A model of adaptive decision making from representation of information environment by quantum fields

We present the mathematical model of decision making (DM) of agents acting in a complex and uncertain environment (combining huge variety of economical, financial, behavioral, and geo-political factors). To describe interaction of agents with it, we apply the formalism of quantum field theory (QTF). Quantum fields are of the purely informational nature. The QFT-model can be treated as a far relative of the expected utility theory, where the role of utility is played by adaptivity to an environment (bath). However, this sort of utility-adaptivity cannot be represented simply as a numerical function. The operator representation in Hilbert space is used and adaptivity is described as in quantum dynamics. We are especially interested in stabilization of solutions for sufficiently large time. The outputs of this stabilization process, probabilities for possible choices, are treated in the framework of classical DM. To connect classical and quantum DM, we appeal to Quantum Bayesianism (QBism). We demonstrate the quantum-like interference effect in DM which is exhibited as a violation of the formula of total probability and hence the classical Bayesian inference scheme.Comment: in press in Philosophical Transactions

Not fitting in and getting out : psychological type and congregational satisfaction among Anglican churchgoers in England

Listening to the motivations reported by individuals for ceasing church attendance and becoming church leavers, Francis and Richter identified high on the list the sense of "not fitting in". Drawing on psychological type theory, several recent studies have documented the way in which some psychological types are over-represented in church congregations and other psychological types are under-represented. Bringing these two observations together, the present study tested the hypothesis that church congregations have created type-alike communities within which individuals displaying the opposite type preferences are more likely to feel marginalised and to display lower levels of satisfaction with the congregations they attend. Data were provided by 1867 churchgoers who completed a measure of psychological type, together with measures of frequency of attendance and congregational satisfaction. These data confirmed that congregations were weighted towards preferences for introversion, sensing, feeling and judging, and that individuals displaying the opposite preferences (especially intuition, thinking and perceiving) recorded lower levels of congregational satisfaction. The implications of these findings are discussed for promoting congregational retention by enhancing awareness of psychological type preferences among those who attend

Effects of two doses of glucose and a caffeine-glucose combination on cognitive performance and mood during multi-tasking

Background: This study assessed the effects of two doses of glucose and a caffeine–glucose combination on mood and performance of an ecologically valid, computerised multi-tasking platform. Materials and methods: Following a double-blind, placebo-controlled, randomised, parallel-groups design, 150 healthy adults (mean age 34.78 years) consumed drinks containing placebo, 25 g glucose, 60 g glucose or 60 g glucose with 40 mg caffeine. They completed a multitasking framework at baseline and then 30 min following drink consumption with mood assessments immediately before and after the multitasking framework. Blood glucose and salivary caffeine were co-monitored. Results: The caffeine–glucose group had significantly better total multi-tasking scores than the placebo or 60 g glucose groups and were significantly faster at mental arithmetic tasks than either glucose drink group. There were no significant treatment effects on mood. Caffeine and glucose levels confirmed compliance with overnight abstinence/fasting, respectively, and followed the predicted post-drink patterns. Conclusion: These data suggest that co-administration of glucose and caffeine allows greater allocation of attentional resources than placebo or glucose alone. At present, we cannot rule out the possibility that the effects are due to caffeine alone Future studies should aim at disentangling caffeine and glucose effect

Sequential Extensions of Causal and Evidential Decision Theory

Moving beyond the dualistic view in AI where agent and environment are separated incurs new challenges for decision making, as calculation of expected utility is no longer straightforward. The non-dualistic decision theory literature is split between causal decision theory and evidential decision theory. We extend these decision algorithms to the sequential setting where the agent alternates between taking actions and observing their consequences. We find that evidential decision theory has two natural extensions while causal decision theory only has one.Comment: ADT 201

A direct method for measuring discounting and QALYs more easily and reliably

Time discounting and quality of life are two important factors in evaluations of medical interventions. The measurement of these two factors is complicated because they interact. Existing methods either simply assume one factor given, based on heuristic assumptions, or invoke complicating extraneous factors, such as risk, that generate extra biases. The authors introduce a method for measuring discounting (and then quality of life) that involves no extraneous factors and that avoids distorting interactions. Their method is considerably simpler and more realistic for subjec

Dynamic Environmental Photosynthetic Imaging Reveals Emergent Phenotypes.

