Reviving Bank Antirust

After decades of disuse, antitrust is back. Renewing the United States’ longstanding distrust of concentrated economic power, antimonopoly scholars have documented widespread harms of corporate “bigness” and inspired policy initiatives to de-concentrate the U.S. economy. To date, however, the new antitrust movement has largely overlooked a key cause of commercial concentration: the rapid consolidation of the U.S. banking sector. More than thirty thousand banks served local communities a century ago, but today just six financial conglomerates control half of the U.S. banking system. Bank consolidation, in turn, has spurred conglomeration throughout the economy. As the Supreme Court recognized in 1963, “[C]oncentration in banking accelerates concentration generally.” This Article contends that scholars and policymakers have neglected bank antitrust law for the past forty years and thereby encouraged excessive consolidation in the banking sector and the broader economy. It argues that policymakers’ current approach to bank antitrust—premised on a narrow conception of consumer welfare—has failed in two critical respects. First, it has failed on its own terms, as bank mergers have increased the cost and reduced the availability of basic financial services. Second, because of its limited focus on consumer prices, the prevailing standard has ignored numerous nonprice harms stemming from bank consolidation, including diminished product quality, heightened entry barriers, and greater macroeconomic instability. To correct these shortcomings, this Article proposes a roadmap for reviving bank antitrust. It recommends strengthening the analytical tools used to identify anticompetitive bank mergers and rejecting a narrow focus on consumer prices in favor of a more comprehensive analysis of the costs that bank consolidation imposes on society. Reviving bank antitrust in this way is critical to enhancing competition in the financial sector and throughout the U.S. economy

Board to Death: How Busy Directors Could Cause the Next Financial Crisis

In the aftermath of the Great Recession, shareholders and regulators expect financial institution boards of directors to play an active role in risk management. To date, however, shareholders, policymakers, and academics have ignored a critical shortcoming: the directors of the United States’ largest financial institutions are too busy to fulfill their governance responsibilities. Many financial institution directors hold full-time executive positions, and most serve on the board of at least one other company. Although these outside commitments provide important learning and networking opportunities, they also contribute to cognitive overload and limit the time that directors spend assessing strategy and risk. This Article argues that overcommitted directors impair the governance of large financial institutions. These firms, by virtue of their complexity and systemic importance, require enhanced risk monitoring that busy directors are ill-equipped to provide. Nonetheless, the boards of many large financial institutions remain alarmingly overcommitted. Through a series of case studies—including Wells Fargo’s fraudulent accounts scandal and JPMorgan’s London Whale trades—this Article explores how busy directors inhibit oversight of management, increase the risk of firm failure, and could cause the next financial crisis. This Article proposes a series of reforms to alleviate director overcommitment and thereby enhance the stability of the financial system

Modernizing Bank Merger Review

Sixty years ago, Congress established a federal pre-approval regime for bank mergers to protect consumers from then-unprecedented consolidation in the banking sector. This process worked well for several decades, but it has since atrophied, producing numerous “too big to fail” banks. This Article contends that regulators’ current approach to evaluating bank merger proposals is poorly suited for modern financial markets. Policymakers and scholars have traditionally focused on a single issue: whether a bank merger would reduce competition. Over the past two decades, however, changes in bank regulation and market structure—including the repeal of interstate banking restrictions and the emergence of nonbank financial service providers—have rendered bank antitrust analysis largely obsolete. As a result, regulators have rubber-stamped recent bank mergers, despite evidence that such deals could harm consumers and destabilize financial markets

Who\u27s Looking Out for the Banks?

