The Rhetoric of Shell Shock

UMKC Honors Colleg

Whither Experimental Semantics?

The main goal of the paper is to propose a methodology for the theory of reference in which experiments feature prominently. These experiments should primarily test linguistic usage rather than the folk’s referential intuitions. The proposed methodology urges the use of: (A) philosophers’ referential intuitions, both informally and, occasionally, scientifically gathered; (B) the corpus, both informally and scientifically gathered; (C) elicited production; and, occasionally, (D) folk’s referential intuitions. The most novel part of this is (C) and that is where most of the experimental work should be. The secondary goal of the paper is to defend my earlier paper “Experimental Semantics” from the criticisms of Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich in “If Folk Intuitions Vary, Then What?” They charge that I have seriously misunderstood their goal in “Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style” and that many of my arguments are “largely irrelevant”. I argue that these charges are baseless

Responding to a hatchet job Ludlow’s review of ignorance of language.

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Linguistic Intuitions and Cognitive Penetrability

Metalinguistic intuitions play a very large evidential role in both linguistics and philosophy. Linguists think that these intuitions are products of underlying linguistic competence. I call this view “the voice of competence” (“VoC”). Although many philosophers seem to think that metalinguistic intuitions are a priori many may implicitly hold the more scientifically respectable VoC. According to VoC, I argue, these intuitions can be cognitively penetrated by the central processor. But, I have argued elsewhere, VoC is false. Instead, we should hold “the modest explanation” (“ME”) according to which these intuitions are fairly unreflective empirical theory-laden central-processor responses to phenomena. On ME, no question of cognitive penetration arises. ME has great methodological significance for the study of language. Insofar as we rely on intuitions as evidence we should prefer those of linguists and philosophers because they are more expert. But, more importantly, we should be seeking other evidence in linguistic usage

Intuitions: Rijeka Response to Nenad Miščević

This paper is a response to Nenad Miščević’s “Reply to Michael Devitt”, the latest in an exchange on the source of linguistic intuitions. Miščević defends a modifi ed version (“MoVoC”) of the received view that these intuitions are the product of a linguistic competence. I have earlier rejected all versions of the received view urging instead that intuitions are, like perceptual judgments, empirical theory-laden central-processor responses to phenomena. (1) I emphasize here, against Miščević, that this claim about a speaker’s intuitions about strings is not to be confl ated with a claim about her understanding of strings. (2) I develop my claim, addressed by Miščević, that MoVoC is implausible in three ways. But these are not the main problems for MoVoC. For further discussion of those, see Jutronić’s paper in this volum