Do Wages Compensate for Workplace Disamenities?

Adam Smith's idea that the wage structure reflects differences in work conditions is a central tenet of modern competitive theory of the labor market. However, the empirical relevance of this theory of equalizing differences remains unclear. This paper suggests a novel test for compensating wage differentials based on job satisfaction and wages. If wages differentials solely reflect compensation for work conditions, workers will not prefer jobs with high wages to jobs with low wages. Moreover, this new test allows discussing whether industry and firm size wage differentials reflect rents or compensate for work conditions. Results indicate that wage differentials do not exclusively reflect compensation for work conditions

How Changes in Financial Incentives Affect the Duration of Unemployment

This paper studies how changes in the two key parameters of unemployment insurance - the benefit replacement rate (RR) and the potential duration of benefits (PBD) - affect the duration of unemployment.In 1989, the Austrian government made unemployment insurance more generous by changing, simultaneously, the maximum duration of regular unemployment benefits and the earnings replacement ratio.We find that increasing the replacement ratio has much weaker disincentive effects than increasing the maximum duration of benefits.We use these results to split up the total costs to unemployment insurance funds into costs due to changes in the unemployment insurance system and costs due to behavioral responses of unemployed workers.Results indicate that costs due to behavioral responses are substantial.incentives;unemployment;unemployment insurance;policy

The Impact of Active Labor Market Programs and Benefit Entitlement Rules on the Duration of Unemployment

Swiss policy makers created a unique link between unemployment benefits and active labor market programs (ALMPs) by making benefit payments conditional on program attendance after 7 months of unemployment duration. We evaluate the effect of ALMPs and benefit entitlement on the duration of unemployment in Switzerland. In the evaluation we allow for selectivity affecting the inflow into programs. Our results indicate that (i) after ALMP- participation the transition rate to jobs increases fro Swiss women but not for Swiss men. However, the job hazard rate is strongly reduced during participation. Taken together, this leads to the conclusion that programs prolong unemployment duration for men, but tend to shorten durations for women. (ii) once the unemployment spell approaches the expiration of unconditional benefit entitlement the job-hazard rate increases strongly, both for women and for men. (iii) there are important selectivity effects for Swiss females, but not for Swiss males.active labor market policy;benefit entitlement;treatment effect;bivariate duration model

How Effective are Unemployment Benefit Sanctions? Looking Beyond Unemployment Exit

This paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of benefit sanctions, i.e. temporary reductions in unemployment benefits as punishment for noncompliance with eligibility requirements. In addition to the effects on unemployment durations, we evaluate the effects on post-unemployment employment stability, on exits from the labor market and on earnings. In our analysis we use a rich set of Swiss register data which allow us to distinguish between ex ante effects, the effects of warnings and the effects of enforcement of benefit sanctions. Adopting a multivariate mixed proportional hazard approach to address selectivity, we find that both warnings and enforcement increase the job finding rate and the exit rate out of the labor force. Warnings do not affect subsequent employment stability but do reduce post-unemployment earnings. Actual benefit reductions lower the quality of post-unemployment jobs both in terms of job duration as well as in terms of earnings. The net effect of a benefit sanction on post-unemployment income is negative. Over a period of two years after leaving unemployment workers who got a benefit sanction imposed face a net income loss equivalent to 30 days of full pay due to the ex post effect. In addition to that, stricter monitoring may reduce net earnings by up to 4 days of pay for every unemployed worker due to the ex ante effect.Benefit sanctions;earnings effects;unemployment duration;competing-risk duration models

Social Interactions and Schooling Decisions

The aim of this paper is to study whether a child's schooling choices are affected by the schooling choices of other children. Identification is based on a randomized targeted intervention that grants a cash subsidy conditional on school attendance to a subgroup of eligible children within small rural villages in Mexico (PROGRESA). This policy change spills over to ineligible children if social interactions are relevant. Results indicate that the eligible children tend to attend school more frequently, and the ineligible children acquire more schooling when the subsidy is introduced in their local village. Moreover, the overall effect of PROGRESA on eligible children is the sum of a direct effect due to cash transfers and an indirect effect due to changes in peer group schooling. Interestingly, the social interactions effect is almost as important as the direct effect

The Impact of Active Labor Market Programs and Benefit Entitlement Rules on the Duration of Unemployment

Swiss policy makers created a unique link between unemployment benefits and active labor market programs (ALMPs) by making benefit payments conditional on program attendance after 7 months of unemployment duration. We evaluate the effect of ALMPs and benefit entitlement on the duration of unemployment in Switzerland. In the evaluation we allow for selectivity affecting the inflow into programs. Our results indicate that (i) after ALMP- participation the transition rate to jobs increases fro Swiss women but not for Swiss men. However, the job hazard rate is strongly reduced during participation. Taken together, this leads to the conclusion that programs prolong unemployment duration for men, but tend to shorten durations for women. (ii) once the unemployment spell approaches the expiration of unconditional benefit entitlement the job-hazard rate increases strongly, both for women and for men. (iii) there are important selectivity effects for Swiss females, but not for Swiss males

How Effective are Unemployment Benefit Sanctions? Looking Beyond Unemployment Exit

This paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of benefit sanctions, i.e. temporary reductions in unemployment benefits as punishment for noncompliance with eligibility requirements. In addition to the effects on unemployment durations, we evaluate the effects on post-unemployment employment stability, on exits from the labor market and on earnings. In our analysis we use a rich set of Swiss register data which allow us to distinguish between ex ante effects, the effects of warnings and the effects of enforcement of benefit sanctions. Adopting a multivariate mixed proportional hazard approach to address selectivity, we find that both warnings and enforcement increase the job finding rate and the exit rate out of the labor force. Warnings do not affect subsequent employment stability but do reduce post-unemployment earnings. Actual benefit reductions lower the quality of post-unemployment jobs both in terms of job duration as well as in terms of earnings. The net effect of a benefit sanction on post-unemployment income is negative. Over a period of two years after leaving unemployment workers who got a benefit sanction imposed face a net income loss equivalent to 30 days of full pay due to the ex post effect. In addition to that, stricter monitoring may reduce net earnings by up to 4 days of pay for every unemployed worker due to the ex ante effect.

Causality and endogeneity: Problems and solutions

Most leadership and management researchers ignore one key design and estimation problem rendering parameter estimates uninterpretable: Endogeneity. We discuss the problem of endogeneity in depth and explain conditions that engender it using examples grounded in the leadership literature. We show how consistent causal estimates can be derived from the randomized experiment, where endogeneity is eliminated by experimental design. We then review the reasons why estimates may become biased (i.e., inconsistent) in non-experimental designs and present a number of useful remedies for examining causal relations with non-experimental data. We write in intuitive terms using nontechnical language to make this chapter accessible to a large audience