78 research outputs found
The effect of information on social preferences towards an outgroup of refugees: A field experiment
Previous research has shown that individuals discriminate against outgroup members in economic decision-tasks (e.g., Chen and Li 2009, Hett et al. 2017, see also Social Identity Theory, Tajfel and Turner 1979). In this paper, we examine sendersâ economic decisions in a dictator game, given that the receiver belongs to a refugee outgroup. First, we find that providing stylized information about the perspective of the receiver influences sendersâ social preferences. Second, we show that political preferences matter substantially. Our data reveal that sendersâ political orientation moderates the effect of information on their social preferences: While the information treatment strengthens social preferences towards outgroup members for more left-wing oriented participants, the treatment effect on participants who favor more right-wing parties is even negative. Our experiment allows to derive policy implications on how attitudes towards refugees could be altered
Perspective taking does not moderate the price precision effect, but indirectly affects counteroffers to asking prices
Precise asking-prices (e.g., 250,000), are stronger anchors, leading buyers to counter closer to the asking-price. This 'precision effect' is driven by (i) higher evaluation of the seller's competence, and (ii) buyers using a finer-grained numerical scale when the asking-price is precise compared with round. But are buyers more susceptible to precise anchors, the more they take the seller's perspective? If so, what are the underlying mechanisms leading to this increased susceptibility? We examine the potential moderating role of trait (Experiment 1) and manipulated (Experiment 2) perspective-taking on the price precision effect and its underlying mechanisms. We test the prediction that the more buyers take the seller's perspective, the more they will evaluate a precise-opening seller as competent, which in turn will increase buyers' susceptibility to precise prices (H1). We further test two competing predictions regarding the moderating role (H2a) of perspective-taking versus lack thereof (H2b) on buyers' use of a finer-grained numerical scale when countering a precise asking-price. Results revealed that precise asking-prices lead to counteroffers closer to the asking-price. This price precision effect was driven by the scale granularity, but not the perception of seller's competence mechanism. Further, perspective-taking did not moderate the price precision effect. Exploratory analyses revealed that perspective-taking leads to higher perception of seller's competence, which in turn leads to counteroffers that are closer to the asking-price. Overall, both price precision and perspective-taking shape counteroffers (but not in an interaction), making the two factors important in negotiation processes
Precious property or magnificent money? How money salience but not temperature priming affects first-offer anchors in economic transactions
The present study aims for a better understanding of how individualsâ behavior in monetary price negotiations differs from their behavior in bartering situations. Two contrasting hypotheses were derived from endowment theory and current negotiation research to examine whether negotiators are more susceptible to anchoring in price negotiations versus in bartering transactions. In addition, past research found that cues of coldness enhance cognitive control and reduce anchoring effects. We attempted to replicate these coldness findings for price anchors in a distributive negotiations scenario and to illuminate the potential interplay of coldness priming with a price versus bartering manipulation. Participants (N=219) were recruited for a 2 Ă 2 between-subjects negotiation experiment manipulating (1) monetary focus and (2) temperature priming. Our data show a higher anchoring susceptibility in price negotiations than in bartering transactions. Despite a successful priming manipulation check, coldness priming did not enhance cognitive control (nor interact with the price/bartering manipulation). Our findings improve our theoretical understanding of how the focus on negotiation resources frames economic transactions as either unidirectional or bidirectional, and how this focus shapes partiesâ susceptibility for the anchoring bias and negotiation behavior. Implications for theory and practice are discussed
Bargaining zone distortion in negotiations: The elusive power of multiple alternatives
AbstractWe challenge the assumption that having multiple alternatives is always better than a single alternative by showing that negotiators who have additional alternatives ironically exhibit downward-biased perceptions of their own and their opponentâs reservation price, make lower demands, and achieve worse outcomes in distributive negotiations. Five studies demonstrate that the apparent benefits of multiple alternatives are elusive because multiple alternatives led to less ambitious first offers (Studies 1â2) and less profitable agreements (Study 3). This distributive disadvantage emerged because negotiatorsâ perception of the bargaining zone was more distorted when they had additional (less attractive) alternatives than when they only had a single alternative (Studies 1â3). We further found that this multiple-alternatives disadvantage only emerges when negotiators used quantitative (versus qualitative) evaluation standards to gauge the extremity of their offers (Study 4), and when they base their offers on their own numerical alternative(s) versus on opponent information (Study 5)
The too-much precision effect: When and why precise anchors backfire with experts
All data and materials have been made publicly available via the Open Science Framework and can be accessed at https://osf.io/b8zft/.</p
Addressing climate change with behavioral science:A global intervention tournament in 63 countries
Effectively reducing climate change requires marked, global behavior change. However, it is unclear which strategies are most likely to motivate people to change their climate beliefs and behaviors. Here, we tested 11 expert-crowdsourced interventions on four climate mitigation outcomes: beliefs, policy support, information sharing intention, and an effortful tree-planting behavioral task. Across 59,440 participants from 63 countries, the interventions' effectiveness was small, largely limited to nonclimate skeptics, and differed across outcomes: Beliefs were strengthened mostly by decreasing psychological distance (by 2.3%), policy support by writing a letter to a future-generation member (2.6%), information sharing by negative emotion induction (12.1%), and no intervention increased the more effortful behavior-several interventions even reduced tree planting. Last, the effects of each intervention differed depending on people's initial climate beliefs. These findings suggest that the impact of behavioral climate interventions varies across audiences and target behaviors.</p
Addressing climate change with behavioral science:A global intervention tournament in 63 countries
Effectively reducing climate change requires marked, global behavior change. However, it is unclear which strategies are most likely to motivate people to change their climate beliefs and behaviors. Here, we tested 11 expert-crowdsourced interventions on four climate mitigation outcomes: beliefs, policy support, information sharing intention, and an effortful tree-planting behavioral task. Across 59,440 participants from 63 countries, the interventions' effectiveness was small, largely limited to nonclimate skeptics, and differed across outcomes: Beliefs were strengthened mostly by decreasing psychological distance (by 2.3%), policy support by writing a letter to a future-generation member (2.6%), information sharing by negative emotion induction (12.1%), and no intervention increased the more effortful behavior-several interventions even reduced tree planting. Last, the effects of each intervention differed depending on people's initial climate beliefs. These findings suggest that the impact of behavioral climate interventions varies across audiences and target behaviors.</p
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