Determinants of winning and losing persistence in the Polish banking sector

The article explores the reasons for winning and losing persistence in the Polish banking sector in the 1994–2005 period. It empirically verifies four hypotheses. They associate the performance persistence with market power, informational opacity, ownership structure, as well as with different operational and risk profiles of banks. Estimation of probit models led to the conclusion that in Poland market power related to the developed distribution channels and informational opacity make winning persistence more likely while preventing losing persistence from occurring. Furthermore, foreign-controlled banks have more chances to succeed repeatedly and avert subsequent failures. The picture of performance persistence in the Polish banking sector is biased by banks’ earnings management, especially by the avoidance of reporting small losses.performance persistence, banking system, emerging markets

Why Companies Go Private in Emerging Markets? Evidence from Poland

In recent years the number of going private transactions has sharply increased in emerging markets. The purpose of this study is to establish the financial characteristics of companies that have gone private using a dataset comprising of Polish companies. We use a probit model to distinguish the difference between firms that went private and companies that did not. We find that the probability of going private grew with a rise in the concentration of foreign ownership, an increase in the relative level of free cash flows, a decrease in the level of long term debt, and a decrease in the liquidity of share trading. The results obtained are important both for investors wishing to identify entities characterized by a high likelihood of going private and for governmental authorities evaluating the methods and rationality of privatization mature state- owned enterprises.Going Private, free cash flow, information asymmetry, ownership structure, emerging markets

Divestments in Banking. Preliminary Evidence on the Role of External Factors

Divestment constitutes an important method of corporate restructuring. Despite this fact, the banking literature on divestment is very limited. In this text, we try to remediate partially to the shortcomings of the existing literature by examining empirically the role of external factors. Using a large sample of 313 transactions, we have established that parent companies originate from countries with relatively high accumulated wealth, slow GDP growth, stable macroeconomic situation and dominant bank intermediation in financial system. The acquirers in turn come from poorer countries with faster economic growth and relatively more market-oriented financial systems. Those results broadly conform with the predictions of three hypotheses formulated in the text, namely the weak performance hypothesis, the corporate governance hypothesis and the rebalancing hypothesis

Local banks in social media: determinants and consequences

In this study, we examine the determinants of social media adoption by local banks and its consequences. We use a unique dataset covering almost 600 local banks in Poland during the 2010–2016 period. This dataset contains information on the activity of local banks in social media, their financial performance and branch locations as well as the information on bank customers obtained from sociological surveys. We find the likelihood of social media adoption positively related to bank size and the technological and financial sophistication of clients. We show also that the impact of factors related to local competition is conditional on the performance of neighboring banks already present in social media. Finally, we establish that social media adoption helps local banks to defend their interest margins in the environment of low interest rates and intensifying competition. Therefore, our study suggests that social media can be used as a tool to develop a business model based on frequent interactions with clients and close relationships

The effects of foreign and government ownership on bank lending behavior during a crisis in Central and Eastern Europe

We examine whether foreign-owned and government-owned banks in Central and Eastern Europe reacted differently during a domestic systematic banking crisis and the global financial crisis of 2008. Our panel dataset comprises data on more than 400 banks for the period 1994- 2010. Our analysis shows that foreign banks provided credit during domestic banking crises in host countries, while government-owned banks contracted. In contrast, foreign-owned banks reduced their credit base during the global financial crisis, while government-owned banks expanded. Consequently, our results show that foreign-owned banks may contribute to financial stability during domestic crisis episodes, but also increase the risk of importing instability from abroad during a crisis in their home markets. However, government-owned banks may substitute for foreign-owned banks and hinder the transmission of international shocks. Thus, our results indicate that a mixed banking sector consisting of foreign-owned and government-owned banks is most advisable

The effects of foreign and government ownership on bank lending behavior during a crisis in Central and Eastern Europe

We examine whether foreign-owned and government-owned banks in Central and Eastern Europe reacted differently during a domestic systematic banking crisis and the global financial crisis of 2008. Our panel dataset comprises data on more than 400 banks for the period 1994- 2010. Our analysis shows that foreign banks provided credit during domestic banking crises in host countries, while government-owned banks contracted. In contrast, foreign-owned banks reduced their credit base during the global financial crisis, while government-owned banks expanded. Consequently, our results show that foreign-owned banks may contribute to financial stability during domestic crisis episodes, but also increase the risk of importing instability from abroad during a crisis in their home markets. However, government-owned banks may substitute for foreign-owned banks and hinder the transmission of international shocks. Thus, our results indicate that a mixed banking sector consisting of foreign-owned and government-owned banks is most advisable

The Effects of Foreign and Government Ownership on Bank Lending Behavior During a Crisis in Central and Eastern Europe

We examine whether foreign-owned and government-owned banks in Central and Eastern Europe reacted differently during a domestic systematic banking crisis and the global financial crisis of 2008. Our panel dataset comprises data on more than 400 banks for the period 1994- 2010. Our analysis shows that foreign banks provided credit during domestic banking crises in host countries, while government-owned banks contracted. In contrast, foreign-owned banks reduced their credit base during the global financial crisis, while government-owned banks expanded. Consequently, our results show that foreign-owned banks may contribute to financial stability during domestic crisis episodes, but also increase the risk of importing instability from abroad during a crisis in their home markets. However, government-owned banks may substitute for foreign-owned banks and hinder the transmission of international shocks. Thus, our results indicate that a mixed banking sector consisting of foreign-owned and government-owned banks is most advisable

Market Discipline during Crisis: Evidence from Bank Depositors in Transition Countries

The Central European banking industry is dominated by foreign-owned banks. During the recent crisis, for the first time since the transition, foreign parent companies were frequently in worse financial conditions than their subsidiaries. This situation created a unique opportunity to study new aspects of depositor discipline. In this article, we investigate whether depositors flexibly accommodated to the changing sources of risk. We also analyse the informational foundations of depositors’ decisions. Using a comprehensive data set, we find that the recent crisis did not change the sensitivity of deposit growth rates to accounting risk measures. We establish that depositors’ actions were much more strongly influenced by press rumours concerning parent companies than by fundamentals, and that the impact of rumours on deposit growth rates was highly economically significant. Additionally, we document that public aid announcements were interpreted by depositors primarily as a confirmation of a parent company’s financial distress. Our results have important policy implications, as depositor discipline is usually the only viable and universal source of market discipline for banks in emerging economies