226 research outputs found

    Closed-Loop Brain Devices in Offender Rehabilitation: Autonomy, Human Rights, and Accountability

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    The current debate on closed-loop brain devices (CBDs) focuses on their use in a medical context; possible criminal justice applications have not received scholarly attention. Unlike in medicine, in criminal justice, CBDs might be offered on behalf of the State and for the purpose of protecting security, rather than realising healthcare aims. It would be possible to deploy CBDs in the rehabilitation of convicted offenders, similarly to the much-debated possibility of employing other brain interventions in this context. Although such use of CBDs could in principle be consensual, there are significant differences between the choice faced by a criminal offender offered a CBD in the context of criminal justice, and that faced by a patient offered a CBD in an ordinary healthcare context. Employment of CBDs in criminal justice thus raises ethical and legal intricacies not raised by healthcare applications. This paper examines some of these issues under three heads: autonomy, human rights, and accountability

    Technologie en de menselijke maat in het strafrecht

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    The central question of this chapter is: how can technology be used in criminal justice in a humane manner

    Virtual reality interventions for victims of crime: A systematic review

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    In the forensic field, most studies employing virtual reality (VR) interventions have focused on offenders. The validity and safety of VR applications for victims of crime are still unclear. Following PRISMA guidelines, a systematic review on VR interventions for crime victims was performed to assess the efficacy, acceptability by patients, and cost-effectiveness of these interventions compared to in-person care. We identified 34 potentially eligible studies from 188 records obtained from database searches (Medline/Pubmed, CINAHL, PsycINFO, Web of Science, and Scopus); four additional articles were identified via alternative sources. In total, nine articles were included for the qualitative synthesis. Patient satisfaction with VR interventions was found to be equivalent to face-to-face interventions. Both VR exposure and control groups found relief from posttraumatic symptoms, with differences either statistically insignificant or in favor of VR. Despite the increased costs linked to the technology required, VR appears to be a promising alternative to in vivo exposure, but further research is needed. Limitations of the review include the varied experimental protocols, which did not allow us to conduct a quantitative analysis and comparison of findings across different studies, and the generally poor quality of the studies included. Further research, preferably in larger groups, is needed to shed more light on the effectiveness of VR interventions for traumatized victims of crime

    Chapter 3 Persuasive technologies and the right to mental liberty

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    The outline of this chapter is as follows. In section 2 we provide a further definition of PTs, and present some possibilities that PTs offer for the smart correctional rehabilitation of criminal offenders. Next, in section 3, we briefly discuss the right to mental liberty and the extent to which this right is guaranteed by existing European human rights. In section 4, we discuss three considerations that should be relevant in specifying human rights protection against smart rehabilitation. Subsequently, in section 5 we explore whether the use of PTs in the context of smart rehabilitation would infringe an appropriately specified legal right to mental liberty. We suggest that, in this context, it might be difficult to identify compelling distinctions between novel forms of smart rehabilitation and more traditional criminal legal interventions, such as the imposition of a prison sentence or a psychological treatment program

    Free will, neuroscience, and choice: towards a decisional capacity model for insanity defense evaluations

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    Il libero arbitrio è stato spesso considerato una tematica centrale nella dottrina della responsabilità criminale. Ciononostante, il concetto stesso di libero arbitrio presenta intrinseche problematiche nella sua definizione teorica e applicazione pratica in un contesto clinico/ forense ed è intensamente dibattuto. Nello specifico, l’esistenza stessa del libero arbitrio è stata recentemente posta in discussione anche sulla base di alcune evidenze sperimentali neuroscientifiche. Questo dibattito ha implicazioni significative in quei campi in cui l’associazione tra libertà di scelta è comportamento costituisce il focus di interesse, quali la psichiatria forense. Esiste inoltre una sorta di conflittualità tra la centralità e concezione teorica del libero arbitrio (free will) e il suo status e applicazione pratica. Questo problema ha bisogno di essere affrontato, specialmente all’interno della psichiatria forense, dal momento che risulta rilevante per l’effettiva valutazione dell’infermità di mente. Nel presente articolo cercheremo di rendere operativo il concetto del “libero arbitrio” utilizzando il modello a quattro dimensioni utilizzato per la capacità decisionale, che può essere impiegato nella valutazione forense dell’infermità di mente. Descriveremo i suoi vantaggi e applicazioni per guidare la valutazione dell’infermità di mente. Mentre il libero arbitrio è spesso considerato problematico dal punto di vista delle neuroscienze, questo modello, a nostro avviso, è compatibile con le neuroscienze; inoltre, le valutazioni che utilizzino questo modello possono anche essere arricchite e rafforzate dalle scoperte neuro scientifiche, per esempio riguardo il controllo inibitorioFree will has often been considered central to criminal responsibility. Yet, the concept of free will is also difficult to define and operationalize, and, moreover, it is intensely debated. In particular, the very existence of free will has been denied based on recent neuroscience findings. This debate has significant implications on those fields in which the link between free will and behaviour is the main focus of interest, such as forensic psychiatry. In fact, a tension is often experienced between the centrality of the notion of free will on the one hand, and its controversial status on the other. This tension needs to be addressed, especially in forensic psychiatry, since it is relevant for actual assessments of legal insanity. In the present paper we will try to operationalize “free will” using a fourpartite decision-making capacity model, which can be used in forensic assessment of insanity. We will describe its advantages and application to guide mental insanity assessments. Whereas free will is often considered problematic from a neuroscience perspective, this model, we argue, is compatible with neuroscience; moreover, evaluations using this model can also be informed and strengthened by neuroscientific findings, for example regarding inhibitory control

    The various faces of vulnerability: offering neurointerventions to criminal offenders

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    In recent years, we have witnessed considerable progress in neurotechnologies that visualize or alter a person’s brain and mental features. In the near future, some of these technologies could possibly be used to change neural parameters of high-risk behavior in criminal offenders, often referred to as neurointerventions. The idea of delivering neurointerventions to criminal justice populations has raised fundamental normative concerns, but some authors have argued that offering neurointerventions to convicted offenders could be permissible. However, such offers raise normative concerns too. One prominent worry that is often emphasized in the literature, relates to the vulnerability of convicted offenders in prison and forensic patients in mental health facilities. In this paper, we aim to show that as far as vulnerability is considered relevant within the context of offering medical interventions to offenders, it could contribute to arguments against as well as in favor of these offers

    Persuasive Technologies and the Right to Mental Liberty: The ‘Smart’ Rehabilitation of Criminal Offenders

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    Every day, millions of people use mobile phones, play video games and surf the Internet. It is thus important to determine how technologies like these change what people think and how they behave. This is a central issue in the study of persuasive technologies. ‘Persuasive technologies’—henceforth ‘PTs’—are digital technologies, such as mobile apps, video games and virtual reality systems, that are deployed for the explicit purpose of changing attitudes and/or behaviours, without using coercion, deception or extreme forms of psychological manipulation (such as hypnosis or indoctrination), and without exerting a direct (not psychologically mediated) physical effect on the brain. Typically PTs employ strategies such as prompting, information provision and encouragement..

    Zwijgen in de 21e eeuw:Tijd voor herbezinning op het recht tegen zelfincriminatie?

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