Selective Estrogen Receptor Modulators: A Potential Option For Non-Binary Gender-Affirming Hormonal Care?

Gender dysphoria describes the distress associated with having a gender identity that differs from one’s birth-assigned sex. To relieve this distress, transgender, and gender diverse (henceforth, trans) individuals commonly undergo medical transition involving hormonal treatments. Current hormonal treatment guidelines cater almost exclusively for those who wish to transition from male to female or vice versa. In contrast, there is a dearth of hormonal options for those trans individuals who identify as non-binary and seek an androgynous appearance that is neither overtly male nor female. Though prolonged puberty suppression with gonadotrophin releasing hormone agonists (GnRHa) could in theory be gender-affirming by preventing the development of unwanted secondary sex characteristics, this treatment option would be limited to pre- or peri-pubertal adolescents and likely have harmful effects. Here, we discuss the theoretical use of Selective Estrogen Receptor Modulators (SERMs) for non-binary people assigned male at birth (AMAB) who are seeking an androgynous appearance through partial feminization without breast growth. Given their unique range of pharmacodynamic effects, SERMs may represent a potential gender-affirming treatment for this population, but there is a lack of knowledge regarding their use and potentially adverse effects in this context

Appearance-altering facial surgery on children: An empirically informed ethical analysis

© 2015 Dr. Lauren Elizabeth NotiniUsing empirically informed ethical analysis, this thesis investigates the ethics of appearance-altering facial surgeries performed on children. These surgeries have attracted controversy in the media and ethics literature and are the subject of legislation and professional guidelines, which leave much to individual practitioners’ discretion. Despite their contentious nature, very little is known about surgeons’ practices and decision-making processes regarding these surgeries. This thesis is ‘empirically informed’ in two different ways: (1) by existing empirical data on psychosocial outcomes of children with facial differences and children who have undergone appearance-altering facial surgeries and (2) by new interview data from 22 surgeons who encounter requests for these surgeries. Using reflective equilibrium as my method of ethical analysis, these two kinds of empirical data are combined with established paediatric bioethical principles and concepts, including the zone of parental discretion and children’s assent and dissent, to arrive at a comprehensive position on the ethics of performing these surgeries. Using reflective equilibrium, I found some aspects of surgeons’ decision-making processes and practices diverged from existing ethical understandings about the relative roles of children and parents in medical decisions. One such area related to the ethical weight surgeons attach to children’s refusals. While most ethicists in the literature advocate including children in decisions, they do not necessarily recommend giving them decision-making authority. In contrast, most surgeons tended to give children a larger role in decisions about appearance-altering facial surgeries, viewing them as ultimate decision makers. In this thesis, I make normative claims about the relative levels of ethical weight surgeons should place on children’s and parents’ wishes when making decisions about these surgeries. Using the established ethical framework of the zone of parental discretion and related ethical concepts of harm and benefit, I claim that several morally relevant differences exist between these surgeries and other medical procedures requested for children. These include their uncertain risk-benefit ratio, their elective nature, uncertainty as to how the child will later perceive their facial difference and the acceptability of surgery, and the existence of alternative, less risky and invasive psychosocial interventions for alleviating appearance-related psychosocial harm. I argue these differences warrant placing greater (even absolute) ethical weight on children’s wishes, especially when children refuse these surgeries, and comparably less ethical weight on parents’ wishes, when making these decisions. Although my ethical position is similar to most of the surgeons’ judgments, I argue it would be worthwhile for surgeons to know about and use ethical principles and concepts more explicitly when making decisions and communicating with children and/or their parents. I also claim that surgeons ought to make more of a considered effort to ascertain children’s actual wishes and inform parents and/or children about non-surgical options for alleviating appearance-related psychosocial distress, and be taught strategies for saying no and how to articulate their ethical reasoning. These findings have significant implications for clinical practice, raise questions for further ethical analysis and contribute to refinement of existing understandings of children’s assent and dissent and parents’ role as proxy decision makers for their children

When (if ever) may doctors discuss religion with their patients?

There is ongoing debate within the bioethics literature regarding to what extent (if any) it is ethically justifiable for doctors to engage in religious discussion with their patients, in cases where patients cite religious considerations as influencing their medical decision-making. In this paper, we concede that certain forms of religious discussion between doctors and patients are morally permissible (though not necessarily morally obligatory), insofar as patients’ religious beliefs may comprise an important part of their overall wellbeing and can influence their medical decisions. However, we argue that it is not morally permissible for doctors to engage in substantive religious discussion with their patients, beyond simply inquiring about the patient's values (which may include their religious values) or referring patients to a chaplain or religious figure for further discussion. In support of this claim, we put forward two key arguments which have remained relatively unaddressed in the current debate. First, we argue that it is not practical for doctors to engage in substantive religious discussion with patients, and hence it cannot be morally obligatory for them to do so. Second, we argue that, while doctors might have a professional duty to ensure that their patient's religious interests (if any) are addressed, this does not entail that doctors themselves are the ones who should directly address these interests. Along the way, we anticipate and respond to some possible objections to these two key arguments.</p

Offering and returning secondary findings in the context of exome sequencing for hearing loss: Clinicians' views and experiences

10.1080/23294515.2022.2160507AJOB Empirical Bioethics14274-8