What Imagination Teaches

David Lewis has argued that “having an experience is the best way or perhaps the only way, of coming to know what that experience is like”; when an experience is of a sufficiently new sort, mere science lessons are not enough. Developing this Lewisian line, L.A. Paul has suggested that some experiences are epistemically transformative. Until an individual has such an experience it remains epistemically inaccessible to her. No amount of stories and theories and testimony from others can teach her what it is like to have it, nor is she able to achieve this knowledge by way of imaginative projection. It’s this last claim that is the focus of this paper. In particular, I explore the case for the claim that some experiences are in principle imaginatively inaccessible to someone who has not undergone the experience itself or one relevantly similar. As I will suggest, this case is not as strong as is often thought. Close attention to the mechanisms of imagination, and in particular, to cases of skilled imaginers, suggests how techniques of imaginative scaffolding can sometimes be used to give us epistemic access to experiences we have not had, even ones that are radically different from any that we have had before. As a result, considerably fewer experiences remain imaginatively out of reach than proponents of transformative experience would have us believe. Experience may well be the best teacher, but this paper aims to show that imagination comes in a close second

CPI-E On Every Desktop!

Christian Periodical Index-Electronic is now beginning its third year of \u27-Production. Initial subscriptions to the index were made following conference in 1999 after the official ribbon cutting at Lee University in Cleveland, Tennessee. Since that time we have seen many libraries subscribe. The electronic version is available in both cd-rom format and via the Internet. Libraries have successfully setup access both by ip recognition and by password for patrons accessing the library\u27s databases remotely. This year the CPI Team decided to make a more conscious effort to market the product with several initiatives underway. These include direct mailings with a newly designed brochure, vendor booths at some strategic conferences in addition to our own ACL conference and a regular column in The Christian Librarian. This is our inaugural article for the column

Imaginative Vividness

How are we to understand the phenomenology of imagining? Attempts to answer this question often invoke descriptors concerning the “vivacity” or “vividness” of our imaginative states. Not only are particular imaginings often phenomenologically compared and contrasted with other imaginings on grounds of how vivid they are, but such imaginings are also often compared and contrasted with perceptions and memories on similar grounds. Yet however natural it may be to use “vividness” and cognate terms in discussions of imagination, it does not take much reflection to see that these terms are ill understood. In this paper, I review both some relevant empirical literature as well as the philosophical literature attempt to get a handle on what it could mean, in an imaginative context, to talk of vividness. As I suggest, this notion ultimately proves to be so problematic as to be philosophically untenable

Imaginative Experience

In this essay, the focus is not on what imagination is but rather on what it is like. Rather than exploring the various accounts of imagination on offer in the philosophical literature, we will instead be exploring the various accounts of imaginative experience on offer in that literature. In particular, our focus in what follows will be on three different sorts of accounts that have played an especially prominent role in philosophical thinking about these issues: the impoverishment view (often associated with Hume), the will-dependence view (often associated with Wittgenstein), and the nonexistence view (often associated with Sartre). While there are important insights to be drawn from each of these views, each seems to me to be importantly flawed in various ways. As I will suggest, close examination reveals that none of them gives us an adequate account of the character of imaginative experience. Ultimately, in the final section of this paper, I briefly explore what their failure teaches us about the project of giving an account of imaginative experience

Kind Instantiation and Kind Change - A Problem for Four-Category Ontology

In Lowe’s Four-Category Ontology, instantiation is a basic formal ontological relation between particulars (objects, modes) and their kinds (kinds, attributes). Therefore, instantiation must be considered as a metaphysically necessary relation, which also rules out the metaphysical possibility of kind change. Nevertheless, according to Lowe, objects obtain their identity conditions in a more general level than specific natural kinds, which allows for kind change. There also seems to be actual examples of kind change. The advocate of Four-Category Ontology is obliged to resolve the tension between these mutually incompatible claims. In this article, we argue that the only viable option for the advocate of Four-Category Ontology is to bite the bullet and stick to the necessity of each of the most specific natural kind to the object instantiating it. As a major drawback, the four-category ontologist does not have any credible means to allow for kind change or determination of the identity conditions in a more general level

Another Kind of Classroom

The home locker room at Broadway Field is silent. Nobody is taping ankles. Nobody is listening to music. Everybody is reading. Inside a badly out-of-date dressing room in Seaside, Ore., the football team sits on wooden benches and pores over a four-paragraph letter written by coach Jeff Roberts ’97. In the letter, Roberts – also the school’s principal – urges players to “embrace the now” and reminds them of “unfinished business with Banks,” a league opponent Seaside hasn’t beaten since the team’s seniors were in first grade

A Kind of Magic

We introduce the extended Freudenthal-Rosenfeld-Tits magic square based on six algebras: the reals $\mathbb{R}$, complexes $\mathbb{C}$, ternions $\mathbb{T}$, quaternions $\mathbb{H}$, sextonions $\mathbb{S}$ and octonions $\mathbb{O}$. The ternionic and sextonionic rows/columns of the magic square yield non-reductive Lie algebras, including $\mathfrak{e}_{7\scriptscriptstyle{\frac{1}{2}}}$. It is demonstrated that the algebras of the extended magic square appear quite naturally as the symmetries of supergravity Lagrangians. The sextonionic row (for appropriate choices of real forms) gives the non-compact global symmetries of the Lagrangian for the $D=3$ maximal $\mathcal{N}=16$, magic $\mathcal{N}=4$ and magic non-supersymmetric theories, obtained by dimensionally reducing the $D=4$ parent theories on a circle, with the graviphoton left undualised. In particular, the extremal intermediate non-reductive Lie algebra $\tilde{\mathfrak{e}}_{7(7)\scriptscriptstyle{\frac{1}{2}}}$ (which is not a subalgebra of $\mathfrak{e}_{8(8)}$) is the non-compact global symmetry algebra of $D=3$, $\mathcal{N}=16$ supergravity as obtained by dimensionally reducing $D=4$, $\mathcal{N}=8$ supergravity with $\mathfrak{e}_{7(7)}$ symmetry on a circle. The ternionic row (for appropriate choices of real forms) gives the non-compact global symmetries of the Lagrangian for the $D=4$ maximal $\mathcal{N}=8$, magic $\mathcal{N}=2$ and magic non-supersymmetric theories obtained by dimensionally reducing the parent $D=5$ theories on a circle. In particular, the Kantor-Koecher-Tits intermediate non-reductive Lie algebra $\mathfrak{e}_{6(6)\scriptscriptstyle{\frac{1}{4}}}$ is the non-compact global symmetry algebra of $D=4$, $\mathcal{N}=8$ supergravity as obtained by dimensionally reducing $D=5$, $\mathcal{N}=8$ supergravity with $\mathfrak{e}_{6(6)}$ symmetry on a circle.Comment: 38 pages. Reference added and minor corrections mad