An Exploration of the Pay Levels Needed to Attract Students With Mathematics, Science and Technology Skills to a Career in K-12 Teaching

In an exploratory study (Note 1) of the role of salary level and other factors in motivating undergraduate math, science, and technology majors to consider a career as a K-12 teacher, the salary level students said would motivate them to consider a career in teaching was related to the salary expected in their chosen non-teaching occupation, but not to three of the Big 5 personality dimensions of extroversion, agreeableness, and openness, nor concern for others or career risk aversion. An annual starting salary 45% above the local average would attract 48% of the sophomore students and 37% of the juniors. Focus group results suggested that low pay was an important reason for not considering K-12 teaching, but that perceived job demands and abilities and interests were also important reasons for not being attracted to a teaching career

Varieties of Knowledge and Skill-Based Pay Design

This article describes the design of knowledge and skill-based pay systems for K-12 teachers in six U.S. school districts and one charter school. Based on a theory of action that relates knowledge and skill- based pay systems to improvements in instruction, and the expectancy theory of motivation, seven dimensions for comparison are identified and the systems are compared based on these dimensions. While there were a variety of reasons for designing new pay systems, similarities included that teachers were involved in the design processes, and that the knowledge and skills rewarded are more closely related to instruction than in the traditional salary schedule (though none of the systems placed heavy emphasis on content-specific pedagogy). Most systems made use of existing standards or definitions of good teaching, such as the Framework for Teaching (Danielson, 1996). While most of the systems involved performance-based assessments of teacher skills, in no case were seniority and graduate degrees eliminated as a basis for pay progression. Few of the programs had developed a coordinated professional development program specifically linked to the knowledge and skills rewarded by the new pay system. Implications for policy makers and system designers are drawn

Percepções dos maestros sobre um novo sistema de avaliação da performance e da sua influência na prática: Uma análise dentro das escuelas e entre as escuelas

Teacher performance evaluation systems (PESs) are central to policy efforts to increase teacher effectiveness and student learning. We argue that for these reforms to work, PESs need to be treated as coherent systems, in which teachers perceive that there are linkages between the PES components. Using teacher survey data from a large, midwestern school district, this article explores the linkages between teacher perceptions of a new PES using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), structural equation modeling (SEM), and multilevel CFA. We also examine whether a strong evaluation climate developed in this district. The CFA and SEM analysis demonstrate that teacher perceptions of PES are interrelated and linked to perceptions of changes in teaching practices and to the potential impact on student learning. The multilevel CFA demonstrates cross-level noninvariance, with fewer factors being identified at the school levels. These results suggest a need for a school‐level theory of action with corresponding school‐level constructs. While we did not find evidence of a shared strong evaluation climate, the results of the analysis illustrate the importance of examining within-school agreement, both to assess the reliability of between-school differences in average teacher perceptions and to assess whether schools are developing a strong evaluation climate.Los sistemas de evaluación del desempeño de los maestros (PES) son fundamentales para los esfuerzos de las políticas para aumentar la efectividad de los docentes y el aprendizaje de los estudiantes. Argumentamos que para que estas reformas funcionen, los SPE deben tratarse como sistemas coherentes, en los que los docentes perciben que existen vínculos entre los componentes de PSA. Utilizando los datos de la encuesta de docentes de un gran distrito escolar del medio oeste, este artículo explora los vínculos entre las percepciones de los docentes de un nuevo PES utilizando análisis factorial confirmatorio (CFA), modelado de ecuaciones estructurales (SEM) y CFA multinivel. También examinamos si se desarrolló un clima de evaluación fuerte en este distrito. Los análisis de CFA y SEM demuestran que las percepciones de los maestros sobre los SPE se interrelacionan y se relacionan con las percepciones de los cambios en las prácticas de enseñanza y con el posible impacto en el aprendizaje de los estudiantes. El CFA multinivel demuestra la no invariabilidad de niveles cruzados, con menos factores identificados en los niveles escolares. Estos resultados sugieren la necesidad de una teoría de acción a nivel escolar con los constructos correspondientes a nivel escolar. Aunque no encontramos evidencia de un clima de evaluación sólido compartido, los resultados del análisis ilustran la importancia de examinar el acuerdo dentro de la escuela, tanto para evaluar la confiabilidad de las diferencias entre las escuelas en las percepciones promedio de los docentes como para evaluar si las escuelas están desarrollando clima de evaluación fuerte.Los sistemas de avaliação do desempenho dos professores (PES) filho fundamental para os esforços das políticas para aumentar a eficácia dos professores e a aprendizagem dos estudiosos. Argumentamos que, para que estes esquemas funcionem, os SPE deben tratarse como os sistemas coerentes, nos quais os docentes percebem que existem entre os componentes da PSA. Utilizando os dados da pesquisa de professores de um grande distrito da medicina ocidental, este artigo explora os acontecimentos entre as percepções dos docentes de um novo PES analisado factorial confirmatorio (CFA), modelo de ecuaciones estructurales (SEM) e CFA multinivel. Também foi possível encontrar um clima de avaliação para avaliar este distrito. As análises de CFA e SEM demonstram quais são as percepções das mudanças nas relações públicas e se relacionam com a percepção das mudanças nas prácticas de enseñanza e com o possível impacto na aprendizagem dos estudiosos. El CFA multinivel demuestra a invariabilidade de niveles cruzados, com menos fatores identificados nas niveles escolares. Estos resultados sugam a necessidade de uma teoría de uma escola nivelada com os constructos correspondentes a nivel escolar. A inexistente evidencias in the clima of evaluación maciço compartimenta, los procesos del análisis ilustrant la importancia de dashboard in aeroplane of la escuela, both for evaluate the dependibility of las différences en las escuelas en las percepción promedio de los docentes for evaluat si as escuelas estão desarrollando clima de avaliação fuerte