Understanding and improving the productivity and robustness of plant photosynthesis requires high-throughput phenotyping under environmental conditions that are relevant to the field. Here we demonstrate the dynamic environmental photosynthesis imager (DEPI), an experimental platform for integrated, continuous, and high-throughput measurements of photosynthetic parameters during plant growth under reproducible yet dynamic environmental conditions. Using parallel imagers obviates the need to move plants or sensors, reducing artifacts and allowing simultaneous measurement on large numbers of plants. As a result, DEPI can reveal phenotypes that are not evident under standard laboratory conditions but emerge under progressively more dynamic illumination. We show examples in mutants of Arabidopsis of such "emergent phenotypes" that are highly transient and heterogeneous, appearing in different leaves under different conditions and depending in complex ways on both environmental conditions and plant developmental age. These emergent phenotypes appear to be caused by a range of phenomena, suggesting that such previously unseen processes are critical for plant responses to dynamic environments

Bayesian Conditioning, the Reflection Principle, and Quantum Decoherence

The probabilities a Bayesian agent assigns to a set of events typically change with time, for instance when the agent updates them in the light of new data. In this paper we address the question of how an agent's probabilities at different times are constrained by Dutch-book coherence. We review and attempt to clarify the argument that, although an agent is not forced by coherence to use the usual Bayesian conditioning rule to update his probabilities, coherence does require the agent's probabilities to satisfy van Fraassen's [1984] reflection principle (which entails a related constraint pointed out by Goldstein [1983]). We then exhibit the specialized assumption needed to recover Bayesian conditioning from an analogous reflection-style consideration. Bringing the argument to the context of quantum measurement theory, we show that "quantum decoherence" can be understood in purely personalist terms---quantum decoherence (as supposed in a von Neumann chain) is not a physical process at all, but an application of the reflection principle. From this point of view, the decoherence theory of Zeh, Zurek, and others as a story of quantum measurement has the plot turned exactly backward.Comment: 14 pages, written in memory of Itamar Pitowsk

A pedagogic appraisal of the Priority Heuristic

We have explored how science and mathematics teachers made decisions when confronted with a dilemma in which a fictitious young woman, Deborah, may choose to have an operation that might address a painful spinal condition. We sought to explore the extent to which psychological heuristic models, in particular the Priority Heuristic, might successfully describe the decision-making process of these teachers and how an analysis of the role of personal and emotional factors in shaping the decision-making process might inform pedagogical design. A novel aspect of this study is that the setting in which the decision-making process is examined contrasts sharply with those used in psychological experiments. We found that to some extent, even in this contrasting setting, the Priority Heuristic could describe these teachers' decision-making. Further analysis of the transcripts yielded some insights into limitations on scope as well the richness and complexity in how personal factors were brought to bear. We see these limitations as design opportunities for educational intervention

Resolving the Ellsberg Paradox by Assuming that People Evaluate Repetitive Sampling

Ellsberg (1961) designed a decision experiment where most people violated the axioms of rational choice. He asked people to bet on the outcome of certain random events with known and with unknown probabilities. They usually preferred to bet on events with known probabilities. It is shown that this behavior is reasonable and in accordance with the axioms of rational decision making if it is assumed that people consider bets on events that are repeatedly sampled instead of just sampled once

On the origin of utility, weighting, and discounting functions: How they get their shapes and how to change their shapes

We present a theoretical account of the origin of the shapes of utility, probability weighting, and temporal discounting functions. In an experimental test of the theory, we systematically change the shape of revealed utility, weighting, and discounting functions by manipulating the distribution of monies, probabilities, and delays in the choices used to elicit them. The data demonstrate that there is no stable mapping between attribute values and their subjective equivalents. Expected and discounted utility theories, and also their descendants such as prospect theory and hyperbolic discounting theory, simply assert stable mappings to describe choice data and offer no account of the instability we find. We explain where the shape of the mapping comes from and, in describing the mechanism by which people choose, explain why the shape depends on the distribution of gains, losses, risks, and delays in the environment