Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES dataset

Recent research on economic sanctions has produced significant advances in our theoretical and empirical understanding of the causes and effects of these phenomena. Our theoretical understanding, which has been guided by empirical findings, has reached the point where existing data sets are no longer adequate to test important hypotheses. This article presents a recently updated version of the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) data set. This version of the data extends the temporal domain, corrects errors, updates cases that were ongoing as of the last release, and includes a few additional variables. We describe the dataset, paying special attention to the key differences in the new version, and we present descriptive statistics for some of the key variables, highlighting differences across versions. Since the major change in the data set was to more than double the time period covered, we also present some simple statistics showing trends in sanctions use over time

Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data

In the literature on sanctions effectiveness, scholars have identified a number of factors that may contribute to sanctions success. However, existing empirical studies provide mixed findings concerning the effects of these factors. This research note explores two possible reasons for this lack of consistency in the literature. First, informed by the recent theories that suggest threats are an important part of sanctions episodes, we analyze both threats and imposed sanctions. Second, to lessen model dependency of empirical findings, we employ a methodology that permits us to check systematically the robustness of the empirical results under various model specifications. Using the newly released Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions data, our analyses of both threats and imposed sanctions show that two factors—involvement of international institutions and severe costs on target states—are positively and robustly related to sanctions success at every stage in sanctions episodes. Our analyses also identify a number of other variables that are systematically related to sanctions success, but the significance of these relationships depends on the specific model estimated. Finally, our results point to a number of differences at the threat and imposition stages, which suggests specific selection effects that should be explored in future work

Replication data for: State Bargaining with Transnational Terror Groups

Several policymakers argue against negotiating with transnational terrorists because of the inability of terrorist groups to form credible commitments. To succeed in negotiation, terrorists must convince target governments that they are credible bargaining partners. This paper explores how constraints from host states affect the ability of terrorists to form credible commitments. If facing sufficient threats, host states may have an incentive to broker peaceful agreements. Hosts that have the ability to monitor and impose moderate costs on terrorist groups can increase the likelihood of negotiated settlements. The paper concludes with an empirical test of the model's hypotheses using data on transnational terrorism in the pre-9/11 period from 1968 to 1991

Non-state actors and political conflict

In the vast majority of international relations literature, states are assumed to have a monopoly on the use of force throughout their territory. However, states are increasingly facing considerable security challenges from militant non-state actors. In the vast majority of these cases, state/non-state actor conflict is terminated through violent conflict, often with devastating consequences. Given this empirical pattern, a disturbing trend is the internationalization of conflicts between states and non-state actors. Increasingly, non-state actors move their base of operations to foreign host states in order to increase the target's cost of retaliation. This behavior holds the potential to escalate conflicts from civil war to interstate or regional wars. Due to the devastation associated with such conflicts, this project examines the possibilities for the peaceful conflict resolution of state/non-state political violence. Specifically, this project attempts to identify the conditions under which peaceful conflict resolution can succeed as an alternative to the use of force. This project addresses three puzzles. First, at what point do states and non-state actors agree to negotiate? Second, what factors promote successful negotiation to conflicts involving a target state and non-state actors? Finally, what are the consequences of failing to achieve negotiated settlements? This project addresses each of these questions by constructing game theoretic models. The models examine the strategic interaction between non-state actors, host states, and targets of non-state violence. The models are empirically tested using several data sources, including the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events, State Failure data, and source date from the RAND corporation

Transnational Terrorism, US Military Aid, and the Incentive to Misrepresent

This study proposes a strategic explanation for the USA's continued provision of military aid to host states with problems of terrorism, despite its poor empirical record. Using a game theoretic model, I demonstrate that US military aid creates a moral hazard problem. If host states are provided with the tools to pacify their territory only if terrorist campaigns are ongoing, but will lose this aid once the problem of terrorism ceases, host states have little incentive to accelerate the demise of terrorist groups. However, the model demonstrates that while military aid does not accomplish the US goal of disarming terrorists, military aid is effective at preventing host states from negotiating with terrorist organizations. The provision of military aid provides a disincentive for host states to reach a negotiated settlement with terrorist groups, and therefore prevents terrorist organizations from altering the status quo that is favorable to the USA. This suggests that while military aid may not be effective at actually disarming terrorist groups, it can be effective at keeping terrorist groups out of power. These hypotheses are tested using the Jones & Libicki (2008) data on terrorism from 1997 to 2006. The empirical results support the conclusions of the theoretical model.conflict, military aid, terrorism

Replication Data for: Terrorism, Dynamic Commitment Problems, and Military Conflict

Since 9/11, several states initiated military conflicts in the name of fighting terrorism. However, studies indicate that the costs of terrorism are insignificant compared to the damage created by war. This raises the question: why do states initiate costly wars when the risk posed by terrorism appears marginal? This study presents two explanations. First, we argue that while terrorists frequently fail to achieve their strategic objectives, terrorists can accomplish tactical objectives, and may transition to insurgencies by seizing control of pockets of territory. States may respond by initiating preventive wars to stop terrorists from consolidating control over their strategically valuable territories (such as resource rich areas). Second, rival states may opportunistically exploit terrorist violence by declaring that the government is a ‘weak state.’ This allows rivals to seize portions of the government’s territory under the cover of fighting terror. We test these hypotheses using post-Cold war African dyads from 1990-2006

Effect of cenosphere on dielectric properties of low density polyethylene.

Dielectric characterization of cenosphere filled low density polyethylene composites is reported in this paper. Cenosphere filled low density polyethylene (LDPE) composites with inhomogeneous dispersions of cenosphere were prepared and dielectric measurements have been performed on these composites in the temperature range 34–110 �C in the frequency range 1–10 kHz. The dielectric constants of the composites with filler concentrations 0%, 10%, 15% and 20 vol.% were measured. Effect of temperature and frequency variations on dielectric constant (e 0 ), dissipation factor (tand) and a.c. conductivity (ra.c.) was also determined. The frequency dependent dielectric and conductivity behaviour of flyash cenosphere filled low density polyethylene (LDPE) polymer composites have been studied. Appearance of peak in the dielectric loss curves for all the concentrations confirms the presence of relaxing dipoles in the cenosphere/LDPE composites. The effect of filler distribution on the dielectric constant is examined and the observed differences are attributed to the differences in two kinds of interfaces present: one formed between the touching cenosphere particles and the other formed between LDPE and cenosphere. With the increase of cenosphere content dielectric constant decreased gradually. Maxwell–Garnett approximation fairly fits for the dielectric data obtained experimentally for these composite