Bargaining over Managerial Contracts in Delegation Games: The Quadratic Cost Case

We again examine how the managers' bargaining power affects social welfare and the firms'' profits in both quantity and price competition, in particular, in the case where each firm''s production technology is represented by a quadratic cost function. We show that under both the competition types, if the relative bargaining power of managers is sufficiently low, increase in the power results in the decrease of each firm''s profit and the increase of social welfare on the other hand, if the managers'' relative bargaining power is sufficiently high, its increase leads to the deterioration of social welfare due to the excessively high total cost in the market. This result is somewhat in contrast to the existing ones obtained in the constant marginal cost case, and hence, our findings show that they are not robust against the change in the type of each firm''s cost function.Bargaining over managerial delegation sales delegation quadratic cost function

Bargaining over Managerial Contracts in Delegation Games: The Differentiated Goods Case

This paper investigates the bargaining between owners and managers over their managerial delegation contracts, in order to explain the disclosure obligation that is central to many modern corporate governance codes. We consider the managerial incentive contracts based on the profit and sales of each firm and the delegation game with bargaining in two types of differentiated-products duopolistic competition wherein each firm's manager chooses his or her own output or price. We show that in equilibrium, the profit of each firm decreases, whereas the consumer surplus and social welfare increase as the relative bargaining power of the managers increases in both quantity and price competitions. Thus, we find that similar to the case of the quantity competition wherein both firms produce homogeneous goods in Witteloostuijn et al. (2007), the managerial power of managers is positively associated with social welfare.

Bargaining over Managerial Contracts in Delegation Games: The Sequential Move Case

This paper examines the bargaining problem between firms' owners and managers over their managerial delegation contracts in a duopolistic market with differentiated-products. Assuming that delegated managers make every managerial decision in the market, we analyze how the managers'' bargaining power affects social welfare and firms'' profits for each case of sequential quantity competition and sequential price competition. We show that the relative increase in the managers'' bargaining power leads to decrease in firms'' profits but improves social welfare in each case, and that this result holds for any case of the degree of product differentiation. This shows that the existing results obtained for the simultaneous move case and a single homogeneous product case are robust in the sequential move cases.

A Theory of Civil Conflict and Democracy in Unequal Societies

This paper examines the endogenous choice between democracy and conflict in a scenario with different social classes in terms of income inequality and with parties representing each of the two social classes. We consider how the change in economic inequality between the poor and rich people affects the sustainability of democracy against conflict and how it impacts the equilibrium levels of tax rate and public expenditure under democracy. We show that the increase in economic inequality destabilizes of democracy since the poor hardly has the incentive to sustain the democracy Further the increase is positively associated with the equilibrium levels of both the tax rate and public expenditure. Therefore, we successfully provide theoretic justification for the fact that sufficiently large economic inequality decreases the possibility of a self-enforcing democracy.

Mixed Oligopoly and Productivity-Improving Mergers

This paper investigates productivity improving merger activities between a public firm and a private firm in mixed oligopoly. We assume that the merged firm has two plants (formerly, firms). We show that both owners of a public firm and a private firm want to merge by coordinating their shareholding ratios in the merged firm, whenever the number of private firms is larger than a critical value, while the public firm does not want to merge without the effect of improving the productivity of the merged firm.mixed oligopoly

Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly: The Managerial Delegation Case

We introduce managerial delegation into Pal's (1998) model and examine the impact of the introduction of managerial delegation on endogenous timing in a mixed duopolistic model for differentiated goods. We show that a public firm and a private firm choose quantities sequentially in the equilibrium of our model. Thus, we find that the Pal''s (1998) results are robust against managerial delegation.Endogenous Timing

Shiteki kasen oyobi kongo kasen shijo ni okeru suiheiteki kigyokan gappei no kenkyu :

制度:新 ; 報告番号:甲3169号 ; 学位の種類:博士(経済学) ; 授与年月日:2010/7/21 ; 早大学位記番号:新545