Color me honest! Time pressure and (dis)honest behavior

We introduce three modifications to the die-in-a-cup paradigm to gain novel insights into dishonest behavior under time pressure. The regular die is substituted with a custom one that has a distinct color on each side as a way of manipulating familiarity with the decision situation. The cup is substituted with a ‘dice tower' to control the randomization process. Alongside outcome data, we capture mouse cursor trajectories. Results from our preregistered laboratory experiment involving 229 subjects suggest that time pressure increases dishonesty only when the regular die is used. Mouse tracking analysis suggests that it takes more effort to be honest than to lie outright and that partial lying is most difficult

I win it’s fair, you win it’s not. Selective heeding of merit in ambiguous settings

One’s willingness to accept an outcome or even to correct it depends on whether the underlying procedure is deemed legitimate. We examine a modified version of the dictator game, where dictatorship is assigned by a fair procedure that is linked to the participant actions but in effect is completely random, to illustrate that this belief is not independent of the outcome and is self-serving in its nature. We also discuss the perceptions of fairness and merit as potential drivers of the observed behavioral phenomenon

Information, strategic behavior and learning in games: an experimental analysis

The current doctoral thesis is comprised of three distinct papers with a unifying theme of studying human behavior in strategic environments of incomplete information. Each paper considers a particular manifestation of information guiding, shaping or in some other way, affecting human behavior when the environment is not known to the fullest extent. The general contribution of this work goes to the literature that originated in the second half of the last century with the works of such prominent economists as George Akerlof, Kenneth Arrow, Michael Spence, George Stigler, and is now usually referred to as the economics of information. The first paper takes the popular perspective on information by considering it a stock variable, that is, knowledge that can be used by players as a tool to achieve certain goals. Specifically, it investigates whether knowledgeable players can be better off than their uninformed opponents in a number of repeated 2x2 games of incomplete information. The second paper considers information as a flow variable by studying the relation between the amount of payoff feedback the choice of action provides and speed with which human subjects learn to play repeated 2x2 games of incomplete information. The third paper examines information as a screening protocol. It takes the well-established notion of conditional cooperation in the public goods game framework to see how sensitive the concept itself as well as its corollaries are to the type of information used to define them in the first place. The main research method used in all three papers is that of an economic laboratory experiment. The underlying theoretical framework relies on the modeling concepts from game theory and behavioral economics. Both parametric, including regression analysis, and non-parametric methods of statistical analysis are used. The first paper also uses computer simulation techniques

Color me honest! Time pressure and (dis)honest behavior

We introduce three modifications to the die-in-a-cup paradigm to gain novel insights into dishonest behavior under time pressure. The regular die is substituted with a custom one that has a distinct color on each side as a way of manipulating familiarity with the decision situation. The cup is substituted with a ‘dice tower' to control the randomization process. Alongside outcome data, we capture mouse cursor trajectories. Results from our preregistered laboratory experiment involving 229 subjects suggest that time pressure increases dishonesty only when the regular die is used. Mouse tracking analysis suggests that it takes more effort to be honest than to lie outright and that partial lying is most difficult.ISSN:2813-529

Experimental evidence of an environmental attitude-behavior gap in high-cost situations

So far, there has been mixed evidence in the literature regarding the relationship between environmental attitudes and actual `green' actions, something known as the attitude-behavior gap. This raises the question of when attitudes can actually work as a lever to promote environmental objectives, such as climate change mitigation, and, conversely, when other factors would be more effective. This paper presents an online experiment with real money at stake and real-world consequences designed to test the effect of environmental attitudes on behavior under various conditions. We found that environmental attitudes affected behavior only in low-cost situations. This finding is consistent with the low-cost hypothesis of environmental behavior postulating that concerned individuals will undertake low-cost actions in order to reduce the cognitive dissonance  between their attitudes and rational realization of the environmental impact of their behavior but avoid higher-cost actions despite their greater potential as far as environmental protection. This finding has important consequences for the design of more effective climate policies in a democratic context as it puts limits on what can be achieved by raising environmental concern alone

Perception of the relative merits of the participants by treatment condition.

7 implies that the selected player deserves to determine the payoff outcomes more than the other, 1 implies the opposite and 4 implies that the two deserve it equally.</p

Regression results (s.e. in parentheses).

Regression results (s.e. in parentheses).</p

Data_Sheet_1_Color me honest! Time pressure and (dis)honest behavior.ZIP

We introduce three modifications to the die-in-a-cup paradigm to gain novel insights into dishonest behavior under time pressure. The regular die is substituted with a custom one that has a distinct color on each side as a way of manipulating familiarity with the decision situation. The cup is substituted with a ‘dice tower' to control the randomization process. Alongside outcome data, we capture mouse cursor trajectories. Results from our preregistered laboratory experiment involving 229 subjects suggest that time pressure increases dishonesty only when the regular die is used. Mouse tracking analysis suggests that it takes more effort to be honest than to lie outright and that partial lying is most difficult.</p

Presentation_1_Color me honest! Time pressure and (dis)honest behavior.pdf

We introduce three modifications to the die-in-a-cup paradigm to gain novel insights into dishonest behavior under time pressure. The regular die is substituted with a custom one that has a distinct color on each side as a way of manipulating familiarity with the decision situation. The cup is substituted with a ‘dice tower' to control the randomization process. Alongside outcome data, we capture mouse cursor trajectories. Results from our preregistered laboratory experiment involving 229 subjects suggest that time pressure increases dishonesty only when the regular die is used. Mouse tracking analysis suggests that it takes more effort to be honest than to lie outright and that partial lying is most difficult.</p