Rare as Hens\u27 Teeth: The New Geography of the American Death Penalty

Today, only a few dozen scattered counties actually impose death sentences, supporting the death penalty’s arbitrariness

Contaminated Confessions Revisited

A second wave of false confessions is cresting. In the first twenty-one years of post-conviction DNA testing, 250 innocent people were exonerated, forty of which had falsely confessed. Those false confessions attracted sustained public attention from judges, law enforcement, policymakers, and the media. Those exonerations not only showed that false confessions can happen, but did more by shedding light on the problem of confession contamination, in which details of the crime are disclosed to suspects during the interrogation process. As a result, false confessions can appear deceptively rich, detailed, and accurate. In just the last five years, there has been a new surge in false confessions — a set of twenty-six more false confessions among DNA exonerations. All but two of these most recent confessions included crime scene details corroborated by crime scene information. Illustrating the power of contaminated false confessions, in nine of the cases, defendants were convicted despite DNA tests that excluded them at the time. As a result, this second wave of false confessions should cause even more alarm than the first. In the vast majority of cases there is no evidence to test using DNA. Unless a scientific framework is adopted to regulate interrogations, including by requiring recording of entire interrogations, overhauling interrogation methods, providing for judicial review of reliability at trial, and informing jurors with expert testimony, the insidious problems of confession contamination will persist

The Constitutional Regulation of Forensic Evidence

The Constitution increasingly regulates the use of forensic evidence in criminal cases. This is a remarkable shift. In decades past, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to provide strong due process protection against destruction of forensic evidence or to obtain defense access to experts. In contrast, in recent years, the Court’s series of Confrontation Clause rulings tightened requirements to present live testimony in the courtroom. Perhaps far more significant, I will argue, the Court has strengthened obligations of defense counsel to litigate forensics, twice underscoring in little noticed opinions: “Criminal cases will arise where the only reasonable and available defense strategy requires consultation with experts or introduction of expert evidence.” In this Essay, I describe how despite decades of missed opportunities to adequately regulate forensics, in recent rulings the Court and to a far greater degree, lower state and federal courts, increasingly focus on sound litigation of forensics. In an era of plea bargaining, the accuracy of forensic analysis depends far less on cross-examination at trial, and far more on sound lab techniques, full disclosure of strengths and limitations of forensic evidence to prosecutors and the defense, and careful litigation. The changing judicial understanding of the constitutional significance of forensic evidence in criminal cases may follow from a new appreciation that forensic evidence is not only increasingly important in criminal cases, but that many traditional techniques lack adequate reliability and validity. The Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clauses are emerging as promising constitutional sources for improved regulation of forensics, including through ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady v. Maryland rulings focusing on investigations and plea bargains. How meaningful courts will make those dual constitutional protections in the years to come will be a crucial test of our commitment to accuracy in criminal justice

The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat

A corporation is no scapegoat, assures the Department of Justice, because the first priority is to prosecute culpable individuals and not artificial entities. Yet, as I document in this empirical study, far more often than not, when the largest corporations settle federal criminal cases, no individuals are charged. High profile failures to prosecute executives in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis have only made the problem more urgent. The corporation appears to be a kind of a scapegoat: impossible to physically jail, but capable of receiving blame and punishment while individual culprits go free. In this Article, I develop original empirical data detailing the path of individual prosecutions accompanying federal corporate prosecution agreements. Only 34 percent of federal corporate deferred and non-prosecution agreements from 2001-2014 were accompanied by charges against individuals. Those prosecutions produced uneven results. Only 42 percent of those charged received any jail time. There were large numbers of outright losses: 15 percent terminated in acquittals or dismissals. Only a handful of the cases involved high-level executives. These findings illustrate the challenges posed by organizational complexity and the manner in which it can obscure fault. Contrary to the calls of prominent critics, I argue that bringing more individual criminal cases cannot adequately substitute for prosecuting companies. Instead, corporate prosecutions should be leveraged to enhance individual accountability. In conclusion, I propose statutory, sentencing, and policy changes to tighten the connection between individual and corporate accountability for crimes

DNA and Due Process

The U.S. Supreme Court in District Attorney\u27s Office v. Osborne confronted novel and complex constitutional questions regarding the postconviction protections offered to potentially innocent convicts. Two decades after DNA testing exonerated the first inmate in the United States, the Court heard its first claim by a convict seeking DNA testing that could prove innocence. I argue that, contrary to early accounts, the Court did not reject a constitutional right to postconviction DNA testing. Despite language suggesting the Court would not constitutionalize the issue by announcing an unqualified freestanding right, Chief Justice Roberts\u27s majority opinion proceeded to carefully fashion an important, but qualified and derivative procedural due process right. While denying relief to Osborne for narrow factual and procedural reasons, the Court\u27s ruling swept more broadly. The Court held that states with postconviction discovery rules, as almost all have enacted, may not arbitrarily deny access to postconviction DNA testing, and then pointed to the generous provisions of the federal Innocence Protection Act as a model for an adequate statute. The Court also continued to assume that litigants may assert constitutional claims of actual innocence in habeas proceedings. In this Essay, I explore the contours of the Osborne due process right, its larger implications for constitutional interpretation, and, more specifically, whether the decision has the potential to create pressure on the States to provide meaningful avenues for convicts to litigate their innocence

Introduction: Symposium on ‘Convicting the Innocent

Examining what went wrong in the first 250 DNA exonerations was a sobering occupation, and I describe what I found in my book Convicting the Innocent, published by Harvard University Press in 2011. Still more haunting is the question of how many other wrongful convictions have not been uncovered and will never see the light of day. The New England Law Review has brought together a remarkable group of scholars who have each made leading contributions to the study of wrongful convictions from different disciplines and scholarly perspectives: Simon Cole, Deborah Davis, Gisli H. Gudjonsson, Richard Leo, and Elizabeth Loftus. Each has done ground-breaking work focusing on evidence in criminal investigations and prosecutions, looking beyond just what we know from the wrongful convictions that do come to light. This Symposium issue returns the focus to research that can tell us more about the causes of wrongful convictions, and in this introduction I try to do justice to their remarkable contributions

The Myth of the Presumption of Innocence

James Q. Whitman, in his deeply comparative new article, describes the American criminal justice system, in contrast with continental and inquisitorial systems, as more focused on the danger of innocent persons being arrested and convicted. In this Response, I respond by questioning the comparison on both sides of the equation, not to disagree with its utility or its contours, but because I admire the project and seek to elaborate here on Whitman’s deep concern with unpacking the status of the presumption of innocence and that of mercy. I describe how the American presumption of innocence is more of an ideal than real. Nor does the supposed and oft proclaimed focus in constitutional criminal procedure on the question of guilt or innocence translate into rights protective as against wrongful convictions. However, there is today the potential for a new kind of convergence, as systems on both sides of the Atlantic are responding to wrongful convictions with a rethinking of traditional procedural rules, including rules of finality that long resisted reopening convictions in a broad range of civil and common law systems. Continental systems are increasingly receptive to claims of new evidence of innocence, in part because of lessons drawn from research on wrongful convictions in the United States. And in a reverse irony, inquisitorial tools are influencing efforts to make criminal adjudication in the United States more reliable. As a result, in the years ahead, there is much that all systems can do to make the presumption of innocence far more than the vestigial “inaccurate, shorthand description” of a right that it has so often served as in the past, and instead a “corner stone” of criminal justice