How Costly is it for Poor Farmers to Lift Themselves out of Subsistence?

The main objective of this paper is to provide estimates of the cost of moving out of subsistence for Madagascar's farmers. The analysis is based on a simple asset-return model of occupational choice. Estimates suggest that the entry (sunk) cost associated with moving out of subsistence can be quite large|somewhere between 124 and 153 percent of a subsistence farmer's annual production. Our results make it possible to identify farm characteristics likely to generatee large gains if moved out of subsistence, yielding useful information for the targeting of trade-adjustment assistance programs

Productive Development Policies in Latin American Countries: The Case of Peru, 1990-2007

This paper assesses the institutional setting and productive impact of selected productive development policies (PDPs), institutions, and programs implemented in Peru during the period 1990-2007. The assessment is based on a simple, basic framework of a series of economic or market failures that may have constrained the transformation of the productive structure, the process of innovation, and the growth of total factor productivity. Evidence indicates that the PDPs and structural reforms implemented in Peru did not significantly alter the productive structure of the Peruvian economy. If the objectives of the PDPs are to transform the productive structure, increase total factor productivity, and enhance innovation, government interventions need to focus directly on the source of market failures and create quality productive changes within the private sector

Tariff Reforms in the Presence of Foreign Actors.

Bhagwati and Brecher (1980) showed that when the relative amount of foreign-owned factors in the host country is sufficiently large as to induce a change in the direction of the trade pattern, immiserising tariff reductions may occur. Here it is shown that in the mirror case when foreign-owned factors tend to promote the existing trade pattern (i.e. trade-promoting), similar results can be obtained.TARIFFS;INTERNATIONAL TRADE;CAPITAL;FINANCIAL MARKET

Tariff Reductions in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment.

FREE TRADE;INVESTMENTS

Barriers to Exit from Subsistence Agriculture

This paper reviews the evidence on the determinants of subsistence agriculture and the barriers that farmers face to switch to market-oriented agriculture. We review a number of recent empirical approaches to the estimation of variable, fixed, and sunk transaction costs, with the weight of the evidence suggesting that those costs are very substantial. Tentative policy implications are drawn in terms of infrastructure and support as well as the organization of intermediation markets

External Quota Harmonization in FTAs: A Step Backward ?

This paper explores how political-economy forces shape quantitative barriers against the rest of the world in an FTA. We show that whereas the dilution of lobbying power in an FTA typically leads to a relaxation of external quotas, this result is likely to be overturned as integration deepens. In particular, we show that cooperation among member countries on the level of their external quotas, cross-border lobbying by import-competing interests in the free-trade area, and the consolidation of national external quotas into a single one, all lead to stffer restrictions against imports from the rest of the world. We also show that unlike tariffs, endogenous quotas are not crucially a ected by the presence of rules of origin

Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption: Does PSI Help?

This paper provides a new approach to the evaluation of pre-shipment inspection (PSI) programs as ways of improving tariff-revenue collection and reducing fraud when customs administrations are corrupt. We build a model highlighting the contribution of surveillance firms to the generation of information and describing how incentives for fraud and collusive behaviour between importers and customs are affected by the introduction of PSI. It is shown theoretically that the introduction of PSI has an ambiguous effect on the level of customs fraud. Empirically, our econometric results suggest that PSI reduced fraud in the Philippines; it increased it in Argentina and had no significant impact in Indonesia