Preface

How do, could and should the various institutions responsible for the production of security and the management of conflict in Tropical African societies evolve in response to the presence of violent conflict? The research reported in this issue of the IDS Bulletin is built on the observation that all governance (especially in Africa) is multilevelled and networked – from the village to the international organisation, and well beyond what is specified in formal government structures. Thus the focus must be not only on the ways in which key conflict?management institutions evolve themselves but also on the changing ways in which the networks in which they are embedded actually operate

Asymmetric Information and the Role of NGOs in African Health Care

In African health care the "miracle of the market "has not occurred. Patients exhibit willingness to pay for health care and yet practitioners are unable to sell their services. Simultaneously non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are running successful health facilities for which patients are willing to pay. We develop a model of the demand for health care in the presence of asymmetric information that allows us to view African health care in the framework of the New Institutional Economics literature. We use previously published empirical results to support the validity of this view and show that NGOs have the institutional capacity to deliver high quality health care, whereas private practitioners, even with good intentions, will not easily succeed. Having arrived at the well documented conclusion that NGOs provide high quality services through theory allows us to draw policy conclusions on ways to extend the provision of health services

Institutional Solutions to the Principal-Agent Problem in African Health Care

Free markets for health care in Africa do not function properly, in that patients exhibit willingness to pay for health care and yet practitioners are unable to sell their services. It is widely acknowledged that health markets everywhere are troubled with imperfect information. Therefore it is no surprise that free markets and spot contracts do not lead to an efficiently functioning market for health care. When issues of agency are not resolved we find practitioners specializing in the sale of pharmaceuticals but not using their skills as diagnosticians. Mechanisms that can reduce agency cost are beneficial to both patients and practitioners. This paper draws on theory and empirical evidence to examine what institutions are necessary to solve the problems of imperfect information in this context. We dismiss government regulation because the regulatory capacity does not exist in most African countries. Theory suggests that self-regulation by professional bodies should arise as privatization continues. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that this conclusion is overly-optimistic. On the other hand, referral networks perform much the same function but do not require centralized control. The most successful institution for the delivery of quality medical care in Africa is that of independent, pre-existing value-based organizations (missions) and we suggest their choice of institutional form has contributed to their success

Social Contracts, Networks and Security in Tropical Africa Conflict States: An Overview

In this IDS Bulletin we present fieldwork from articles covering the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Mozambique and Somalia to show that assumptions derived from the classical social contract theorists frequently lead the international community astray as it attempts to rebuild these African states. The historical social contract for most Africans is not between the state and individuals but with communities. When it comes to security, there are two contracts and two bargains to consider instead of the single one of classical presumptions. The contracts are (i) community governance structures with local families; and (ii) the state with community governance systems, with supplemental ties to individuals. The bargains are (iii) the regime with the military; and (iv) the state with the international community. The military is frequently a source of predation on communities rather than of protection. The dynamics of these contracts and bargains can be in conflict with one another, leading to a situation where governance is multilevel and networked. The presence and importance of international actors in the networks changes policies and indirectly affects politics, but it does not threaten the integrity of the state as an institution itself, which instead is rooted in the processes of the other three compacts

Social Contracts, Networks and Security in Tropical Africa Conflict States: An Overview

In this IDS Bulletin we present fieldwork from articles covering the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Mozambique and Somalia to show that assumptions derived from the classical social contract theorists frequently lead the international community astray as it attempts to rebuild these African states. The historical social contract for most Africans is not between the state and individuals but with communities. When it comes to security, there are two contracts and two bargains to consider instead of the single one of classical presumptions. The contracts are (i) community governance structures with local families; and (ii) the state with community governance systems, with supplemental ties to individuals. The bargains are (iii) the regime with the military; and (iv) the state with the international community. The military is frequently a source of predation on communities rather than of protection. The dynamics of these contracts and bargains can be in conflict with one another, leading to a situation where governance is multilevel and networked. The presence and importance of international actors in the networks changes policies and indirectly affects politics, but it does not threaten the integrity of the state as an institution itself, which instead is rooted in the processes of the other three compacts

Recreating political order : the Somali systems today

The Somali pastoral system of production covers at least six political entities. Three of the formal ones are within the borders of the former Republic of Somalia and do not meet the full definition of states. Despite the warfare that has often engulfed the former Somalia, it is a mistake to think of the three political entities that occupy it as necessarily or wholly anarchic. Lineage institutions have survived from the colonial era and been resurrected to provide venues for negotiation, consensus-building and the reduction of interpersonal violence, even if not the authoritative imposition of decisions upon groups of the unwilling. After 17 years of centrality to the continuity of Somali governance and the recreation of quasi-state political authorities, however, these lineage institutions are showing signs of stress. As their great influence came to be recognised they were penetrated by patronage and used by warlords to prosecute sub-clan warfare. They no longer are able to provide consensus representation even in the peaceful political systems of Somaliland and Puntland. Somalis therefore have experimented with new political institutions that could provide a greater basis for cross-clan action and authoritative decision-making – regional nationalism and democracy in Somaliland and Islamic sheria in all the territories but especially by the nowdeposed (but far from dead) Union of Islamic Courts. Indeed sheria now is a central, unifying ideology throughout the Somalis, even if there is conflict over its interpretation and the instrumentalities through which it will be enforced. Somali governmental processes thus are present, but weak in their ability to impose decisions and to project their authority into the rural areas. There are public goods that Somalis need which only states can provide. But the transformation of traditional order in the warlord conflicts of the last 17 years will make such states difficult to create. Keywords: Somalia; Somaliland; social contract; clan; sheria; statelessness

The social structure of the agricultural extension services in the Western province of Kenya

Agricultural extension visits in Western Province are heavily skewed in favour of progressive farmers and are infrequently paid to the non-innovative majority. This pattern is certainly undesirable in terms of income distribution but it also probably does not maximum the possibilities for economic growth in agriculture. In a Tanzania study, Thoden van Volzen argues that a similar distribution of government services is caused by the fact agricultural extension officials are part of an isolated, cohesive, social elite and that this involves them in a social class alliance and exchange of benefits with the richer farmers. Data from Western Province confirm that the senior agricultural staff are part of an isolated, relatively cohesive elite group. The junior staff, who are in direct contact with farmers, form groups distinct from their seniors, however, are local in their orientation, are part of the middle, not the upper, rural elite, and are not very cohesive. Furthermore, neither their middle elite social status nor any private exchange of benefits account for their stress on work with progressive farmers. Instead, it seems more likely that the progressive farmer bias is caused by a combination of factors, including extension ideology, the psychological response to receptivity and distorted perceptions of the rural reality