The Economic Value of Resource Flexibility

The economic value of resource flexibility is discussed in the context of a model of a two-stage production process with stochastic variability. A unique optimal barrier policy is characterized with any level of capacity flexibility. The more flexible the capacities, the lower the optimal inventory limit and the higher the profit of the producer. A diffusion approximation of the model is also discussed

Cournot Oligopoly with Information Sharing

This paper studies the incentives for information sharing among firms in a Cournot oligopoly facing a linear uncertain demand and an affine conditional expectation information structure. No information sharing is found to be the unique equilibrium in two cases in which the signals with equal precision are assumed indivisible and infinitely divisible. However, the nonpooling equilibrium converges to the situation where the pooling strategies are adopted as the amount of information increases. Hence, the efficiency is achieved in the competitive equilibrium as the number of the firm become large

An Efficient Market Mechanism with Endogenous Information Acquisition: Cournot Oligopoly Case

The question of how an efficient competitive equilibrium could be reached through a pricing mechanism in which the information acquisition is endogenously determined is addressed. The traditional oligopoly market is extended to include an ex ante information market when there is uncertainty either in the cost function or the demand function. Equilibrium behavior is characterized in a two-stage noncooperative game involving n production firms and m research firms in the industry. As the environment becomes more competitive, meaning, both the information market and the tangible good market become large, the equilibrium random price of the product converges almost surely to its competitive price level with certainty and consequently the total social welfare (consumer plus producer surplus) is maximized

The Economic Value of Resource Flexibility

The economic value of resource flexibility is discussed in the context of a model of a two-stage production process with stochastic variability. A unique optimal barrier policy is characterized with any level of capacity flexibility. The more flexible the capacities, the lower the optimal inventory limit and the higher the profit of the producer. A diffusion approximation of the model is also discussed

An Efficient Market Mechanism with Endogenous Information Acquisition: Cournot Oligopoly Case

The question of how an efficient competitive equilibrium could be reached through a pricing mechanism in which the information acquisition is endogenously determined is addressed. The traditional oligopoly market is extended to include an ex ante information market when there is uncertainty either in the cost function or the demand function. Equilibrium behavior is characterized in a two-stage noncooperative game involving n production firms and m research firms in the industry. As the environment becomes more competitive, meaning, both the information market and the tangible good market become large, the equilibrium random price of the product converges almost surely to its competitive price level with certainty and consequently the total social welfare (consumer plus producer surplus) is maximized

Cournot Oligopoly with Information Sharing

This paper studies the incentives for information sharing among firms in a Cournot oligopoly facing a linear uncertain demand and an affine conditional expectation information structure. No information sharing is found to be the unique equilibrium in two cases in which the signals with equal precision are assumed indivisible and infinitely divisible. However, the nonpooling equilibrium converges to the situation where the pooling strategies are adopted as the amount of information increases. Hence, the efficiency is achieved in the competitive equilibrium as the number of the firm become large

Optimal Research for Cournot Oligopolists

We extend the classical Cournot model to take account of uncertainty in either the cost function or the demand function. By undertaking research, firms can acquire private (asymmetric) information to help resolve their uncertainty and make a more informed production decision. The model is a two stage game: in the first stage research levels are chosen, and in the second stage, conditional on private research outcomes, production decisions are made. We find that for a linear, continuous information structure there is a unique Nash equilibrium to the game. In the equilibrium there may be an inefficient amount of aggregate research and there may be incomplete pooling as well. The model specializes to the classical case when the cost of research is zero (and each firm gains essentially the same information by doing an infinite amount of research) or when the cost of research is so high no firm undertakes research

Optimal Research for Cournot Oligopolists

We extend the classical Cournot model to take account of uncertainty in either the cost function or the demand function. By undertaking research, firms can acquire private (asymmetric) information to help resolve their uncertainty and make a more informed production decision. The model is a two stage game: in the first stage research levels are chosen, and in the second stage, conditional on private research outcomes, production decisions are made. We find that for a linear, continuous information structure there is a unique Nash equilibrium to the game. In the equilibrium there may be an inefficient amount of aggregate research and there may be incomplete pooling as well. The model specializes to the classical case when the cost of research is zero (and each firm gains essentially the same information by doing an infinite amount of research) or when the cost of research is so high no firm undertakes research

Hexa­kis­(dimethyl­formamide-κO)manganese(II) μ-oxido-bis­[trichlorido­ferrate(III)]

The title compound, [Mn(C3H7NO)6][Fe2Cl6O], was obtained unintentionally as a product of an attempted synthesis of heterometallic complexes with Schiff base ligands using manganese powder and FeCl3·6H2O as starting materials. In the [Fe2OCl6]2− anion, the O atom and the Fe atom occupy positions with site symmetry and 3, respectively, resulting in a linear Fe—O—Fe angle and a staggered conformation. The octa­hedrally surrounded cation (site symmetry ) and the [Fe2Cl6O]2− anion are alternately stacked along [001]