A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience

When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches vehicle and process theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space for vehicle theories of consciousness in cognitive science, they are relatively rare. This is because of the influence exerted, on the one hand, by a large body of research which purports to show that the explicit representation of information in the brain and conscious experience are dissociable, and on the other, by the classical computational theory of mind – the theory that takes human cognition to be a species of symbol manipulation. But two recent developments in cognitive science combine to suggest that a reappraisal of this situation is in order. First, a number of theorists have recently been highly critical of the experimental methodologies employed in the dissociation studies – so critical, in fact, it’s no longer reasonable to assume that the dissociability of conscious experience and explicit representation has been adequately demonstrated. Second, classicism, as a theory of human cognition, is no longer as dominant in cognitive science as it once was. It now has a lively competitor in the form of connectionism; and connectionism, unlike classicism, does have the computational resources to support a robust vehicle theory of consciousness. In this paper we develop and defend this connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. It takes the form of the following simple empirical hypothesis: phenomenal experience consists in the explicit representation of information in neurally realized PDP networks. This hypothesis leads us to re-assess some common wisdom about consciousness, but, we will argue, in fruitful and ultimately plausible ways

A Defence of Cartesian Materialism

One of the principal tasks Dennett sets himself in "Consciousness Explained" is to demolish the Cartesian theatre model of phenomenal consciousness, which in its contemporary garb takes the form of Cartesian materialism: the idea that conscious experience is a process of presentation realized in the physical materials of the brain. The now standard response to Dennett is that, in focusing on Cartesian materialism, he attacks an impossibly naive account of consciousness held by no one currently working in cognitive science or the philosophy of mind. Our response is quite different. We believe that, once properly formulated, Cartesian materialism is no straw man. Rather, it is an attractive hypothesis about the relationship between the computational architecture of the brain and phenomenal consciousness, and hence one that is worthy of further exploration. Consequently, our primary aim in this paper is to defend Cartesian materialism from Dennett's assault. We do this by showing that Dennett's argument against this position is founded on an implicit assumption (about the relationship between phenomenal experience and information coding in the brain), which while valid in the context of classical cognitive science, is not forced on connectionism

Developing cessation interventions for the social and community service setting: A qualitative study of barriers to quitting among disadvantaged Australian smokers

Background: Smoking rates remain unacceptably high among individuals who are socially disadvantaged. Social and community service organisations (SCSO) are increasingly interested in providing smoking cessation support to clients, however little is known about the best way to assist disadvantaged smokers to quit in this setting. This study aimed to explore barriers and facilitators to quitting within the conceptual framework of the PRECEDE model to identify possible interventions appropriate to the social and community service setting. Methods: Semi-structured focus groups were conducted with clients attending five community welfare organisations located in New South Wales, Australia. Thirty-two clients participated in six focus groups. A discussion guide was used to explore the barriers and facilitators to smoking and smoking cessation including: current smoking behaviour, motivation to quit, past quit attempts, barriers to quitting and preferences for cessation support. Focus groups were audio-taped, transcribed and analysed using thematic analysis techniques. Results: Participants were current smokers and most expressed a desire to quit. Factors predisposing continued smoking included perceived benefits of smoking for stress relief, doubting of ability to quit, fear of gaining weight, and poor knowledge and scepticism about available quit support. The high cost of nicotine replacement therapy was a barrier to its use. Continual exposure to smoking in personal relationships and in the community reinforced smoking. Participants expressed a strong preference for personalised quit support. Conclusions: Disadvantaged smokers in Australia express a desire to quit smoking, but find quitting difficult for a number of reasons. SCSOs may have a role in providing information about the availability of quit support, engaging disadvantaged smokers with available quit support, and providing personalised, ongoing support

The Disunity of Consciousness

It is commonplace for both philosophers and cognitive scientists to express their allegiance to the "unity of consciousness". This is the claim that a subject’s phenomenal consciousness, at any one moment in time, is a single thing. This view has had a major influence on computational theories of consciousness. In particular, what we call single-track theories dominate the literature, theories which contend that our conscious experience is the result of a single consciousness-making process or mechanism in the brain. We argue that the orthodox view is quite wrong: phenomenal experience is not a unity, in the sense of being a single thing at each instant. It is a multiplicity, an aggregate of phenomenal elements, each of which is the product of a distinct consciousness-making mechanism in the brain. Consequently, cognitive science is in need of a multi-track theory of consciousness; a computational model that acknowledges both the manifold nature of experience, and its distributed neural basis

The genetic basis for adaptation of model-designed syntrophic co-cultures.

