Networks that organised competition : corporate resource sharing between Swedish property underwriters 1875-1950

This thesis investigates the corporate networks of Swedish property underwriters 1875-1950. During this period, networks of increasing intensity was an essential part in the organisation of the Swedish property insurance market. Corporate resource sharing allowed underwriters to accommodate the ever-changing industrialised demand for property insurance. Interlocking directorates, ownership ties and membership in collaborative organisations were the vessels of this corporate resource sharing. This study proposes a network perspective on the organisation of competition and collaboration. It finds that networks lowered firms’ cost-threshold for underwriting diversification, causing wellconnected firms to expand into new markets more easily. An essential resource to underwriters was information, and information exchange motivated several interfirm rapprochements. The driving forces for the organisational shift towards increased networking were, however, complex, and included both socioeconomic and strategic factors. Through networks of mutual resource sharing, the consolidation that appears in the industry after 1950 was preceded by a long historical process in which firms who would later merge developed measurably clustered network structures as early as in the 1910s. In the 1920s the networks already contributed to a high market concentration. Networks thereby conditioned the underwriting operation of individual firms as well as the structural evolution of the Swedish insurance market as a whole

Networks that organised competition : corporate resource sharing between Swedish property underwriters 1875-1950

This thesis investigates the corporate networks of Swedish property underwriters 1875-1950. During this period, networks of increasing intensity was an essential part in the organisation of the Swedish property insurance market. Corporate resource sharing allowed underwriters to accommodate the ever-changing industrialised demand for property insurance. Interlocking directorates, ownership ties and membership in collaborative organisations were the vessels of this corporate resource sharing. This study proposes a network perspective on the organisation of competition and collaboration. It finds that networks lowered firms’ cost-threshold for underwriting diversification, causing wellconnected firms to expand into new markets more easily. An essential resource to underwriters was information, and information exchange motivated several interfirm rapprochements. The driving forces for the organisational shift towards increased networking were, however, complex, and included both socioeconomic and strategic factors. Through networks of mutual resource sharing, the consolidation that appears in the industry after 1950 was preceded by a long historical process in which firms who would later merge developed measurably clustered network structures as early as in the 1910s. In the 1920s the networks already contributed to a high market concentration. Networks thereby conditioned the underwriting operation of individual firms as well as the structural evolution of the Swedish insurance market as a whole

Networks that organised competition : corporate resource sharing between Swedish property underwriters 1875-1950

This thesis investigates the corporate networks of Swedish property underwriters 1875-1950. During this period, networks of increasing intensity was an essential part in the organisation of the Swedish property insurance market. Corporate resource sharing allowed underwriters to accommodate the ever-changing industrialised demand for property insurance. Interlocking directorates, ownership ties and membership in collaborative organisations were the vessels of this corporate resource sharing. This study proposes a network perspective on the organisation of competition and collaboration. It finds that networks lowered firms’ cost-threshold for underwriting diversification, causing wellconnected firms to expand into new markets more easily. An essential resource to underwriters was information, and information exchange motivated several interfirm rapprochements. The driving forces for the organisational shift towards increased networking were, however, complex, and included both socioeconomic and strategic factors. Through networks of mutual resource sharing, the consolidation that appears in the industry after 1950 was preceded by a long historical process in which firms who would later merge developed measurably clustered network structures as early as in the 1910s. In the 1920s the networks already contributed to a high market concentration. Networks thereby conditioned the underwriting operation of individual firms as well as the structural evolution of the Swedish insurance market as a whole

Variation in organizational form across lines of property insurance : Sweden, 1913-1939

This article examines the impact of organizational structure on risk taking across different lines of property insurance (fire, marine, vehicle and specialized property insurance) in Sweden from 1913 to 1939. Based on the theoretical arguments whereby the mutual organizational form has a competitive advantage in underwriting homogeneous but unknown risk distribution, while the stock organizational form is more likely to underwrite more volatile and heterogeneous risk categories, we conclude that organizational form has a significant impact on risk taking. Our empirical analysis shows that the risk taking, measured as incurred claims to anticipated losses, was on average lower among mutual insurers. When comparing across lines of insurance, the analysis shows that the mutual form was more successful in keeping down risks in fire and marine, while less so in vehicle and specialized property insurance. Stock companies mitigated the higher risk by ceding more premiums to reinsurers and by diversifying more across different lines of insurance

Pre-welfare state provision and adverse selection : enrolment in a Swedish nationwide health insurance society

Mutual benefit societies evolved as the major provider for sickness, accident and life insurance in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries on both sides of the Atlantic. One of the major problems facing insurers was the risk of adverse selection, i.e. that unhealthy individuals had more incentives than healthy individuals to insure when priced for the average risk. By empirically examining whether longevity among insured individuals in a nationwide mutual health society was different from a matched sample of uninsured individuals, we seek to identify the presence of adverse selection. We find no compelling evidence showing that unhealthy individuals were more likely to insure, or reasons to believe that problems related to adverse selection would have been a major reason for government intervention in the health insurance market in Sweden

Adverse selection in mutual benefit societies : an longitudinal approach

Mutual benefit societies evolved as the major provider for illness, accident and burialinsurance in the late 19 th and early 20 th century in the Western world. One of themajor problems facing the insurers was the risk for adverse selection; that unhealthyindividuals had more incentive then healthy to insure when priced for the averagerisk. By empirically examine if the longevity among insured in mutual benefit societieswas different from uninsured, we seek to identify the presence of adverse section. Wefind no compelling evidence that unhealthy individuals was more likely to insure, orreasons to believe that adverse selection was behind the decline of mutual benefitsocieties in the twentieth century

Adverse selection in mutual benefit societies : an longitudinal approach

Mutual benefit societies evolved as the major provider for illness, accident and burialinsurance in the late 19 th and early 20 th century in the Western world. One of themajor problems facing the insurers was the risk for adverse selection; that unhealthyindividuals had more incentive then healthy to insure when priced for the averagerisk. By empirically examine if the longevity among insured in mutual benefit societieswas different from uninsured, we seek to identify the presence of adverse section. Wefind no compelling evidence that unhealthy individuals was more likely to insure, orreasons to believe that adverse selection was behind the decline of mutual benefitsocieties in the twentieth century