Enhancing Teacher Quality Through Knowledge- and Skills-Based Pay

The 1989 Education Summit established the National Education Goals that spurred states to set standards and assess educational outcomes (Patton and Thompson, 1999). A decade into standards-based reform, the 1999 Education Summit identified two important policy areas that have emerged to carry out these goals: teacher quality and accountability (National Education Summit, 1999). Research supports the important relationship between teacher quality and student achievement (Darling-Hammond and Ball, 1998; Ferguson and Ladd, 1996; Sanders and Horn, 1994; Wright, Horn, and Sanders, 1997). Concerns about teacher quality led the National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future to recommend that states and districts consider better ways of linking pay to the development of teacher knowledge and skills (National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future, 1996). Exploring better ways of using pay to enhance teacher quality is also supported, to varying degrees, by teacher unions and associations. Knowledge- and skills-based pay systems are emerging as a potentially promising way of leveraging the investment in teacher pay to improve teacher quality and to provide clearer signals to teachers about how they should focus their professional energies. This CPRE Policy Brief reports on our experiences in working with policymakers and studying knowledge- and skills-based pay systems. We provide guidance on important design issues for these systems, and recommend ways state and district policymakers can strengthen the capacity for and pursue knowledge- and skills-based pay

Recruiting New Teachers to Urban School Districts: What Incentives Will Work

Explores the effectiveness of financial incentives in attracting qualified teachers to low-performing and hard-to-staff schools. Surveys teachers in training on factors in job choices and considers the size of an effective pay incentive and alternatives

School-Based Performance Award Programs, Teacher Motivation, and School Performance: Findings From a Study of Three Programs

Building on a strong foundation of research and experience with educational reform across the nation, in the 1990s educational policymakers undertook sophisticated comprehensive educational reform efforts. The centerpiece of these reforms was the creation of state educational standards, assessments, and goals, and the realignment of state and local resources to support the achievement of these goals. A number of states and districts have embraced the idea of performance-based accountability (Fuhrman, 1999), in which rewards and sometimes sanctions are used as incentives for measurable improvement in student achievement. Some jurisdictions have modified their teacher compensation systems in order to provide incentives that support improving student achievement. Learning from the relative failure of prior efforts to realign teacher compensation via individual performance pay systems (Murnane and Cohen, 1986), states and districts undertaking compensation reform in the 1990s have tended to focus on innovations such as school-based performance awards (SBPAs) and pay based on knowledge and skills, which are thought to be better ways of supporting collaborative cultures in schools (Odden and Kelley, 1997). This report provides an overview of the findings of a series of studies of SBPA programs conducted by the Consortium for policy Research in Education between 1995 and 1998. The research reported here focuses on two such programs, in Kentucky and Charlotte-Mecklenburg (North Carolina), that pay teachers bonuses, and on one program, in Maryland, that provides the award to schools to use for activities and improvements

Teacher Performance Pay: Synthesis of Plans, Research, and Guidelines for Practice

The single salary schedule has ruled the delivery of teacher pay for decades, despite long-standing criticism that it fails to link some portion of teachers\u27pay to their performance. In recent years, there has been some experimentation with performance pay for teachers. Early attempts focused on the development of merit pay, in which pay raises were linked to subjective evaluations of teacher performance. Subsequent evaluations of merit pay plans questioned their effectiveness, especially given their limited survival, though it was acknowledged that the problem was not necessarily merit pay per se, but the way the plans were designed, implemented, and administered (Hatry, Greiner, & Ashford, 1994). Notwithstanding these unsuccessful experiences, national surveys have found that teacher attitudes toward some forms of performance pay are not unfavorable (Ballou, 2001; Ballou & Podgursky, 1993). In the 1990s, other forms of performance pay began to emerge at the state and district levels. Notable were school-based performance awards and knowledge- and skill-based pay plans. Elements from these plans have now been incorporated into combined pay plans. And while none of these plans has been widely adopted, they have drawn intensive national scrutiny and study. This Policy Brief focuses on the nature and effectiveness of these plans. We first provide generic descriptions of three types of plans, followed by a synthesis of research results on their effectiveness. A set of guidelines for effective practice is then provided to help states and districts embarking on these forms of performance pay. We conclude with a look ahead at recent developments in performance pay plans and other deviations from the traditional teacher salary schedule

