Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?

Much attention has been devoted to studying models of tournaments or situations in which an individual\u27s payment depends only on his or her output or rank relative to that of other competitors. Academic interest derives from the fact that under certain sets of assumptions, tournaments have desirable normative properties because of the incentive structures they provide. Our paper uses nonexperimental data to test whether tournaments actually elicit effort responses. We focus on professional golf tournaments because information on the incentive structure (prize distribution) and measures of individual output (players\u27 scores) are both available. We find strong support for the proposition that the level and structure of prizes in PGA tournaments influence players\u27 performance

The Incentive Effects of Tournaments Revisited: Evidence From the European PGA Tour

This analysis of data from the 1987 European Men\u27s Professional Golf Association (PGA) Tour strongly supports the hypothesis that the level and structure of prizes in PGA tournaments influence players\u27 performance. Specifically, players\u27 performance appears to vary positively with both the total money prizes awarded in a tournament and the marginal return to effort in the final round of play (a value that varies among players largely depending on how the prize money is allocated among finishers of different ranks). The authors suggest that these results, together with the similar results of their earlier study of the 1984 U.S. Men\u27s PGA Tour, may have implications for the design of compensation systems for certain groups of workers, such as corporate executives, college professors, and salespeople

New Market Power Models and Sex Differences in Pay

In the context of certain general equilibrium search models, it is possible to infer the elasticity of labor supply to the firm from the elasticity of the quit rate with respect to the wage. We use this framework to estimate the elasticity of labor supply for men and women workers at a chain of grocery stores operating in the southwestern United States, identifying separation elasticities from differences in wages and separation rates across different job titles within the firm. We estimate elasticities of labor supply to the firm of about 2.7 for men and about 1.5 for women, suggesting significant wage-setting power for the firm. Since women have lower elasticities of labor supply to the firm, a Robinson-style monopsony model might explain lower relative pay of women in the grocery industry. The wage gaps we observe among workers in US retail grocery stores are close to what the monopsony model predicts for the elasticities we have estimated.monopsony papers, labor supply, grocery stores, elasticity

Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?

Much attention has been devoted to studying models of tournaments or situations in which an individual's payment depends only on his output or rank, relative to other competitors. Such models are of more than academic Interest as they may well describe the compensation structures applicable to many corporate executives and professors, to sales people whose bonuses depend on their relative outputs. and to the more obvious example of professional sports tournaments. Academic interest derives from the fact that under certain sets of assumptions tournaments have desirable normative properties because of the incentive structures they provide. Our paper uses nonexperimental data to test if tournaments actually elicit desired effort responses. We focus on golf tournaments because information on the incentive structure (prize distribution) and measures of individual output (players' scores) are both available. Under suitable assumptions, players' scores can be related to players' effort and implications for both players' overall tournament scores and their scores on the last round of a tournament drawn. In addition, data are available to control for factors other than the incentive structure that should affect output; these factors include player quality, quality of the rest of the field, difficulty of the course, and weather conditions. The data used in our analyses cane from the "1985 Golf Digest Almanac", the "Official 1985 PGA Tour Media Guide", and the "1984 PGA Tour Player Record". We find strong support for the proposition that the level and structure of prizes in PGA tournaments influence players' performance.

Race and Policing: An Agenda for Action

This paper is organized into two parts -- Strategic Voice and Tactical Agency. Strategic Voice argues that problems of race in policing cannot be resolved by the police alone. Other people must help by understanding and ameliorating the social conditions that cause race to be associated with crime and hence become a dilemma for American policing. Rather than accepting these conditions as givens, police leaders with their powerful collective voice should actively call attention to what needs to be changed. Tactical Agency outlines what the police can do on their own initiative to deal with the operational dilemmas of race -- in the communities they serve and in their own organizations

Stoneware from Fayette, Greene, and Washington Counties, Pennsylvania

No abstract is available at this time

Fort Gaddis: Fact or Misnomer

No abstract is available at this time