Political congruence between adolescence and their parents: evidence from a quasi-experimental local elections in the city of Ghent (Belgium)

Lowering the voting age is often criticized due to the alleged political immaturity of young voters, which is considered as negative for the quality of democracy. We adopt a unique approach to this issue by measuring political congruence between adolescents and their parents to ascertain whether ideological views and salient positional issues, such as attitudes on immigration, differ between different age groups in adolescence. Using a household survey in the city of Ghent (Belgium), first we compare political ideologies and attitudes toward immigration for those of age between 15 and 19, and their parents. We find that adolescent children tend to resemble the political ideologies of their parents, and they also tend to have similar attitudes about immigration. Second, we find that ideological resemblance is even higher among adolescents that regularly talk about politics with their parents. Finally, we do not find evidence that political congruence with parents differs by the age of adolescent children or their right to vote. Therefore, we conclude that political ideology and positional views are formed in an early stage of adolescence, i.e., before the age of 15. Our findings have relevance for the debate about lowering the voting age, as it points to already clearly formed ideological views and political attitudes at early stages of adolescent life.publishedVersio

Trajectories of Mental Health Problems in Childhood and Adult Voting Behaviour: Evidence from the 1970s British Cohort Study

The link between childhood mental health difficulties such as conduct problems and adult political abstention has been overlooked despite early mental health difficulties potentially resulting in political self-marginalisation. Using the1970s British Cohort Study, we estimate developmental trajectories of conduct problems (i.e., from 5 to 16 years). Logistic regression, linear probability models, and propensity score matching were then conducted to test the association between trajectory group membership and voter turnout at 30, 42, and 46 years of age. Three distinct trajectories of conduct problems were identified: a normative (n = 11,871; reference group), moderate-chronic (n = 3433), and elevated-chronic (n = 250) group. Results revealed an association between conduct problems and decreased turnout. In particular the elevated-chronic group had a decreased odds of voting of 52.2%, 52.0%, and 45.7%, as compared to the normative group at 30, 42, and 46 years respectively. The moderate-chronic group had a decreased odds of voting of 24.7% as compared to the normative group at age 30 only. Matched results and linear probability models substantiated findings, suggesting (1) the importance of considering childhood factors when examining antecedents of lifelong voting behaviour, and (2) the political self-marginalisation of people with chronic childhood conduct problems more than 3 decades later.publishedVersio

Trajectories of mental health problems in childhood and adult voting behaviour:Evidence from the 1970s British Cohort Study

The link between childhood mental health difficulties such as conduct problems and adult political abstention has been overlooked despite early mental health difficulties potentially resulting in political self-marginalisation. Using the1970s British Cohort Study, we estimate developmental trajectories of conduct problems (i.e., from 5 to 16 years). Logistic regression, linear probability models, and propensity score matching were then conducted to test the association between trajectory group membership and voter turnout at 30, 42, and 46 years of age. Three distinct trajectories of conduct problems were identified: a normative (n = 11,871; reference group), moderate-chronic (n = 3433), and elevated-chronic (n = 250) group. Results revealed an association between conduct problems and decreased turnout. In particular the elevated-chronic group had a decreased odds of voting of 52.2%, 52.0%, and 45.7%, as compared to the normative group at 30, 42, and 46 years respectively. The moderate-chronic group had a decreased odds of voting of 24.7% as compared to the normative group at age 30 only. Matched results and linear probability models substantiated findings, suggesting (1) the importance of considering childhood factors when examining antecedents of lifelong voting behaviour, and (2) the political self-marginalisation of people with chronic childhood conduct problems more than 3 decades later. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11109-022-09852-9

Macroeconomy and macropartisanship: Economic conditions and party identification

“It's the economy stupid”—is the phrase that captures the ubiquity of economics in determining election outcomes. Nevertheless, while several studies support the premise of economic voting, a constant critique of valence economic models is that partisan bias contaminates voters' economic perceptions, thus invaliding any independent effect of economic opinions on the vote. Here, we test whether partisanship may itself be endogenous to the macroeconomy. Aggregating data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), supplemented with European Social Survey (ESS) data to bolster the time analysis, we focus on macropartisanship and find a drop-off of party identifiers for governing parties in tandem with the economic downturn, specifically from rising unemployment. More generally, macropartisanship responds to economic conditions, suggesting that the endogeneity concern between party attachment and valence economic conditions is not unidirectional. That is, while economic perceptions may be influenced by party identification, party identification can be influenced by economic conditions.publishedVersio

Trust in political parties and ideological proximity voting in Europe: the role of trust in political parties as a heuristic mechanism

Previous studies have investigated to what extent voters can achieve proximity between their preferences and the positions of the party they vote for. Combining data from the European Social Survey and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, we investigate whether trust in political parties increases ideological proximity voting. We argue that voters use their level of trust in parties as a heuristic mechanism. First, trust can increase proximity voting because citizens need to trust that political parties will take voters’ policy preferences into account when in government. Second, we examine whether low-trusting voters tend to cast a protest vote, and do not engage in ideological proximity voting. We test this assumption regarding three determinants of the vote choice: general left-right ideology views, preferences for income redistribution, and anti-immigrant sentiments. We find that ideological proximity voting is indeed moderated by trust: those who trust political parties are more likely to cast a vote based on their policy preferences, while those who distrust tend to vote for protest parties. Nevertheless, also among protest voters, trust is conducive for higher levels of proximity voting.publishedVersio

Exploring the Neglected Dimension of the Economic Vote: A Global Analysis of the Positional Economics Thesis

status: publishe

Is There a Partisan Bias in the Perception of the State of the Economy? A Comparative Investigation of European Countries, 2002-2016.

status: Published onlin

Patrimonial economic voting: a cross-national analysis of asset ownership and the vote

Our study examines the impact possession of assets (patrimony) has on the vote in 34 countries. We provide the first comprehensive test of patrimony on the vote cross-nationally. Using Module 4 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) and hierarchical models, we show that asset ownership matters and has a direct effect on the vote in several countries. More assets increase the likelihood of supporting the right. In other nations, its effect is indirect or absent. Accounting for this macro variation, we show that patrimonial voting is stronger in liberal welfare states and in countries where the tax system does not limit incentives to invest. However, we find no evidence that patrimonial voting is conditioned by ideological polarization. Our research highlights that economic voting is multidimensional and that patrimony, especially in some countries, is a potent determinant of the vote.status: Published onlin

The Compleat German Economic Voter: New Pathways in Patrimonial and Positional Economic Voting

status: Published onlin

The long-term effects of the economic crisis on political trust in Europe: Is there a negativity bias in the relation between economic performance and political support?

status: publishe