Understanding the gender wage gap differential between public and private sector in Italy : a quantile approach for panel data

This paper analyzes the gender wage gaps across the wage distribution in both the private and public sectors in Italy for the years 2005-2010. We use quantile regression methods to estimate and decompose the gender wage gap at different points of the wage distribution. We find in both sectors a consistent level of gender wage gap (lower in the public sector) and an increasing path along the wage distribution. Counterfactual decomposition analysis supports the idea of a sticky floor mechanism in action in the private sector and of a glass ceiling in the public sector. In addition to standard decomposition techniques we propose a two step procedure that relies on a novel approach to estimating fixed effects quantile regressions. Its main advantage is that it allows the estimation of the marginal effect of the employment sector on wages at different points of the distribution, while accounting for both observable and time-invariant unobservable factors. When we control for employees\u2019 observed and unobservable individual characteristics, the main finding is that the gender wage gap substantially decreases in both sectors. A second evidence is that the sticky floor effect in the private sector vanishes, while the glass ceiling effect in the public sector remains. The evidence from the longitudinal analysis amplifies the differences of the wage-setting mechanisms in the two sectors

Launch of a product and patents : evidence from the US cardiovascular pharmaceutical sector

Recent literature on the role of patents in shaping competition between incumbents and new entrants shows mixed evidence, as patents can discourage entry into markets but may also encourage potential entrants by increasing profitability from research and development. The increasing use of patents as strategic weapons motivates this investigation of the impact of innovation on competition. In a case study of US pharmaceutical cardiovascular submarkets over the period 1988-1998, we use a panel probit model to study the impact of a firm\u2019s patents and rivals\u2019 patents in the firm\u2019s decision to launch new products. Our results show that the number of a firm\u2019s lagged patents encourages the firm\u2019s entry with new products, while rivals\u2019 initial stock of patents discourages entry, but more recent patents promote entry by opening new technological opportunities

Autologus peripheral stem cell transplantation in a patient with diffuse systemic sclerosis: our experience

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Scope Economies in the Pharmaceutical Sector

The paper\u2019s objectives are twofold : to propose an experimental simulation to measure scope economies between pairs of submarkets and to point out the role of submarkets in explaining the concentration level in the pharmaceutical market. We simulate scope economies consistent with the diversification choices of large international companies in the years 1987 and 1997. Our results suggest that: i) the random diversification (that is no scope economies hypothesis) is rejected, and ii) scope economies are significant

Entry and Submarket Concentration : empirical Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry

The paper investigates the decisions of companies to enter new submarkets, analyzing the relationship between submarket concentration and entry through the explanatory power of submarkets. The relationship is analyzed both at the aggregate level for all countries and at the country-specific level using a pharmaceutical company dataset gathered in seven countries in the 1987-1998 period. A Bayesian panel probit model enables us to measure entry into a new submarket using the lagged dependent variable to incorporate potential state persistence. The results obtained at the submarket level indicate a negative correlation between concentration and entry by diversification, although previous literature at market level has indicated conflicting results for the same relationship

Diversification by entry into a new submarket?

Using a dataset on the subsector and geographical segmentation of 208 Pharmaceutical companies, a Bayesian panel probit is used to analyze the role of state dependency, size and achieved diversification in affecting entry decision. We properly account for unobservable heterogeneity in a context with nonstrictly exogenous regressors. We find that achieved diversification, measured by the number of submarkets already entered affects negatively the probability of entry. Beside some country-specific exceptions, size and the lagged dependent variable do not seem to be relevant

Entry into pharmaceutical submarkets : a Bayesian panel probit analysis

We study entry into pharmaceutical submarkets by using a dynamic panel probit model. We develop a Bayesian version of Wooldridge's approach to dealing with unobserved heterogeneity. We distinguish between greenfield entry (entry with first product) and undifferentiated entry, which may take the form of introducing further products. We extend the standard reduced form model to consider company size in the submarket and across all submarkets. We find that greenfield and undifferentiated entries have different determinants, that global and submarket size measures have different effects and that sunk costs often have positive effects on entry due to a commitment mechanism

Entry in Pharmaceutical Submarkets:a Bayesian Panel Probit analysis

We study entry into pharmaceutical submarkets by using a dynamic panel probit model. We develop a Bayesian version of Wooldridge's approach to dealing with unobserved heterogeneity. We distinguish between greenfield entry (entry with first product) and undifferentiated entry, which may take the form of introducing further products. We extend the standard reduced form model to consider company size in the submarket and across all submarkets. We find that greenfield and undifferentiated entries have different determinants, that global and submarket size measures have different effects and that sunk costs often have positive effects on entry due to a commitment mechanism