Understanding the fundamental characteristics of microbial communities could have far reaching implications for human health and applied biotechnology. Despite this, much is still unknown regarding the genetic basis and evolutionary strategies underlying the formation of viable synthetic communities. By pairing auxotrophic mutants in co-culture, it has been demonstrated that viable nascent E. coli communities can be established where the mutant strains are metabolically coupled. A novel algorithm, OptAux, was constructed to design 61 unique multi-knockout E. coli auxotrophic strains that require significant metabolite uptake to grow. These predicted knockouts included a diverse set of novel non-specific auxotrophs that result from inhibition of major biosynthetic subsystems. Three OptAux predicted non-specific auxotrophic strains-with diverse metabolic deficiencies-were co-cultured with an L-histidine auxotroph and optimized via adaptive laboratory evolution (ALE). Time-course sequencing revealed the genetic changes employed by each strain to achieve higher community growth rates and provided insight into mechanisms for adapting to the syntrophic niche. A community model of metabolism and gene expression was utilized to predict the relative community composition and fundamental characteristics of the evolved communities. This work presents new insight into the genetic strategies underlying viable nascent community formation and a cutting-edge computational method to elucidate metabolic changes that empower the creation of cooperative communities

From the oceans to the cloud: Opportunities and challenges for data, models, computation and workflows.

© The Author(s), 2019. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License. The definitive version was published in Vance, T. C., Wengren, M., Burger, E., Hernandez, D., Kearns, T., Medina-Lopez, E., Merati, N., O'Brien, K., O'Neil, J., Potemrag, J. T., Signell, R. P., & Wilcox, K. From the oceans to the cloud: Opportunities and challenges for data, models, computation and workflows. Frontiers in Marine Science, 6(211), (2019), doi:10.3389/fmars.2019.00211.Advances in ocean observations and models mean increasing flows of data. Integrating observations between disciplines over spatial scales from regional to global presents challenges. Running ocean models and managing the results is computationally demanding. The rise of cloud computing presents an opportunity to rethink traditional approaches. This includes developing shared data processing workflows utilizing common, adaptable software to handle data ingest and storage, and an associated framework to manage and execute downstream modeling. Working in the cloud presents challenges: migration of legacy technologies and processes, cloud-to-cloud interoperability, and the translation of legislative and bureaucratic requirements for “on-premises” systems to the cloud. To respond to the scientific and societal needs of a fit-for-purpose ocean observing system, and to maximize the benefits of more integrated observing, research on utilizing cloud infrastructures for sharing data and models is underway. Cloud platforms and the services/APIs they provide offer new ways for scientists to observe and predict the ocean’s state. High-performance mass storage of observational data, coupled with on-demand computing to run model simulations in close proximity to the data, tools to manage workflows, and a framework to share and collaborate, enables a more flexible and adaptable observation and prediction computing architecture. Model outputs are stored in the cloud and researchers either download subsets for their interest/area or feed them into their own simulations without leaving the cloud. Expanded storage and computing capabilities make it easier to create, analyze, and distribute products derived from long-term datasets. In this paper, we provide an introduction to cloud computing, describe current uses of the cloud for management and analysis of observational data and model results, and describe workflows for running models and streaming observational data. We discuss topics that must be considered when moving to the cloud: costs, security, and organizational limitations on cloud use. Future uses of the cloud via computational sandboxes and the practicalities and considerations of using the cloud to archive data are explored. We also consider the ways in which the human elements of ocean observations are changing – the rise of a generation of researchers whose observations are likely to be made remotely rather than hands on – and how their expectations and needs drive research towards the cloud. In conclusion, visions of a future where cloud computing is ubiquitous are discussed.This is PMEL contribution 4873