Differential Accumulation: Toward a New Political Economy of Capital

Existing theories of capital, neo-classical as well as Marxist, are anchored in the material sphere of production and consumption. This article offers a new analytical framework for capital as a crystallization of power. The relative nature of power requires accumulation to be measured in differential, not absolute, terms. For absentee owners, the main goal is not to maximize pro.ts, but rather to ‘beat the average’ and exceed the ‘normal rate of return’. The theoretical framework builds on Thorstein Veblen’s separation of industry from business and on Lewis Mumford’s dichotomy between democratic and authoritarian techniques. Extending their contributions, we argue that capital is a business, not an industrial category, a human mega-machine rather than a material artefact. Indeed, it is the social essence of capital which makes accumulation possible in the .rst place. Capital measures the present value of future business earnings, and these depend not on the productivity of industry as such, but on the ability of absentee owners strategically to limit such productivity to their own differential ends. Introducing the twin concepts of the ‘differential power of capital’ (DPK) and the rate of ‘differential accumulation’ (DA), we examine the non-linear and possibly negative link between industrial growth and accumulation in the US

A relationship between electron transfer rates and molecular conduction

This note discusses the relationship between a given intramolecular bridge assisted electron transfer rate and the corresponding zero bias molecular conduction of the same molecular species.Comment: 7 pages. Journal Physical Chemistry, in pres

Demystifying the 'Metric Approach to Social Compromise with the Unanimity Criterion'

In a recent book and earlier studies, Donald Saari well clarifies the source of three classical impossibility theorems in social choice and proposes possible escape out of these negative results. The objective of this note is to illustrate the relevance of these explanations in justifying the metric approach to the social compromise with the unanimity criterion.social choice, impossibility theorems, metric approach to compromise with the unanimity criterion

Revenue Loss in Shrinking Markets

We analyze the revenue loss due to market shrinkage. Specifically, consider a simple market with one item for sale and $n$ bidders whose values are drawn from some joint distribution. Suppose that the market shrinks as a single bidder retires from the market. Suppose furthermore that the value of this retiring bidder is fixed and always strictly smaller than the values of the other players. We show that even this slight decrease in competition might cause a significant fall of a multiplicative factor of $\frac{1}{e+1}\approx0.268$ in the revenue that can be obtained by a dominant strategy ex-post individually rational mechanism. In particular, our results imply a solution to an open question that was posed by Dobzinski, Fu, and Kleinberg [STOC'11]