International Trade, Foreign Investment, and the Formation of the Entrepreneurial Class

In this paper, I examine the argument that free trade may be harmful to less developed countries, because such international competition inhibits the formation of a local entrepreneurial class.I view the entrepreneur as the manager of the industrial enterprise, as well as the agent who bears the risks associated with industrial production. A two-sector model of a small open economy is developed in which the size of the entrepreneurial class is endogenous.It is shown that the entrepreneurial class is smaller under free trade than would be first-best optimal in the presence of efficient risk-sharing institutions such as stock markets. Nonetheless, there are potential gains from trade, and any protectionist policy that increases the number of entrepreneurs will have deleterious welfare consequences.

International Competition and the Unionized Sector

This paper studies the wage and employment behavior of a unionized sector that is confronted by an intensification of international competition. After developing a formal model of a monopoly union subject to majority rule, I study the response of a unionized sector operating under a seniority rule for layoffs and rehires to a trend decrease in the international price of its output. Conditions are provided to validate the casual argument that majority voting in unions and the seniority system together provide an explanation for the lack of union wage adjustment. A modified version of the model allows the job queue to deviate from a strict seniority ranking. In this context I ask, what importance can be attached to the seniority system in determining the wage response to international competition?

Imports as a Cause of Injury: The Case of the U.S. Steel Industry

Recently, the United States International Trade Commission conducted a Section 201 or "escape clause" hearing to determine whether imports have been the most significant cause of injury to the U.S. steel industry. This paper suggests a methodology for conducting the necessary analysis for such determinations, and applies it to the case of the steel industry. First, a reduced-form equation for steel industry employment is derived and estimated. The equation specifies industry employment as a function of the price of imported steel, the price of energy, the price of iron ore, a time trend, real income and (in one variant) the wage rate in the steel industry. The estimated coefficients are used to perform counter factual simulations, which allow us to attribute changes in industry employment to their proximate causes. The analysis reveals that for the period from 1976 to 1983, a secular shift away from employment in the steel industry has been the most important cause of injury. For the shorter period from 1979 to 1983, secular shift and import competition are roughly equal in importance, with the latter being entirely the result of the substantial appreciation of the U.S. dollar during this period.

Comparative Advantage and Long-Run Growth

We construct a dynamic, two-country model of trade and growth in which endogenous technological progress results from the profit-maximizing behavior of entrepreneurs. We study the role that the external trading environment and that trade and industrial policies play in the determination of long-run growth rates. We find that cross-country differences in efficiency at R&D versus manufacturing (i.e. comparative advantage) bear importantly on the growth effects of economic structure and commercial policies. Our analysis allows for both natural and acquired comparative advantage, and we discuss the primitive determinants of the latter.

Outsourcing in a Global Economy

We study the determinants of the location of sub-contracted activity in a general equilibrium model of outsourcing and trade. We model outsourcing as an activity that requires search for a partner and relationship-specific investments that are governed by incomplete contracts. The extent of international outsourcing depends inter alia on the thickness of the domestic and foreign market for input suppliers, the relative cost of searching in each market, the relative cost of customizing inputs, and the nature of the contracting environment in each country.outsourcing, imperfect contracting, trade in intermediate goods, intra-industry trade

Counterfeit-Product Trade

We analyze a two-country model of trade in both legitimate and counterfeit products. Domestic firms own trademarks and establish reputations for delivering high-quality products in a steady-state equilibrium. Foreign suppliers export legitimate low-quality merchandise and counterfeits of domestic brand-name goods. Heterogeneous home consumers either purchase low-quality imports or buy brand-name products, rationally expecting some degree of counterfeiting of the latter. We characterize a counterfeiting equilibrium and explore its properties. We describe the positive and normative effects of counterfeiting in comparison with a no-counterfeiting benchmark. Finally, we provide a welfare analysis of border inspection policy and of policy regarding the disposition of counterfeit goods that are confiscated at the border.

Endogenous Innovation in the Theory of Growth

This paper makes the case that purposive, profit-seeking investments in knowledge play a critical role in the long-run growth process. First, we review the implications of neoclassical growth theory and the more recent theories of 'endogenous growth'. Then we discuss the empirical evidence that bears on the modeling of long-run growth. Finally, we describe in more detail a model of growth based on endogenous technological progress and discuss the lessons that such models can teach us.

Incomplete Contracts and Industrial Organization

We develop an equilibrium model of industrial structure in which the organization of firms is endogenous. Differentiated consumer products can be produced either by vertically integrated firms or by pairs of specialized companies. Production of each variety of consumer good requires a unique, specialized component. Vertically integrated firms can manufacture the components they need in the quantity and type that maximizes profits, but they face a relatively high cost of governance. Specialized firms can produce at lower cost, but input suppliers face a potential hold-up problem. We study the equilibrium mode of organization when inputs are fully or partially specialized. We consider how the degree of competition in the market and other parameters affect the equilibrium choices, and how the equilibrium compares with the efficient allocation.

Asset Bubbles and Endogenous Growth

We study the interaction between productive and nonproductive savings in an economy that grows in the long run due to endogenous improvements in labor productivity. As in the neoclassical growth setting with overlapping generations studied by Tirole (1985), asset bubbles can exist in an economy with endogenous growth provided they are not too large and that the growth rate in the equilibrium without bubbles exceeds the interest rate. Since the growth rate in the bubble-less equilibrium is endogenous, the existence condition reflects parameters of tastes and technology. We find that bubbles, when they exist, retard the growth of the economy, perhaps even in the long run, and reduce the welfare of all generations born after the bubble appears.