A proposal for founding mistrustful quantum cryptography on coin tossing

A significant branch of classical cryptography deals with the problems which arise when mistrustful parties need to generate, process or exchange information. As Kilian showed a while ago, mistrustful classical cryptography can be founded on a single protocol, oblivious transfer, from which general secure multi-party computations can be built. The scope of mistrustful quantum cryptography is limited by no-go theorems, which rule out, inter alia, unconditionally secure quantum protocols for oblivious transfer or general secure two-party computations. These theorems apply even to protocols which take relativistic signalling constraints into account. The best that can be hoped for, in general, are quantum protocols computationally secure against quantum attack. I describe here a method for building a classically certified bit commitment, and hence every other mistrustful cryptographic task, from a secure coin tossing protocol. No security proof is attempted, but I sketch reasons why these protocols might resist quantum computational attack.Comment: Title altered in deference to Physical Review's fear of question marks. Published version; references update

Security of quantum key distribution protocols using two-way classical communication or weak coherent pulses

We apply the techniques introduced in [Kraus et. al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 080501, 2005] to prove security of quantum key distribution (QKD) schemes using two-way classical post-processing as well as QKD schemes based on weak coherent pulses instead of single-photon pulses. As a result, we obtain improved bounds on the secret-key rate of these schemes

Noise Tolerance of the BB84 Protocol with Random Privacy Amplification

We prove that BB84 protocol with random privacy amplification is secure with a higher key rate than Mayers' estimate with the same error rate. Consequently, the tolerable error rate of this protocol is increased from 7.5 % to 11 %. We also extend this method to the case of estimating error rates separately in each basis, which enables us to securely share a longer key.Comment: 26 pages, 1 figure, version 2 fills a logical gap in the proof. Version 3 includes an upper bound on the mutual information with finete code length by using the decoding error probability of the code. Version 4 adds a paragraph clarifying that no previous paper has proved that the BB84 with random privacy amplification can tolerate the 11% error rat

Beating the PNS attack in practical quantum cryptography

In practical quantum key distribution, weak coherent state is often used and the channel transmittance can be very small therefore the protocol could be totally insecure under the photon-number-splitting attack. We propose an efficient method to verify the upper bound of the fraction of counts caused by multi-photon pluses transmitted from Alice to Bob, given whatever type of Eve's action. The protocol simply uses two coherent states for the signal pulses and vacuum for decoy pulse. Our verified upper bound is sufficiently tight for QKD with very lossy channel, in both asymptotic case and non-asymptotic case. The coherent states with mean photon number from 0.2 to 0.5 can be used in practical quantum cryptography. We show that so far our protocol is the $only$ decoy-state protocol that really works for currently existing set-ups.Comment: So far this is the unique decoy-state protocol which really works efficiently in practice. Prior art results are commented in both main context and the Appendi

FGGE/ERBM tape specification and shipping letter description

The Nimbus-7 FGGE/ERBM tape contains 27 ERB parameters which are extracted and reformatted from the Nimbus-7 ERB-MATRIX tape. There are four types of files on a FGGE/ERBM tape: a test file; tape-header file which describes the data set characteristics and the contents of the tape; a grid-descriptor file which contains the information of the ERB scanning channel target number and their associated latitude limits and longitude intervals; and one or more data files. A single end-of-file (EOF) tape mark is written after each file, and two EOF marks are written after the last data file on the tape

FGGE/SMMR-30 tape specification and shipping letter description

The Nimbus-7 FGGE/SMMR-30 tape which contains sea ice concentration data in 30 km resolution which are extracted and reformatted from Nimbus-7 SMMR PARM-30 tapes in accordance with the FGGE level II International Exchange Format Specification is outlined. There are three types of files on a FGGE/SMMR-30 tape. The first file on the tape is a test file. The second file on the tape is a tape header file. The remaining one or more files are data files. All files are terminated with a single end of file (EOP) tape mark. The last file is terminated with two EOF tape marks. All files are made up of one or more physical records. Each physical record contains 2960 bytes. Each data file contains all available values for a 6 hour synoptic time period

FGGE/ERBZ tape specification and shipping letter description

The FGGE/ERBZ tape contains 5 parameters which are extracted and reformatted from the Nimbus-7 ERB Zonal Means Tape. There are three types of files on a FGGE/ERBZ tape: a tape header file, and data files. Physical characteristics, gross format, and file specifications are given. A sample tape check/document printout (shipping letter) is included