Primary and Secondary Causality in the Thought of St. Anselm: A Speculation on Divine Omniscience, Predestination and Grace in the Context of Human Freedom and Spirituality

Implicit in the writings of St Anselm of Canterbury is a distinct conception of the cooperative integration of primary and secondary causality. An exploration of this topic in Anselm\u27s theology will reveal its unique contribution to the understanding that faith, hope and grace affirm the authenticity of human freedom, and serve as an intermediate connection between primary causality (eternal, divine omniscience) and secondary causality (temporal, human experience). This dissertation places specific emphasis on Anselm\u27s De concordia, a treatise in which he seeks to facilitate a clear and rational understanding of how foreknowledge, predestination and grace are compatible with human freedom. Drawing from Anselm\u27s thought on this topic and considering its treatment by others, especially Augustine and Boethius, this study proposes three theories which articulate the logical compatibility of eternal knowledge and free choice: (1) cognitive causality, (2) divine foreknowledge understood as predestination, and (3) the duality of epistemological perspectives. These proposed theories are unique interpretations of what is implicit in Anselm\u27s thought. Their purpose is to facilitate a rational conception of what has been intellectually encountered for centuries as a dilemma, and to demonstrate that compatibility between eternal omniscience and human free will is arrived at through sound reasoning. An anthropological framework will serve throughout this study as the theoretical foundation and methodology for advancing these interpretations of Anselm. This framework lays emphasis on three basic features, or capacities, of the human person: the epistemic, the ethical, and the existential. The compatibility between foreknowledge and free will, in the context of an epistemological distinction between the eternal, divine perspective and the temporal, human perspective, will be articulated in terms of these three capacities -- knowing, doing, and being -- as the core components of human experience (secondary causality). The emphasis moves throughout this dissertation from speculative theory to its practical relevance for human experience, occurring within the overall context of salvific becoming. The authenticity of human freedom, then, is not only arrived at through abstract conceptions concerning its logical compatibility with foreknowledge, but is also revealed as imperative for authenticity in all three human capacities, and so for the person\u27s salvific becoming

CONTRACTS - SALES - EFFECT OF REASONABLE BELIEF IN BUYER\u27S INSOLVENCY ON SELLER\u27S DUTY TO PERFORM

The plaintiff ordered goods from the defendant, for immediate delivery, terms $1,500 down, balance covered by notes of three and six months. The check given for the down payment was dishonored because of insufficient funds but was subsequently honored. On investigation the defendant discovered that there were unpaid judgments outstanding against the plaintiff, some of which were upwards of three years old. Inferring that the plaintiff was insolvent, the defendant refused to deliver the goods unless cash was paid therefor and when plaintiff refused this offer defendant attempted to return the down payment. Held, plaintiff\u27s affairs were in such condition that any reasonable business man would be justified in believing him to be insolvent. A reasonable belief in the buyer\u27s insolvency is sufficient to excuse the seller from performing a contract to sell goods on credit. Leopold v. Rock-Ola Mfg. Corp., (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) 109 F. (2d) 611

CONTRACTS - DISCHARGE - ACCORD AND SATISFACTION WITH A THIRD PERSON

Action by P against D on an alleged oral promise to pay a debt owed to P by D\u27s mother. P had agreed to discharge the mother from liability. There was no direct evidence that the mother was a party to the transaction. Apparently the defense was that D\u27s promise was within the statute of frauds if the agreement to discharge was executory, or, if it was executed, that there was no consideration for D\u27s promise because the discharge of D\u27s mother was not legally binding since it was an accord and satisfaction with a third person. The trial court directed a verdict for D. Held, that the promise was not within the statute of frauds and that such a promise could be binding. The court said that, although a discharge by the creditor is not effective unless assented to by the debtor, the jury would have been warranted in inferring such assent from the circumstances here. F. I. Somers & Sons, Inc. v. LeClerc, (Vt. 1939) 8 A. (2d) 663

TRUSTS-RIGHT OF DIVORCED WIFE OF BENEFICIARY OF SPENDTHRIFT TRUST TO REACH THE BENEFICIARY\u27S INTEREST IN THE TRUST FOR ALIMONY AND SUPPORT FOR CHILDREN

P, divorced wife of D, brought this action for alimony and for support money for her children. The object of the action was to reach the income from a spendthrift trust created for the benefit of D and his present wife and children in the will of D\u27s mother. The will specifically provided that none of the proceeds of the trust were to go to P or her child. Held, the settlor had the right to devise her property in any manner she chose. There is nothing in the statutes or decisions of Wisconsin which forbid such terms in a trust. Nor is there any public policy which would prevent such. Bill dismissed. There was a strong dissent on the grounds that Wisconsin had not declared its policy on this question and that until such was done this court could decide as it thought just. Schwager v. Schwager, (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) 109 F. (2d) 754

