Politics of the international monetary system: an address

International finance ; International Monetary Fund

Commentary on the Democratic Accountability of Non-Governmental Organizations

The essays on the accountability of non-governmental organizations ( NGOs ) in the spring issue of this journal were so thoughtful and balanced that all I can do is to make explicit some points that seemed implicit, particularly in the essays by Kingsbury, Spiro, and Wapner. Accountability is not a pure good. Much of the writing on accountability seems to imply that accountability is like friendship: more is better. But as Kingsbury observes in passing, the total possibilities for participation are inescapably constrained by the need to accomplish the institution\u27s tasks. Too much accountability could hinder NGOs from performing their tasks, as itemized by Spar and Dail in their typology of NGOs. [CONT

The Concept of Accountability in World Politics and the Use of Force

This paper proceeds as follows. In Part I, the author discuss a pluralistic theory of accountability. He begins by defining accountability in a standard fashion, emphasizing two conditions: the availability of information to accountability-holders, and their ability to sanction power-wielders. The author then proceeds to discuss a pluralistic conception of accountability systems. Part II then develops a typology of eight accountability mechanisms, all of which are found in democratic societies, but not all of which are democratic per se. Part III builds on the Jacobson-Ku discussion of the current practices, relative to accountability, of the Security Council and asks how they could, from the perspective of accountability, be improved

Controlling Stocks and Flows to Promote Quality: The Environment, With Applications to Physical and Human Capital

Our analysis melds two traditional approaches to promoting quality. The first is restoring the stock of quality. The second is curbing its flow of deterioration. Although both approaches are widely used in real world settings, analytic models have tended to focus on one strategy or the other. We consider a class of problems, which we call SFQ' problems, in which both stocks and flows can be controlled to promote quality. We develop our results in the context of environmental quality, drawing on real-world examples from atomic wastes to zebra mussels. But the lessons are general, and we show how they apply to promoting the quality of both physical and human capital. We first study optimal policies in the limiting cases when only abatement or restoration is possible. We then focus on the full SFQ world, where both approaches can be used. We show that the optimal policy employs both instruments. Moreover, when combined optimally, neither strategy takes the form it would in the absence of the other.

Pluses and Minuses of a Carbon Tax

Either a tax or a cap can put a price on climate pollution. The goal is to reduce it. Published as Letter to the Editor in the New York Times on June 15th, 2015

Paris: Beyond the Climate Dead End through Pledge and Review?

"The Paris Climate Agreement of December 2015 marks a decisive break from the unsuccessful Kyoto regime. Instead of targets and timetables, it established a Pledge and Review system, under which states will offer Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) to reducing emissions that cause climate change. But this successful negotiation outcome was achieved at the price of vagueness of obligations and substantial discretion for governments. Many governments will be tempted to use the vagueness of the Paris Agreement, and the discretion that it permits, to limit the scope or intensity of their proposed actions. Whether Pledge and Review under the Paris Agreement will lead to effective action against climate change will therefore depend on the inclination both of OECD countries and newly industrializing countries to take costly actions, which for the OECD countries will include financial transfers to their poorer partners. Domestic politics will be crucial in determining the attitudes of both sets of countries to pay such costs. The actual impact of the Paris Agreement will depend on whether it can be used by domestic groups favoring climate action as a point of leverage in domestic politics - that is, in a 'two-level game' simultaneously involving both international and domestic politics." (author's abstract

Five minutes with Robert O. Keohane: “We shouldn’t fool ourselves by believing that global governance will soon be made democratic”

Can global governance through organisations such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization ever be made properly democratic? In an interview with EUROPP’s editor Stuart Brown, Robert O. Keohane discusses the problems with establishing global democratic governance, the distinction between liberal constitutionalist achievements and democracy, and why we should be sceptical of claims that a global democracy is just around the corner

Global Experimentalist Governance

This article outlines the concept of Global Experimentalist Governance (GXG). GXG is an institutionalized transnational process of participatory and multilevel problem solving, in which particular problems, and the means of addressing them, are framed in an open-ended way, and subjected to periodic revision by various forms of peer review in light of locally generated knowledge. GXG differs from other forms of international organization and transnational governance, and is emerging in various issue areas. The Montreal Protocol on ozone-depleting substances is used to illustrate how GXG functions. The conditions for the emergence of GXG are specified, as well as some of its possible benefits.

New Modes of Pluralist Global Governance

This paper describes three modes of pluralist global governance. Mode One refers to the creation and proliferation of comprehensive, integrated international regimes on a variety of issues. Mode Two describes the emergence of diverse forms and sites of cross-national decision making by multiple actors, public and private as well as local, regional and global, forming governance networks and “regime complexes,” including the orchestration of new forms of authority by international actors and organizations. Mode Three, which is the main focus of the paper, describes the gradual institutionalization of practices involving continual updating and revision, open participation, an agreed understanding of goals and practices, and monitoring, including peer review. We call this third mode Global Experimentalist Governance. Experimentalist Governance arises in situations of complex interdependence and pervasive uncertainty about causal relationships. Its practice is illustrated in the paper by three examples: the arrangements devised to protect dolphins from being killed by tuna fishing practices; the U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; and the Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Layer. Experimentalist Governance tends to appear on issues for which governments cannot formulate and enforce comprehensive sets of rules, but which do not involve fundamental disagreements or high politics, and in which civil society is active. The paper shows that instances of Experimentalist Governance are already evident in various global arenas and issue areas, and argues that their significance seems likely to grow