6 research outputs found
Manipulation Strategies for the Rank Maximal Matching Problem
We consider manipulation strategies for the rank-maximal matching problem. In
the rank-maximal matching problem we are given a bipartite graph such that denotes a set of applicants and a set of posts. Each
applicant has a preference list over the set of his neighbours in
, possibly involving ties. Preference lists are represented by ranks on the
edges - an edge has rank , denoted as , if post
belongs to one of 's -th choices. A rank-maximal matching is one in which
the maximum number of applicants is matched to their rank one posts and subject
to this condition, the maximum number of applicants is matched to their rank
two posts, and so on. A rank-maximal matching can be computed in time, where denotes the number of applicants, the
number of edges and the maximum rank of an edge in an optimal solution.
A central authority matches applicants to posts. It does so using one of the
rank-maximal matchings. Since there may be more than one rank- maximal matching
of , we assume that the central authority chooses any one of them randomly.
Let be a manipulative applicant, who knows the preference lists of all
the other applicants and wants to falsify his preference list so that he has a
chance of getting better posts than if he were truthful. In the first problem
addressed in this paper the manipulative applicant wants to ensure that
he is never matched to any post worse than the most preferred among those of
rank greater than one and obtainable when he is truthful. In the second problem
the manipulator wants to construct such a preference list that the worst post
he can become matched to by the central authority is best possible or in other
words, wants to minimize the maximal rank of a post he can become matched
to