5 research outputs found
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Equality and the Morality of Social Status
This dissertation develops an account of the concept of social status and defends an egalitarian principle concerning a distinctive kind of social status, which I call public social status. Roughly put, one’s public social status is the relative excellence that other members of society believe that one has in comparison to other members. Inequalities of public social status, I argue, amount to a profound condition of moral unfreedom for the low status. The heart of the dissertation consists of the development and defense of the principle of equal public social status. Subsequent chapters explore the relationship between that principle and other substantive normative issues in political philosophy. Topics discussed include the justification of democratic institutions, the grounds of democratic authority, and the implications of the principle of equal public social status for the organization of social cooperation and distributive justice
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Justice, Reciprocity, and the Boundaries of State Authority
12 month embargo; first published online 21 March 2021This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at [email protected]
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Adjudicating distributive disagreement
This paper examines different mechanisms for adjudicating disagreement about distributive justice. It begins with a case where individuals have deeply conflicting convictions about distributive justice and must make a social choice regarding the distribution of goods. Four mechanisms of social choice are considered: social contract formation, Borda count vote, simple plurality vote, and minimax bargaining. I develop an agent-based model which examines which mechanisms lead to the greatest degree of satisfying justice-based preferences over the course iterated social choices. Agents are ascribed two kinds of motivations: they wish to realize justice and to receive a greater package of goods. Each agent seeks to realize her ideal distribution, and the failure to do so leaves agents "disappointed," resulting in their trading off the pursuit of gains in justice in favor of gains in self-interest. Mechanisms are assessed using the metric of how many agents remain interested in justice over the course of iterated adjudication. The mechanisms are also examined under some non-ideal conditions, such as the presence of power asymmetries or strategic behavior. Several significant results are addressed: social contract formation and simple plurality voting are robust under the conditions considered, bargaining is a highly ineffective means of adjudicating distributive disagreement, and lastly allowing for concessions in justice for gains in self-interest proves to be a crucial mechanism for ensuring the stability of resolutions.12 month embargo: published online: 24 October 2019This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at [email protected]
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Democratic Public Justification
Democratic institutions are appealing means of making publicly justified social choices. By allowing participation by all citizens, democracy can accommodate diversity among citizens, and by considering the perspectives of all, via ballots or debate, democratic results can approximate what the balance of reasons favors. I consider whether, and under what conditions, democratic institutions might reliably make publicly justified social decisions. I argue that conventional accounts of democracy, constituted by voting or deliberation, are unlikely to be effective public justification mechanisms. I conclude that the limitations of conventional mechanisms can be ameliorated through the use of lotteries instead of elections.18 month embargo; first published online 13 November 2020This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at [email protected]