Un controesempio al Modus Ponens

La traduzione dell’articolo è stata resa possibile grazie al consenso dell’autore e del Journal of Philosophy. Riferimenti originali: Vann McGee (1985): “A Counterexample to Modus Ponens”, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 82, No. 9 (Sep. 1985), pp. 462-47. [N.d.T.

Field's Logic of Truth

Saving Truth from Paradox is a re-exciting development. The 70s and 80s were a time of excitement among people working on the semantic paradoxes. There were continual formal developments, with the constant hope that these results would yield deep insights. The enthusiasm wore off, however, as people became more cognizant of the disparity between what they had accomplished, impressive as it was, and what they had hoped to accomplish. They moved onto other problems that they hoped would prove more yielding. That, at least, was how it seemed to me, so I was delighted to see a dramatically new formal development that is likely to rekindle our enthusiasm

Vagueness in Geography

Some have argued that the vagueness exhibited by geographic names and descriptions such as ''Albuquerque,'' ''the Outback,'' or ''Mount Everest'' is ultimately ontological: these terms are vague because they refer to vague objects , objects with fuzzy boundaries. I take the opposite stand and hold the view that geographic vagueness is exclusively semantic, or conceptual at large. There is no such thing as a vague mountain. Rather, there are many things where we conceive a mountain to be, each with its precise boundary, and when we say ''Everest'' we are just being vague as to which thing we are referring to. This paper defends this view against some plausible objections

Book Review of: FRANCESCO BERTO. There's Something about Godel. Malden, Mass., and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. ISBN 978-1-4051-9766-3 (hbk); 978-1-4051-9767-0 (pbk). Pp. xx + 233. English translation of Tutti pazzi per Godel! (Rome: Gius, Laterza & Figli, 2008)

There's Something about Godel is a bargain: two books in one. The first half is a gentle but rigorous introduction to the incompleteness theorems for the mathematically uninitiated. The second is a survey of the philosophical, psychological, and sociological consequences people have attempted to derive from the theorems, some of them quite fantastical

Review of The Tarskian Turn

Leon Horsten has produced a valuable survey of deflationary axiomatic theories of sentential truth

Logic I

This course provides an introduction to the aims and techniques of formal logic. Logic is the science of correct argument, and our study of logic will aim to understand what makes a correct argument good, that is, what is it about the structure of a correct argument that guarantees that, if the premises are all true, the conclusion will be true as well? Our subject (though, to be sure, we can only scratch the surface) will be truth and proof, and the connection between them

Thought, thoughts, and deflationism

Deflationists about truth embrace the positive thesis that the notion of truth is useful as a logical device, for such purposes as blanket endorsement, and the negative thesis that the notion doesn’t have any legitimate applications beyond its logical uses, so it cannot play a significant theoretical role in scientific inquiry or causal explanation. Focusing on Christopher Hill as exemplary deflationist, the present paper takes issue with the negative thesis, arguing that, without making use of the notion of truth conditions, we have little hope for a scientific understanding of human speech, thought, and action. For the reference relation, the situation is different. Inscrutability arguments give reason to think that a more-than-deflationary theory of reference is unattainable. With respect to reference, deflationism is the only game in town