to disregard defendants\u27 interests in order to give their own people a way to sue at home, when the forum country will be able to enforce the resulting judgment locally, and (2) that even though exorbitant jurisdiction is thus understandable, the ultimate goal should remain its elimination by international agreement
French Article 14 Jurisdiction, Viewed from the United States
French courts have broadly read their Civil Code’s oddly written Article 14 as authorizing territorial jurisdiction over virtually any action brought by a plaintiff of French nationality. This study traces the history of this provision from its genesis two hundred years ago to its extension under the current Brussels Regulation.
Nevertheless, for a number of reasons, French plaintiffs do not use Article 14 all that much, other than in status suits such as matrimonial matters or in situations where the defendant has assets in France (or now, under the Brussels regime, in Europe). The actual use of Article 14 ends up being not all that different from what other countries have accomplished in other ways, such as the United States by its nonpersonal attachment jurisdiction or Germany by its property-based personal jurisdiction. Each country’s exorbitant jurisdiction constitutes a way to allow its own people to sue at home when they can enforce the judgment at home, which is usually so much easier than suing abroad.
So one could argue that, being essentially similar to all the other countries’ exorbitances, Article 14 mainly sounds bad, because it is more nationalistic in expressing who can invoke it and because it does not utilize the subterfuge of expressly linking to property in France or to any other defendant contact with France. But in fact Article 14 has more extensive effects than its limited invocation suggests, lurking in the background of numerous filed cases and threatened cases. The future poses the risk of ever more extensive pernicious effects. International conventions should therefore aim at eliminating Article 14, like any other exorbitant jurisdiction
French Article 14 Jurisdiction, Viewed from the United States
French courts have broadly read their Civil Code’s oddly written Article 14 as authorizing territorial jurisdiction over virtually any action brought by a plaintiff of French nationality. This study traces the history of this provision from its genesis two hundred years ago to its extension under the current Brussels Regulation.
Nevertheless, for a number of reasons, French plaintiffs do not use Article 14 all that much, other than in status suits such as matrimonial matters or in situations where the defendant has assets in France (or now, under the Brussels regime, in Europe). The actual use of Article 14 ends up being not all that different from what other countries have accomplished in other ways, such as the United States by its nonpersonal attachment jurisdiction or Germany by its property-based personal jurisdiction. Each country’s exorbitant jurisdiction constitutes a way to allow its own people to sue at home when they can enforce the judgment at home, which is usually so much easier than suing abroad.
So one could argue that, being essentially similar to all the other countries’ exorbitances, Article 14 mainly sounds bad, because it is more nationalistic in expressing who can invoke it and because it does not utilize the subterfuge of expressly linking to property in France or to any other defendant contact with France. But in fact Article 14 has more extensive effects than its limited invocation suggests, lurking in the background of numerous filed cases and threatened cases. The future poses the risk of ever more extensive pernicious effects. International conventions should therefore aim at eliminating Article 14, like any other exorbitant jurisdiction
Modeling the impact of surveillance activities combined with physical distancing interventions on COVID-19 epidemics at a local level
Physical distancing and contact tracing are two key components in controlling the COVID-
19 epidemics. Understanding their interaction at local level is important for policymakers.
We propose a flexible modeling framework to assess the effect of combining contact
tracing with different physical distancing strategies. Using scenario tree analyses, we
compute the probability of COVID-19 detection using passive surveillance, with and
without contact tracing, in metropolitan Barcelona. The estimates of detection probability
and the frequency of daily social contacts are fitted into an age-structured susceptible-
exposed-infectious-recovered compartmental model to simulate the epidemics consid-
ering different physical distancing scenarios over a period of 26 weeks. With the original
Wuhan strain, the probability of detecting an infected individual without implementing
physical distancing would have been 0.465, 0.515, 0.617, and 0.665 in designated age
groups (0e14, 15e49, 50e64, and >65), respectively. As the physical distancing measures
were reinforced and the disease circulation decreased, the interaction between the two
interventions resulted in a reduction of the detection probabilities; however, despite this
reduction, active contact tracing and isolation remained an effective supplement to
physical distancing. If we relied solely on passive surveillance for diagnosing COVID-19, the
model required a minimal 50% (95% credible interval, 39e69%) reduction of daily social
contacts to keep the infected population under 5%, as compared to the 36% (95% credible
interval, 22e56%) reduction with contact tracing systems. The simulation with the B.1.1.7
and B.1.167.2 strains shows similar results. Our simulations showed that a functioning
contact tracing program would reduce the need for physical distancing and mitigate the
COVID-19 epidemics.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio
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