Transnational Corporations and Developing Public International Law

In recent years the international community has been developing various international codes of conduct, many of which will contain rules governing the behavior of transnational corporations (TNCs). Most of these rules are being developed with little or no direct TNC participation. Professor Charney argues that because TNCs represent major, independent centers of influence, failure to include them in the codes of conduct negotiations may result in rules that do not accurately reflect the realities of TNC interests and power. If the international community later seeks to convert these rules into legal norms, TNC resistance will probably place costly strains on both the rules and the entire international legal system. Professor Charney concludes that the international community should permit TNCs and other interested power groups to participate directly in the development of international norms applicable to their interests. But he cautions that it would be unwise to give TNCs complete international legal personality because this, too, might place undue strains on the international legal system

International Agreements and the Development of Customary International Law

It has never been clear, however, which circumstances of negotiation and conclusion of international agreements contribute to new rules of customary law. The issues can be appreciated if one goes beyond generalities and explores the relationship of specific agreements to customary law. Such an examination has been facilitated by the American Law Institute\u27s Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) which contains a contemporary review of a wide range of public and private international law topics. This Restatement represents the views of some of the best international law experts of the United States and abroad. It is also an extremely important contribution to the law in its own right. For these reasons, this article will use the Restatement as a starting point for examination of the function served by international agreements in the development of customary law. This examination shows the difficulties that are presented when international agreements are so used. It may be possible, however, to identify some factors which would help to distinguish those agreements which may appropriately give rise to customary international law and those which may not

Third State Remedies in International Law

This article explores issues arising from third state enforcement of international law. Support for third state remedies may be found in law, practice, and the literature. It is not, however, definitively stablished. Third state remedies may appear at first glance to serve only the desirable goal of promoting rules of international law, but they may also produce negative side effects. The challenge to the international community is to design an effective third state enforcement regime that minimizes undesirable side effects

Developments in International Criminal Law (Foreword)

Many of the contributions to this issue of the Journal focus on several recent historic developments in the field of international criminal law. In July of 1998, the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (ICC) concluded an intensive five-week session in Rome by adopting a statute for such a. court. Although the United States voted against the statute, its vote, as several contributions to this issue make clear, does not signal U.S. opposition to an international criminal court as such, but, rather, concern that certain features of the statute produced by the Rome Conference may undermine the achievement of other international goals that the United States believes are no less critical for world order and the international protection of human rights. The United States has been a firm supporter of the two existing international criminal courts-the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)- and its support may prove just as crucial to the success of the ICC