How Corruption is Tolerated in the Greek Public Sector: Toward a Second-Order Theory of Normalization

Secrecy and “social cocooning” are critical mechanisms allowing the normalization of corruption within organizations. Less studied are processes of normalization that occur when corruption is an “open secret.” Drawing on an empirical study of Greek public-sector organizations, we suggest that a second-order normalization process ensues among non-corrupt onlookers both inside and beyond the organization. What is normalized at this level is not corruption, but its tolerance, which we disaggregate into agent-focused tolerance and structure-focused tolerance. Emphasizing the importance of non-corrupt bystanders, we claim that second-order normalization helps corruption persist in situations where its presence is openly acknowledged. This adds an important new dimension to normalization theory and we unpack its implications for both future research and practice in this area. </jats:p

A stochastic multidimensional scaling procedure for the empirical determination of convex indifference curves for preference/choice analysis

The vast majority of existing multidimensional scaling (MDS) procedures devised for the analysis of paired comparison preference/choice judgments are typically based on either scalar product (i.e., vector) or unfolding (i.e., ideal-point) models. Such methods tend to ignore many of the essential components of microeconomic theory including convex indifference curves, constrained utility maximization, demand functions, et cetera. This paper presents a new stochastic MDS procedure called MICROSCALE that attempts to operationalize many of these traditional microeconomic concepts. First, we briefly review several existing MDS models that operate on paired comparisons data, noting the particular nature of the utility functions implied by each class of models. These utility assumptions are then directly contrasted to those of microeconomic theory. The new maximum likelihood based procedure, MICROSCALE, is presented, as well as the technical details of the estimation procedure. The results of a Monte Carlo analysis investigating the performance of the algorithm as a number of model, data, and error factors are experimentally manipulated are provided. Finally, an illustration in consumer psychology concerning a convenience sample of thirty consumers providing paired comparisons judgments for some fourteen brands of over-the-counter analgesics is discussed.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/45748/1/11336_2005_Article_BF02294463.pd

Choosing between safeguards : scope and governance decisions in R&D alliances

Research on transaction cost economics has emphasized the choice of an appropriate governance structure as an important mechanism in alleviating exchange hazards in interfirm transactions, yet firms may also manipulate the characteristics of a transaction so as to make it less hazardous in the first place by carefully selecting the activities or assets involved in the transaction. In this paper, we explore this theoretical issue in transaction cost economics by examining how firms design R&D alliances to mitigate appropriation hazards in these interfirm transactions. In particular, we investigate when firms will prefer to limit the scope of functional activities involved in an R&D alliance, thus addressing appropriation hazards directly by manipulating the alliance’s characteristics, versus when they will opt for an equity-based governance structure in order to mitigate appropriation hazards ex post. We argue that firms are more likely to limit the scope of alliance activities rather than choose an equity-based governance structure when there are multiple partners in an alliance and when the partners are from different nations, because monitoring and other control mechanisms become more cumbersome and problematic in these circumstances. In contrast, firms that are direct competitors are more likely to choose an equity-based governance structure in order to mitigate exchange hazards such as knowledge misappropriation through carefully monitored knowledge sharing. Empirical analysis of data on R&D alliances in a variety of industries provides support for our arguments regarding alliances involving multiple partners and alliances between competitors. We discuss the implications of our study for research on transaction cost economics

Thresholds and Transitivity in Stochastic Consumer Choice: A Multinomial Logit Analysis

In previous work, thresholds have been introduced to describe situations where the consumer is indifferent between any two alternatives. Krishnan (Krishnan, K. S. 1977. Incorporating thresholds of indifference in probabilistic choice models. Management Sci. 23 (July) 1224--1233.) formalised thresholds as minimum perceivable differences between the utilities of the alternatives compared and incorporated such thresholds into the binary logit model. The present paper provides an extension and application of the theory to situations where the decision maker is confronted with more than two alternatives. In such situations thresholds can lead to systematic and predictable intransitivity of indifference, violating a basic postulate of utility theory. Explicit probabilities of transitive and intransitive choices are derived within the framework of the multinomial logit model and the stochastic consumer theory associated with this model. The empirical applicability and managerial usefulness of the proposed theory is illustrated using a transportation example with three alternatives. The data employed reflect actual travellers' use of interurban transport modes in Greece. Parameters are estimated by a maximum-likelihood technique, based on a gradient search method. The results support the existence of thresholds. The application has important policy implications.quantal choice, stochastic utility, thresholds, intransitivity, transport mode choice

PARTICIPATION IN THE MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES: Experience from Greek utilities

ABSTRACT: This paper attempts to evaluate employee and social‐group participation in the management of public sector enterprises, using evidence from a scheme introduced in seven public utilities in Greece, 1983‐8. It describes the institutional background and the formal directives through which this participation scheme was implemented and assesses its effects. Difficulties arising from the wider political and administrative environment are discussed. Reasons for the observed disfunctioning of the scheme are given. These refer to the structure of the scheme itself, negligence of existing experience and tradition within the enterprises, and failure to associate participation with modernization. Suggestions are provided for the implementation of more effective participative management in future. Copyright © 1995, Wiley Blackwell. All rights reserve