Football Championships and Jersey Sponsors' Stock Prices: An Empirical Investigation

Corporate sports sponsorship is an important part of many companies? corporate communication strategy. We take the example of major football tournaments to show that sponsorship indeed affects the sponsor?s (stock) market value. We find a statistically significant impact of football results (at an individual game level) of the seven most important football nations at European and World Championships on the stock prices of jersey sponsors. In general, the more important a match and the less expected its result, the higher its impact. In addition, we find a form of ?mere exposure?-effect which contradicts the efficient markets hypothesis.Sports sponsorship, Advertising, Stock market efficiency

Corporate campaign contributions and abnormal stock returns after presidential elections

In the U.S. campaign contributions by companies play a major role in financing election campaigns. We analyze contributions by companies before an election and stock market performance after the election for the presidential elections from 1992 until 2004. We find that (i) the percentage of contributions given to the winner in a presidential election and (ii) the total contribution (divided by market capitalization) have a significant positive impact on a company's stock market performance after an election, with the second factor being more important. Furthermore, we find that hypothetical portfolios of the 30 highest contributors according to (i) would have earned significant abnormal returns of up to 0.54% per month (6.6% p.a.) during the first year after an election. Investing in a portfolio formed according to (ii) would have yielded abnormal returns of up to 1.21% per month (15.5% p.a.) for the same observation period.Presidential Election, Corporate Campaign Contributions, Abnormal Returns

Football Championships and Jersey Sponsors' Stock Prices: An Empirical Investigation

Corporate sports sponsorship is an important part of many companies' corporate communication strategy. We take the example of major football tournaments to show that sponsorship indeed affects the sponsor's (stock) market value. We find a statistically significant impact of football results (at an individual game level) of the seven most important football nations at European and World Championships on the stock prices of jersey sponsors. In general, the more important a match and the less expected its result, the higher its impact. In addition, we find a form of mere exposure-effect which contradicts the efficient markets hypothesis

Thar she bursts - Reducing confusion reduces bubbles

To explore why bubbles frequently emerge in the experimental asset market model of Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988), we vary the fundamental value process (constant or declining) and the cash-to-asset value-ratio (constant or increasing). We observe high mispricing in treatments with a declining fundamental value, while overvaluation emerges when coupled with an increasing C/A-ratio. A questionnaire reveals that the declining fundamental value process confuses subjects, as they expect the fundamental value to stay constant.Running the experiment with a different context (“stocks of a depletable gold mine” instead of “stocks”) significantly reduces mispricing and overvaluation as it reduces confusion.Experimental economics, asset market, bubble, market efficiency, confusion

It is hard to beat the Monkeys - On the Value of Asymmetric Fundamental Information in Asset Markets

In this paper we present results from experimental asset markets and simulations with traders who receive asymmetric information about the fundamental value of an asset. In the experimental markets with repetition insiders outperform the market and uninformed computerized random traders (monkeys) perform equally well compared to average informed traders. This is in line with the results of the equilibrium simulation output in which traders choose between a random strategy and their fundamental strategy. We further find that pattern of average informed not being able to beat the uninformed is not due to their overconfidence but due to the asymmetric information structure of the market.Information economics, experimental economics, agent-based model, overconfidence, value of information

The value of information in a multi-agent market model

We present an experimental and simulated model of a multi-agent stock market driven by a double auction order matching mechanism. Studying the effect of cumulative information on the performance of traders, we find a non monotonic relationship of net returns of traders as a function of information levels, both in the experiments and in the simulations. Particularly, averagely informed traders perform worse than the non informed and only traders with high levels of information (insiders) are able to beat the market. The simulations and the experiments reproduce many stylized facts of stock markets, such as fast decay of autocorrelation of returns, volatility clustering and fat-tailed distribution of returns. These results have an important message for everyday life. They can give a possible explanation why, on average, professional fund managers perform worse than the market index.Comment: 11 pages, 5 figures, published in EPJ

Immaterial and monetary gifts in economic transactions: Evidence from the field

Reciprocation of monetary gifts is well-understood in economics. In contrast, there is little research on reciprocal behavior following immaterial gifts like compliments. We close this gap and investigate how employees reciprocate after receiving immaterial and material gifts. We purchase (1) ice cream from fast food restaurants, and (2) durum doner, a common lunch snack, from independent vendors. Prior to the food's preparation, we either compliment or tip the salesperson. Salespersons reciprocate compliments with higher product weight than in a control treatment. This reciprocal behavior grows over repeated transactions. Tips have a stronger level effect which marginally decreases over time

Friendliness pays off! Monetary and immaterial gifts in consumer-salesperson interactions

Recent studies find ample evidence that monetary and immaterial gifts influence effort in the workplace. We investigate the impacts of monetary gift exchange and of expressions of respect on salespersons' reciprocity when purchasing doner durum, a common lunch snack. Prior to the food's preparation, we either induce monetary gift exchange by tipping or explore the role of respect by making a compliment. We repeat the interaction on five consecutive days. Our findings show that salespersons exhibit positive reciprocity in response both to a monetary gift and to compliments regarding the product. The "compliment-effect" furthermore increases with repeated visits

The value of information in a multi-agent market model

We present an experimental and simulated model of a multi-agent stock market driven by a double auction order matching mechanism. Studying the effect of cumulative information on the performance of traders, we find a non monotonic relationship of net returns of traders as a function of information levels, both in the experiments and in the simulations. Particularly, averagely informed traders perform worse than the non informed and only traders with high levels of information (insiders) are able to beat the market. The simulations and the experiments reproduce many stylized facts of stock markets, such as fast decay of autocorrelation of returns, volatility clustering and fat-tailed distribution of returns. These results have an important message for everyday life. They can give a possible explanation why, on average, professional fund managers perform worse than the market index.Economics; econophysics; financial markets; business and management; information theory and communication theory

Trading strategies and trading profits in experimental asset markets with cumulative information

We study the use of trading strategies and their profitability in experimental asset markets with asymmetrically informed traders. We find that insiders make most of their profits from trades which are initiated by their limit orders especially at the beginning of a period and when the change in their fundamental information is large. The average informed lose most with market orders and their losses are highest at the beginning of a period when they can be exploited by insiders. Uninformed traders act as liquidity providers. They place the highest number of limit orders and end up with the market return