The credibility of central bank announcements

In this paper, we present a monetary policy game in which the central bank has a private forecast of supply and demand shocks. The public needs to form its inflationary expectations and can make use of central bank announcements. However, because of the credibility problem that the central bank faces, the public will not believe a precise announcement. By extending the arrangement proposed by Garfinkel and Oh (1995) to a model that includes private information about both demand and supply shocks, we investigate the feasibility of making imprecise credible announcements concerning the rate of inflation. Klassifikation:E52;E5

Why Speed Doesn’t Kill: Learning to Believe in Disinflation

Central bankers generally prefer to reduce inflation gradually. We show that a central bank may try to convince the private sector of its commitment to price stability by choosing to reduce inflation quickly. We call this "teaching by doing". We find that allowing for teaching by doing effects always speeds up the disinflation and leads to lower inflation persistence. So, we clarify why "speed" in the disinflation process does not necessarily "kill" in the sense of creating large output losses. This result also holds in an environment where private agents learn about the central bank’s inflation target using a constant gain algorithm.learning, disinflation, credibility, sacrifice ratio

Price setting behaviour in the Netherlands: results of a survey

This paper presents the results of a survey among Dutch firms on price setting behaviour in the Netherlands. It aims to identify how sticky prices are, which prices are sticky and why they are sticky. It is part of the Eurosystem Inflation Persistence Network (IPN). The most distinctive feature of the Dutch survey is its broad coverage of the business community (seven sectors and seven size classes). Our primary finding is that price setting behaviour depends critically on both a firm’s size and the competitive environment it faces. Small firms in particular adopt more rigid pricing policies, and the weaker the competition a firm faces, the stickier a company’s price will be. Furthermore, we find that wholesale and retail prices are more flexible than those for business-to-business services. The survey suggests that explicit and informal contracting are the most important sources of price stickiness. Menu costs and psychological pricing – two prominent explanations of price stickiness in the literature – are of minor importance. Finally, there is clear evidence of asymmetries in shocks driving price increases and decreases. JEL Classification: E30, D40nominal rigidity, price setting, survey data

Price, wage and employment response to shocks: evidence from the WDN survey

This paper analyses information from survey data collected in the framework of the Eurosystem's Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) on patterns of firm-level adjustment to shocks. We document that the relative intensity and the character of price vs. cost and wage vs. employment adjustments in response to cost-push shocks depend - in theoretically sensible ways - on the intensity of competition in firms' product markets, on the importance of collective wage bargaining and on other structural and institutional features of firms and of their environment. Focusing on the passthrough of cost shocks to prices, our results suggest that the pass-through is lower in highly competitive firms. Furthermore, a high degree of employment protection and collective wage agreements tend to make this pass-through stronger. --Wage bargaining,labour-market institutions,survey data,European Union

Price, wage and employment response to shocks: evidence from the WDN survey

This paper analyses information from survey data collected in the framework of the Eurosystem’s Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) on patterns of firm-level adjustment to shocks. We document that the relative intensity and the character of price vs. cost and wage vs. employment adjustments in response to cost-push shocks depend – in theoretically sensible ways – on the intensity of competition in firms’ product markets, on the importance of collective wage bargaining and on other structural and institutional features of firms and of their environment. Focusing on the passthrough of cost shocks to prices, our results suggest that the pass-through is lower in highly competitive firms. Furthermore, a high degree of employment protection and collective wage agreements tend to make this pass-through stronger. JEL Classification: J31, J38, P50European Union, Labour-market institutions, survey data, wage bargaining

Credit shocks and the European Labour market

Más de cinco años después del inicio de la crisis de la deuda soberana en Europa, su impacto sobre las variables del mercado laboral no está claro. El objetivo de este documento es contribuir a llenar este vacío. Utilizamos datos cualitativos a escala de empresa para 24 países europeos, recopilados en la Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) del SEBC. Primero, construimos un conjunto de índices que miden las dificultades para acceder al mercado crediticio en los 24 países para el período 2010-2013. En segundo lugar, describimos la relación entre las dificultades crediticias y los ajustes en las variables laborales tanto en el margen extensivo como intensivo del empleo, así como en los salarios. Encontramos una correlación fuerte y significativa entre las dificultades crediticias y los ajustes a lo largo del margen extensivo y del margen intensivo. En cuanto a los salarios, en presencia de dificultades del mercado de crédito, las empresas reducen el componente variable de los salariosMore than five years after the start of the Sovereign debt crisis in Europe, its impact on labour market outcomes is not clear. This paper aims to fill this gap. We use qualitative firm-level data for 24 European countries, collected within the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) of the ESCB. We first derive a set of indices measuring difficulties in accessing the credit market for the period 2010-13. Second, we provide a description of the relationship between credit difficulties and changes in labour input both along the extensive and the intensive margins as well as on wages. We find strong and significant correlation between credit difficulties and adjustments along both the extensive and the intensive margin. In the presence of credit market diffi culties, firms cut wages by reducing the variable part of wages. This evidence suggests that credit shocks can affect not only the real economy, but also nominal variable

A tentative exploration of the effects of Brexit on foreign direct investment vis-à-vis the United Kingdom

La integración en la Unión Europea (UE) ha impulsado la inversión extranjera directa (IED) hacia el Reino Unido, que mantiene un stock relativamente importante de entradas en forma de IED. Este ha aumentado notablemente desde 2005, alcanzando el 61% de su producto interior bruto (PIB) en 2017. La salida del Reino Unido de la UE y del Mercado Único probablemente resultará en flujos de IED más reducidos entre ambos destinos de inversión. El objetivo de este estudio es examinar los efectos que el resultado del referéndum del brexit, de junio de 2016, ha podido tener en la actividad de IED relacionada con el Reino Unido. Si bien los flujos de IEA son notablemente volátiles, con presencia de un gran número de valores atípicos, y con la cautela precisa por la escasa disponibilidad de datos temporales posteriores al referéndum, el análisis encuentra cierta evidencia de una disminución en los flujos brutos de IED entre el Reino Unido y la UE con posterioridad al referéndum. Esto se evidencia, en particular, en el caso de las grandes economías de la UE y en el de Irlanda. Con respecto a una forma particular de IED, inversión en nuevos proyectos (greenfield IED), se encuentra evidencia de un descenso en proyectos anunciados y gastos de capital en el Reino Unido por parte de otros países de la UE en el período posterior al referéndum, así como en la inversión proveniente de Estados Unidos, uno de los socios más importantes no pertenecientes a la UE. (...)European Union (EU) integration has boosted inward EU foreign direct investment (FDI) into the United Kingdom (UK). Within the EU, the UK has a relatively significant stock of inward FDI, having reached 61% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2017 and risen strongly since 2005. The exit of the UK from the EU and the Single Market will probably result in reduced FDI amongst both investment destinations. The aim of this study is to look at the “real-time” effects of the Brexit June 2016 referendum outcome and its aftermath on UK-related FDI activity. Although FDI flows are notably volatile and biased by periodic non-systematic outliers, and despite some caveats on data sources and availability of time series data, we find tentative evidence of a post-referendum slowdown in gross FDI flows between the UK and the EU, notably involving the big EU economies and Ireland. Regarding a very favoured form of FDI, greenfield FDI, we document a post-referendum fall in announced projects and capital expenditures into the UK by both other EU countries as well as one of the most important non-EU partners, the United States. (...