Is the Gold Standard Still the Gold Standard among Monetary Systems?

Critics have raised a number of theoretical and historical objections to the gold standard. Some have called the gold standard a "crazy" idea. The gold standard is not a flawless monetary system. Neither is the fiat money alternative. In light of historical evidence about the comparative magnitude of these flaws, however, the gold standard is a policy option that deserves serious consideration. In a study covering many decades in a large sample of countries, Federal Reserve Bank economists found that "money growth and inflation are higher" under fiat standards than under gold and silver standards. Nor is the gold standard a source of harmful deflation. Alan Greenspan has testified before Congress that "a central bank properly functioning will endeavor to, in many cases, replicate what a gold standard would itself generate." This study addresses the leading criticisms of the gold standard, relating to the costs of gold, the costs of transition, the dangers of speculation, and the need for a lender of last resort. One criticism is found to have some merit. The United States would not enjoy the benefits of being on an international gold standard if it were the first and only country whose currency was linked to gold.A gold standard does not guarantee perfect steadiness in the growth of the money supply, but historical comparison shows that it has provided more moderate and steadier money growth in practice than the present-day alternative, politically empowering a central banking committee to determine growth in the stock of fiat money. From the perspective of limiting money growth appropriately, the gold standard is far from a crazy idea

The S&L Debacle

This speech was given by Professor White as part of the annual Financial Institutions and Regulation Symposium at the Fordham University School of La

How Did We Get into This Financial Mess?

As policymakers confront the ongoing U.S. financial crisis, it is important to take a step back and understand its origins. Those who fault "deregulation," "unfettered capitalism," or "greed" would do well to look instead at flawed institutions and misguided policies. The expansion in risky mortgages to underqualified borrowers was encouraged by the federal government. The growth of "creative" nonprime lending followed Congress's strengthening of the Community Reinvestment Act, the Federal Housing Administration's loosening of down-payment standards, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development's pressuring lenders to extend mortgages to borrowers who previously would not have qualified. Meanwhile, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae grew to own or guarantee about half of the United States' $12 trillion mortgage market. Congressional leaders pointedly refused to moderate the moral hazard problem of implicit guarantees or otherwise rein in their hyperexpansion, instead pushing them to promote "affordable housing" through expanded purchases of nonprime loans to low income applicants. The credit that fueled these risky mortgages was provided by the cheap money policy of the Federal Reserve. Following the 2001 recession, Fed chairman Alan Greenspan slashed the federal funds rate from 6.25 to 1.75 percent. It was reduced further in 2002 and 2003, reaching a record low of 1 percent in mid-2003 - where it stayed for a year. This set off what economist Steve Hanke called "the mother of all liquidity cycles and yet another massive demand bubble." The actual causes of our financial troubles were unusual monetary policy moves and novel federal regulatory interventions. These poorly chosen policies distorted interest rates and asset prices, diverted loanable funds into the wrong investments, and twisted normally robust financial institutions into unsustainable positions

The Community Reinvestment Act: Good Intentions Headed in the Wrong Direction

The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (“CRA” or “the Act”) places an obligation on commercial banks and savings and loan associations (“S&Ls”) and savings banks (together with S&Ls, frequently described as “thrifts”) to meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound operation of such institutions. The Act offers no greater precision for these phrases, and the task of fleshing them out and enforcing them has been left to the bank and thrift regulatory agencies. This article argues that the CRA approach is fundamentally flawed. It is either redundant (because serving the local community is profitable anyway) or require cross-subsidization from other services with above-normal profits

Gravitational Lensing and the Variability of G

The four observables associated with gravitational lensing of distant quasars by intervening galaxies: image splittings, relative amplifications, time delays, and optical depths, provide separate measures of the strength of the gravitational constant $G$ at cosmological distances. These allow one, in principle, to factor out unknown lensing parameters to directly to probe the variation of $G$ over cosmological time. We estimate constraints on $\dot{G}$ which may be derivable by this method both now and in the future. The limits one may obtain can compete or exceed other direct limits on $\dot{G}$ today, but unfortunately extracting this information, is not independent of the effort to fix other cosmological parameters such as $H_0$ and $\Omega_0$ from lensing observations.Comment: 13 pages plus figures (not included