The Pairing of Trigger Point Dry Needling with Rehabilitation Techniques

Trigger point dry needling is a manual treatment modality used for individuals experiencing tightness, pain, and inhibited range of motion in any region of the body. Dry needling can be described as the insertion of a blunt, microfilament non-medicated needle into the skin for the purpose of targeting specific muscles, which contain tight bands known as trigger points. When the needle is inserted into the trigger point the muscle contracts, holds tight to the needle, and elicits a neural twitch response. This ultimately causes the muscle to relax, allowing for reduction in pain and improvements in range of motion. Although the use of dry needling is rising in popularity in the United States, knowledge of its use and effects is limited. Fortunately, more research is being conducted on this form of treatment. In this thesis, the purpose and physiological effects of dry needling will be discussed in detail, along with a comparison between other alternate medical modalities of treatment which target trigger points. In addition, current research on the effectiveness of incorporating dry needling with other manual therapeutic modalities will be discussed. Dry needling has been shown to be very effective in treating trigger points by improving range of motion, decreasing pain, reducing muscle tightness, and increasing muscle oxygenation. Positive effects of dry needling are even more likely to occur when paired with other modes of therapeutic treatment, often in a physical therapy setting but may also be performed by other health professionals including chiropractors, athletic trainers, occupational therapists, and physicians

Consumer Loss Aversion and the Intensity of Competition

Consider a differentiated product market in which all consumers are fully informed about match value and price at the time they make their purchasing decision. Initially, consumers become informed about the prices of all products in the market but do not know the match values. Some consumers have reference-dependent utilities—i.e., they form a reference-point distribution with respect to match value and price that will make them realize gains or losses if their eventually chosen product performs better or, respectively, worse than their reference point in both dimensions. Loss aversion in the match-value dimension leads to a less competitive outcome, while loss aversion in the price dimension leads to a more competitive equilibrium than a market in which consumers are not subject to reference dependence. Depending on the weights consumers attach to the price and the match-value dimension, a market with loss-averse consumers may be more or less competitive than a market with consumers that do not have reference-dependent utilities. We also show that consumer loss aversion tends to lead to higher prices if the market accommodates a larger number of ?rms

Consumer Loss Aversion and the Intensity of Competition

Consider a differentiated product market in which all consumers are fully informed about match value and price at the time they make their purchasing decision. Initially, consumers become informed about the prices of all products in the market but do not know the match values. Some consumers have reference-dependent utilities—i.e., they form a reference-point distribution with respect to match value and price that will make them realize gains or losses if their eventually chosen product performs better or, respectively, worse than their reference point in both dimensions. Loss aversion in the match-value dimension leads to a less competitive outcome, while loss aversion in the price dimension leads to a more competitive equilibrium than a market in which consumers are not subject to reference dependence. Depending on the weights consumers attach to the price and the match-value dimension, a market with loss-averse consumers may be more or less competitive than a market with consumers that do not have reference-dependent utilities. We also show that consumer loss aversion tends to lead to higher prices if the market accommodates a larger number of ?rms.Loss Aversion; Reference-Dependent Utility; Behavioral Industrial Organization; Imperfect Competition; Product Differentiation

Pricing and Information Disclosure in Markets with Loss-Averse Consumers

Abstract: We develop a theory of imperfect competition with loss-averse consumers. All consumers are fully informed about match value and price at the time they make their purchasing decision. However, a share of consumers are initially uncertain about their tastes and form a reference point consisting of an expected match value and an expected price distribution, while other consumers are perfectly informed all the time. We derive pricing implications in duopoly with asymmetric ?rms. In particular, we show that a market may exhibit more price variation the larger the share of uninformed, loss-averse consumers. We also derive implications for ?rm strategy and public policy concerning ?rms’ incentives to inform consumers about their match value prior to forming their reference point