Refugee-Related Political Violence: When? Where? How Much?

Lack of information about the nature and extent of refugee involvement in political violence has long hindered researchers and policymakers. This paper presents new time series data in order to analyze the frequency, persistence, intensity, and type of political violence involving refugees for the years 1987 to 1998. The analysis reveals a number of interesting, and surprising, trends that contradict the conventional wisdom about refugee militarization. Overall, while absolute numbers of refugees involved in political violence have decreased, the number of states affected remains constant. The difference results from smaller refugee populations becoming involved in political violence. Another significant finding contradicts the assumption that political violence affects most refugee areas. In fact, very few refugee situations experience political violence. In most years, over one hundred states host refugees, yet 95% of all refugee-related violence usually takes place, on average, in fewer than fifteen states. The findings from this dataset reveal trends in refugee-related violence and change the terms of the current discourse on refugees and political violence

Militarized Refugee Populations: Humanitarian Challenges in the Former Yugoslavia

This paper examines the conditions under which refugee flows cause conflict to spread across borders. In order to develop propositions, the paper studies a group of Bosnian Muslim refugees who formed an army to retake their hometown. The situation of those refugees suggests that external political conditions, especially support from the refugee receiving state, determined the ability of the refugees to mobilize militarily. The presence of non-civilian elements among the refugees and the influence of powerful refugee leaders acted as necessary, but not sufficient, conditions that led to violence. The Bosnian Muslim case confirms that the actions of humanitarian agencies are constrained by the level of available resources and the attitude of the receiving state. Within those constraints, UNHCR and NGOs may attempt to prevent, reduce, or ignore political violence that involves refugees

Blame the victims? Refugees, state capacity, and non-state actor violence

Existing research argues that refugee inflows may increase the risk of domestic conflict, particularly civil war that, by definition, involves the state as an actor. However, many of the postulated mechanisms linking refugees to a higher risk of such conflict pertain to tensions with locals, which do not necessarily involve any grievances against government authorities. We contend that it is more likely to identify an association between refugees and non-state actor violence, i.e., armed violence between organized non-state groups, neither of which pertains to the state. We also claim that the extent to which refugees are associated with a higher likelihood of non-state conflict depends on the capacity of governments to manage and mitigate risks. We report evidence that refugee populations can be linked to an increased risk of non-state conflict, as well as for a mitigating effect of state capacity on the risk of non-state conflicts in the presence of refugees. We do not find a clear effect of refugee populations on civil war, suggesting that the link depends on existing conflict cleavages relevant to mobilizing refugees or locals. Our research helps to shed light on the relevant security consequences of managing refugee populations. Despite the common arguments portraying refugees as security risks in developed countries, the risk of non-state conflict applies primarily to weak states that have been forced to shoulder a disproportionate burden in hosting refugees

Catalysts of conflict : how refugee crises lead to the spread of civil war

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2002.Includes bibliographical references (p. 328-364).The spread of civil war due to refugee crises has occurred repeatedly throughout history. In some refugee crises, the sending state pursues the refugees, subjecting them to military attack. In other cases, militant exiles use the refugee camps as rear bases in their attacks on the sending state. As the cross-border attacks escalate, the risk of international war grows. The refugee crisis spawned by the 1994 genocide in Rwanda provides the most extreme example of this phenomenon. The militant actions of the Rwandan Hutu refugees in Zaire eventually sparked two international wars that led to further massive population displacement in the region. The recurring pattern of violent refugee crises, prompts the following three questions: 1) How widespread is the phenomenon of political violence involving refugees? 2) Under what conditions do refugee crises cause a civil war to spread across borders? 3) What role can international actors, such as the United Nations or the United States government, play in preventing the spread of violence? To answer the above questions, this dissertation presents new time series data on refugee-related political violence and also systematically compares violent and non-violent crises involving Rwandan, Bosnian, and Afghan refugees. This dissertation advances a political explanation for the spread of civil war in refugee crises and tests it against the prevailing socioeconomic explanation. According to the political explanation, three factors combine to cause the spread of civil war. 1) Strong political cohesion among the group before exile determines initial refugee militancy.(cont.) 2) A refugee hosting state that lacks the capability and/or willingness to secure borders and demilitarize refugees facilitates the spread of war. 3) Third party states and non-state actors that intentionally or inadvertently contribute resources to combatants expand the conflict. The humanitarian assistance literature and the policy community routinely offer socioeconomic explanations that ignore the political context of the crisis. According to those explanations, camps near the border, large populations in camps, the presence of bored young men, and poor living conditions cause cross-border violence. This dissertation finds that none of those four socioeconomic propositions satisfactorily explain the spread of civil war.by Sarah Kenyon Lischer.Ph.D

Dual targeting of JAK2 and ERK interferes with the myeloproliferative neoplasm clone and enhances therapeutic efficacy.

Myeloproliferative neoplasms (MPN) show dysregulated JAK2 signaling. JAK2 inhibitors provide clinical benefits, but compensatory activation of MAPK pathway signaling impedes efficacy. We hypothesized that dual targeting of JAK2 and ERK1/2 could enhance clone control and therapeutic efficacy. We employed genetic and pharmacologic targeting of ERK1/2 in Jak2V617F MPN mice, cells and patient clinical isolates. Competitive transplantations of Jak2V617F vs. wild-type bone marrow (BM) showed that ERK1/2 deficiency in hematopoiesis mitigated MPN features and reduced the Jak2V617F clone in blood and hematopoietic progenitor compartments. ERK1/2 ablation combined with JAK2 inhibition suppressed MAPK transcriptional programs, normalized cytoses and promoted clone control suggesting dual JAK2/ERK1/2 targeting as enhanced corrective approach. Combined pharmacologic JAK2/ERK1/2 inhibition with ruxolitinib and ERK inhibitors reduced proliferation of Jak2V617F cells and corrected erythrocytosis and splenomegaly of Jak2V617F MPN mice. Longer-term treatment was able to induce clone reductions. BM fibrosis was significantly decreased in MPLW515L-driven MPN to an extent not seen with JAK2 inhibitor monotherapy. Colony formation from JAK2V617F patients' CD34+ blood and BM was dose-dependently inhibited by combined JAK2/ERK1/2 inhibition in PV, ET, and MF subsets. Overall, we observed that dual targeting of JAK2 and ERK1/2 was able to enhance therapeutic efficacy suggesting a novel treatment approach for MPN