Standards-Based Teacher Evaluation as a Foundation for Knowledge- and Skill-Based Pay

State accountability systems and the federal No Child Left Behind Act have put additional demands on schools and teachers to improve teacher quality and improve student achievement. Many researchers (e.g., Cohen, 1996; Corcoran & Goertz, 1995; Floden, 1997; Newman, King, & Rigdon, 1997) have argued that such improvements will require a substantial increase in the instructional capacity of schools and teachers. One strategy for capacity building is to provide teachers with incentives to improve their performance, knowledge, or skills. The incentive strategy requires the design and implementation of alternative teacher compensation systems that depart from the single salary schedule (Odden, 2000; Odden & Kelley, 2002). Though slow to take hold, the incentive strategy is currently being pursued by several states (Peterson, 2006). Most of these new or proposed plans link pay to combinations of assessments of teacher performance, acquisition of new knowledge and skills, and student test score gains. Denver\u27s widely followed Pro Comp plan also contains these components. The Teacher Compensation Group of the Consortium for Policy Research in Education (CPRE) has been studying the design and effectiveness of such systems for nearly a decade. We initially focused on school-based performance award programs, in which each teacher in a school receives a bonus for meeting or exceeding schoolwide student achievement goals (Heneman, 1998; Heneman & Milanowski, 1999; Kelley, Heneman, & Milanowski, 2002; Kelly, Odden, Milanowski, & Heneman, 2000). We then shifted our attention to knowledge- and skill-based pay (KSBP) plans, an approach that provides teachers with base pay increases for the acquisition and demonstration of specific knowledge and skills thought to be necessary for improving student achievement. Our initial research described a variety of experiments with KSBP plans (see Odden, Kelley, Heneman, & Milanowski, 2001). We found plans that were rewarding numerous knowledge and skills, including (a) additional licensure or certification, (b) participation in specific professional development activities, (c) National Board Certification, (d) mastery of specific skill blocks such as technology or authentic assessment, (e) leadership activities, and (f) teacher performance as measured by a standards-based teacher evaluation system. We also found districts experimenting with standards-based teacher evaluation without an intended pay link. As described below, in standards-based teacher evaluation systems, teachers\u27 performance is evaluated against a set of standards that define a competency model of effective teaching. Such systems replace the traditional teacher evaluation system and seek to provide a more thorough description and accurate assessment of teacher performance. Findings from our research on some of these systems are the focus of this issue of CPRE Policy Briefs

The Motivational Effects of School-Based Performance Awards

From 1995-1998, CPRE teacher compensation researchers conducted extensive interviews and survey questionnaires of teachers and principals in three sites to measure the motivational effects of school-based performance award (SBPA) programs. When a school met preset educational objectives, usually related to increases in student achievement, the SBPA programs in Charlotte-Mecklenburg (North Carolina) and Kentucky provided salary bonuses to all the teachers in the school and the SBPA program in Maryland provided a monetary award to the school for school improvements. CPRE researchers found that the SBPA programs in two of the three sites helped teachers focus on student performance goals. However, the motivational power of the programs varied due to differences in teachers’ beliefs. For instance, it mattered whether teachers believed their individual effort would lead to increases in schoolwide student performance, the SBPA system was fair and the award amount was worth the extra effort and stress, and that they would be given the award if they could produce the improved performance results. The relationship between teachers who were motivated by school-based performance awards or sanctions and improvements in school performance also varied and may have been attributable to differences in the actual programs as well as the local context

Recruiting New Teachers to Urban School Districts: What Incentives Will Work?

Many urban districts in the United States have difficulty attracting and retaining quality teachers, yet they are often the most in need of them. In response, U.S. states and districts are experimenting with financial incentives to attract and retain high-quality teachers in high-need, low-achieving, or hard-to-staff urban schools. However, relatively little is known about how effective financial incentives are to recruit new teachers to high-need urban schools. This research explores factors that are important to the job choices of teachers in training. Focus groups were held with students at three universities, and a policy-capturing study was done using 64 job scenarios representing various levels of pay and working conditions. Focus group results suggested that: a) many pre-service teachers, even relatively late in their preparation, are not committed to a particular district and are willing to consider many possibilities, including high need schools; b) although pay and benefits were attractive to the students, loan forgiveness and subsidies for further education were also attractive; and c) small increments of additional salary did not appear as important or attractive as other job characteristics. The policy-capturing study showed that working conditions factors, especially principal support, had more influence on simulated job choice than pay level, implying that money might be better spent to attract, retain, or train better principals than to provide higher beginning salaries to teachers in schools with high-poverty or a high proportion of students of color