TRUSTS - SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS - BENEFICIAL INTEREST HELD NOT ATTACHABLE TO MAKE GOOD LIABILITY AS TRUSTEE

Janet Jones was an inactive trustee and one of the beneficiaries of a spendthrift trust. Because of lack of good judgment on the part of her co-trustee, and without any moral fault on her part, Janet was charged with liability for a large sum. Her surety, who paid the succeeding trustee, took an assignment of the rights of the trust estate against Janet Jones and demanded that the trustee pay to it all the income, past, present and future, which the trust instrument gave to such beneficiary. The trustee brought this action for instructions. Held, as the trust estate was only a creditor of Janet Jones and the will precluded attachment of her beneficial interest by creditors, an exception will not be made in favor of the trust estate or its assignee. Blakemore v. Jones, (Mass. 1939) 22 N. E. (2d) 112

INSURANCE -WHAT CONSTITUTES MARKS OF FORCE AND VIOLENCE WITHIN THE MEANING OF A POLICY OF SAFE BURGLARY INSURANCE?

P sued to recover on a policy of safe burglary insurance which required that the entry into the safe must have been made by force and violence of which there shall be visible marks made by tools . . . or other chemicals. P\u27s employee was forced to open the safe, after having been struck on the head with a gun, and in so doing the employee left blood stains on the safe. P contended that the policy was ambiguous in its terms and that the blood on the safe, having chemical qualities, demonstrated the use of chemicals to open the safe, as required by the policy. The trial court entered judgment for the defendant. Held, that blood was not a chemical within the meaning of the policy and that the policy was not ambiguous in its terms. Bridge v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co., 302 Ill. App. 1, 23 N. E. (2d) 367 (1939)

UNFAIR COMPETITION - TRUTHFUL DISPARAGEMENT OF A TRADER\u27S REPUTATION

Plaintiff sued for treble damages under the Anti-Trust Act, alleging that the defendants had conspired and combined to drive him out of the securities business. Plaintiff alleged that to accomplish their purpose the defendants published statements as to plaintiff\u27s criminal record. The facts are not clear, but it appears from the report that the crimes in question were committed twenty years previously, during plaintiff\u27s youth. The trial court instructed the jury that if that information was true [as to plaintiff\u27s criminal record], the Better Business Bureau, regardless of its purpose in disseminating the information, would not be liable, is not liable, because no person or firm can be liable for telling or publishing the truth. Held, that the instruction was substantially correct; that even though the instruction did not apply to this action the defendants would not be liable because there was not sufficient evidence to support the charge of illegality in the combination; that the avowed purpose of the defendants, to rid the securities business of unscrupulous persons, was not only lawful but commendable; that the only question was the illegality of the combination. McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) 107 F. (2d) 908, certiorari denied (U.S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 807

CORPORATIONS - NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS - POWER OF COURT OF EQUITY TO PRESERVE ORIGINAL PURPOSES AND SET-UP OF SUCH A CORPORATION

The Osteopathic Hospital was incorporated in 1919 as a nonprofit corporation by five persons who subscribed funds for its support. Its articles provided that the qualifications for trustees, method of filling vacancies in the board of trustees and the manner in which persons could become members should be set out in the by-laws to be adopted by the original incorporators. The by-laws thus adopted provided for a self-perpetuating board of trustees with power in them to amend the by-laws. These by-laws were not questioned until January 20, 1938, when a group of the members attempted to amend the by-laws to permit election of the trustees by the members and the same group purported to elect trustees under such amendments. This bill in equity was brought by those who were trustees previous to January 20, 1938, in conjunction with the hospital, to determine who were the true trustees and also asking injunctive relief. The lower court found for the plaintiffs and enjoined the defendants from further attempts to amend the by-laws or elect trustees. Held, this was a trust and a court of equity had the power to enjoin interference with the intent of the founders. The injunction was properly granted. Detroit Osteopathic Hospital v. Johnson, 290 Mich. 283, 287 N. W. 466 (1939)

CONTEMPT - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - PARDONS - POWER OF A GOVERNOR TO PARDON FOR CONTEMPT

Dolan and Quinn were indicted for crime, and while awaiting trial were cited for contempt because of alleged attempts to influence members of the jury panel who might be drawn to sit on the jury in the trials of Dolan and Quinn. They were convicted of contempt and committed to jail, from which they petitioned the governor for pardon. The governor and his council adopted an order requiring the opinion of the justices of the Supreme Judicial Court on the question whether the governor had power to pardon such a contempt. Held, these contempts were criminal in their nature and offenses against the commonwealth within the meaning of offenses as used in the pardoning clause of the constitution, so that a pardon would be valid. In re Opinion of the Justices, (Mass. 1938) 17 N. E. (2d) 906