Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods

We characterize the core many-to-one matchings as fixed points of a map. Our characterization gives an algorithm for finding core allocations; the algorithm is efficient and simple to implement. Our characterization does not require substitutable preferences, so it is separate from the structure needed for the non-emptiness of the core. When preferences are substitutable, our characterization gives a simple proof of the lattice structure of core matchings, and it gives a method for computing the join and meet of two core matchings

A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets

We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set and with the predictions of a non-cooperative bargaining model. The setwise-stable set possesses the conflict/coincidence of interest properties from many-to-one, and one-to-one models. The theory parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core-like solutions, besides the setwise-stable set

A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets

We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set, and with the predictions of a non-cooperative bargaining model. The set-wise stable set possesses the canonical conflict/coincidence of interest properties from many-to-one, and one-to-one models. The theory parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to- one, models. We provide results for a number of core-like solutions, besides the setwise-stable set.many-to-many matchings, substitutability, tarski fixed point theorem, setwise stability, core

A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets

Matching market, Core, Setwise stable set

Core Many-to-one Matchings by Fixed-point Methods

We characterize the core many-to-one matchings as fixed points of a map. Our characterization gives an algorithm for finding core allocations; the algorithm is efficient and simple to implement. Our characterization does not require substitutable preferences, so it is separate from the structure needed for the non-emptiness of the core. When preferences are substitutable, our characterization gives a simple proof of the lattice structure of core matchings, and it gives a method for computing the join and meet of two core matchings.matching, supermodular games, tarski's fixed-point theorem

The general principles of the United Nations Convention for the International Sale of Goods

Resumen: En el presente artículo, el autor aborda el estudio del artículo 7° (2) de la Convención de las Naciones Unidas sobre los Contratos de Compraventa Internacional de Mercaderías, norma que invoca los principios generales en que ella se basa como regla de integración e intepretación del Convenio. El artículo explora algunos de los principios establecidos por la doctrina, tales como la buena fe, la interpretación conforme a la real intención y razonabilidad, la teoría de los actos propios, la libertad de forma y la mitigación de daños, mostrando el alcance que le han dado los tribunales en sus fallos.Palabras clave: compraventa internacional, principios, interpretación, integración.Abstract: In this paper the author analyses Article 7 (2) of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. This regulation cites the general principles on which it is founded as a law of integration and interpretation of the Convention. The paper investigates some of the principles established by the doctrine such as the following: acting in good faith; interpreting the real intention and logical nature of contracts; estoppel theory; the freedom to choose the content and form of the contract, and the mitigation of damages. It also demonstrates the scope of previous court rulings.Key words: international sale of goods, principles, interpretation, integration

The general principles of the United Nations Convention for the International Sale of Good

10 PáginasIn this paper the author analyses Article 7 (2) of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. This regulation cites the general principles on which it is founded as a law of integration and interpretation of the Convention. The paper investigates some of the principles established by the doctrine such as the following: acting in good faith; interpreting the real intention and logical nature of contracts; estoppel theory; the freedom to choose the content and form of the contract, and the mitigation of damages. It also demonstrates the scope of previous court rulings.En el presente artículo, el autor aborda el estudio del artículo 7° (2) de la Convención de las Naciones Unidas sobre los Contratos de Compraventa Internacional de Mercaderías, norma que invoca los principios generales en que ella se basa como regla de integración e intepretación del Convenio. El artículo explora algunos de los principios establecidos por la doctrina, tales como la buena fe, la interpretación conforme a la real intención y razonabilidad, la teoría de los actos propios, la libertad de forma y la mitigación de daños, mostrando el alcance que le han dado los tribunales en sus fallos

A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets

We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set, and with the predictions of a non-cooperative bargaining model. The set-wise stable set possesses the canonical conflict/coincidence of interest properties from many-to-one, and one-to-one models. The theory parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core-like solutions, besides the setwise-stable set

On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles

We consider the general many-to-one matching model with ordinal preferences and give a procedure to partition the set of preference profiles into subsets with the property that all preference profiles in the same subset have the same Core. We also show how to identify a profile of (incomplete) binary relations containing the minimal information needed to generate as strict extensions all the (complete) preference profiles with the same Core. This is important for applications since it reduces the amount of information that agents have to reveal about their preference relations to centralized Core matching mechanisms; moreover, this reduction is maximal.Matching, Core