The responsibility to protect and the question of attribution

This article explores the problem of attribution in the context of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) intervention through an analysis of the Syrian chemical weapons attack of 2013. We argue that R2P advocates can be confronted by a crisis dynamic where the political momentum for military intervention runs ahead of independent verification and attribution of mass atrocity crimes. We contrast the political momentum for intervention with the technical process of independent attribution and show that the sort of independent evidence that would ideally legitimize an R2P intervention was unavailable when there was political momentum for action. Conversely, the information that was available (which inevitably informed the political momentum for action) was largely produced by state intelligence organizations - or a potentially briefed media - and shaped by the interests and priorities of its end users. While understandable in the face of the 'extreme', we suggest that the mobilization of political momentum by R2P advocates entails significant dangers: first, it risks undermining the integrity of R2P if evidence is later discredited and second, it risks amplifying the perception that states sometimes exploit humanitarian pretexts in pursuit of other strategic ends

The purpose of United Nations Security Council practice: Contesting competence claims in the normative context created by the Responsibility to Protect.

Practice theory provides important insight into the workings of the Security Council. The contribution is currently limited however by the conjecture that practice theory operates on ‘a different analytical plane’ to norm / normative theory (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014). Building on existing critiques (Duval and Chowdhury 2011; Schindler and Wille 2015) we argue that analyzing practices separately from normative positions risks misappropriating competence and reifying practice that is not fit for purpose. This risk is realized in Adler-Nissen and Pouliot’s (2014) practice based account Libya crisis. By returning the normative context created by the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) to the analytical foreground, and by drawing on a pragmatic conception of 'ethical competence' (Frost 2009), we find that pre-reflexive practices uncritically accepted as markers of competence – e.g. ‘penholding’ – can contribute to the Council’s failure to act collectively in the face of mass atrocity. Drawing on extensive interview material we offer an alternative account of the Libya intervention, finding that the practices of the permanent three (France, UK and US) did not cultivate the kind of collective consciousness that is required to implement R2P. This is further illustrated by an account of the Security Council’s failure in Syria, where the P3’s insistence on regime change instrumentalized the Council at the expense of R2P-appropriate practice. This changed when elected members became ‘penholders’. Practice theory can facilitate learning processes that help the Council meet its responsibilities, but only through an approach that combines its insights with those of norm / normative theory

The UN security council divided: Syria in crisis

The UN Security Council has been deeply divided over how to respond to the Arab Spring crisis in Syria. Since the uprising began in Syria in March 2011 the Syrian Government has responded with extreme violence against civilians and civilian areas to suppress protests. In the face of escalating violence, the Security Council has experienced protracted deadlock. Divisions on how to interpret the situation in Syria left the Security Council unable to find consensus on issuing a non-binding Presidential Statement for the first five months of the crisis. Subsequent disagreement on what measures to take to address the violence has led to two vetoed resolutions on the divisive issues of sanctions and regime change. The vetoes occurred in October 2011 and in February 2012, vetoed by both Russia and China. More than a year into the crisis the Security Council authorised a team of unarmed UN military observers to be deployed in Syria in a rare moment of consensus on this issue. However this lowest-common-denominator response was quickly suspended due to high levels of violence against UN observers. Throughout the stalemate in the Security Council violence against Syrian civilians continued to escalate