When the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act authorized financial conglomeration in 1999, Professor Arthur Wilmarth, Jr. presciently predicted that diversified financial holding companies would try to exploit their bank subsidiaries by transferring government subsidies to their nonbank affiliates. To prevent financial conglomerates from taking advantage of their insured depository subsidiaries in this way, policymakers instructed a bank\u27s board of directors to act in the best interests of the bank, rather than the bank\u27s holding company. This symposium Article, written in honor of Professor Wilmarth\u27s retirement, contends that this legal safeguard ignores a critical conflict of interest: the vast majority of large-bank directors also serve as board members of their parent holding companies. These dual directors are therefore poorly situated to exercise the independent judgment necessary to protect a bank from exploitation by its nonbank affiliates. This Article proposes to strengthen bank governance-and better insulate banks from their nonbank affiliates-by mandating that some of a bank\u27s directors be unaffiliated with its holding company. As long as banks are permitted to affiliate with nonbanks, this reform is essential to ensure that someone is looking out for the well-being of insured depository institutions

Too Many to Fail: Against Community Bank Deregulation

Since the 2008 financial crisis, policymakers and scholars have fixated on the problem of “too-big-to-fail” banks. This fixation, however, overlooks the historically dominant pattern in banking crises: the contemporaneous failure of many small institutions. We call this blind spot the “too-many-to-fail” problem and document how its neglect has skewed the past decade of financial regulation. In particular, we argue that, for so- called community banks, there has been a pronounced and unjustifiable shift toward deregulation, culminating in sweeping regulatory rollbacks in the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act of 2018. As this Article demonstrates, this deregulatory trend rests on three myths. First, that community banks do not contribute to systemic risk and were not central to the 2008 crisis. Second, that the Dodd-Frank Act imposed regulatory burdens that threaten the survival of the community bank sector. And third, that community banks cannot remain viable without special subsidies or regulatory advantages. While these claims have gained near- universal acceptance among legal scholars and policymakers, none of them withstands scrutiny. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, community banks were key participants in the 2008 crisis, were not uniquely burdened by postcrisis reforms, and continue to thrive economically. Dispelling these myths about the community bank sector leads to the conclusion that diligent oversight of community banks is necessary to preserve financial stability. Accordingly, this Article recommends a reversal of the community bank deregulatory trend and proposes affirmative reforms, including enhanced supervision and macroprudential stress tests, that would help mitigate systemic risks in the community bank sector

Regulating Entities and Activities: Complementary Approaches to Nonbank Systemic Risk

The recent financial crisis demonstrated that, contrary to longstanding regulatory assumptions, nonbank financial firms—such as investment banks and insurance companies—can propagate systemic risk throughout the financial system. After the crisis, policymakers in the United States and abroad developed two different strategies for dealing with nonbank systemic risk. The first strategy seeks to regulate individual nonbank entities that officials designate as being potentially systemically important. The second approach targets financial activities that could create systemic risk, irrespective of the types of firms that engage in those transactions. In the last several years, domestic and international policymakers have come to view these two strategies as substitutes, largely abandoning entity-based designations in favor of activities-based approaches. This Article argues that this trend is deeply misguided because entity- and activities-based approaches are complementary tools that are each essential for effectively regulating nonbank systemic risk. Eliminating an entity-based approach to nonbank systemic risk—either formally or through onerous procedural requirements—would expose the financial system to the same risks that it experienced in 2008 as a result of distress at nonbanks like AIG, Bear Stearns, and Lehman Brothers. This conclusion is especially salient in the United States, where jurisdictional fragmentation undermines the capacity of financial regulators to implement an effective activities-based approach. Significant reforms to the U.S. regulatory framework are necessary, therefore, before an activities-based approach can meaningfully complement domestic entity-based systemic risk regulation

Differential cross section measurements for the production of a W boson in association with jets in proton–proton collisions at √s = 7 TeV

Measurements are reported of differential cross sections for the production of a W boson, which decays into a muon and a neutrino, in association with jets, as a function of several variables, including the transverse momenta (pT) and pseudorapidities of the four leading jets, the scalar sum of jet transverse momenta (HT), and the difference in azimuthal angle between the directions of each jet and the muon. The data sample of pp collisions at a centre-of-mass energy of 7 TeV was collected with the CMS detector at the LHC and corresponds to an integrated luminosity of 5.0 fb[superscript −1]. The measured cross sections are compared to predictions from Monte Carlo generators, MadGraph + pythia and sherpa, and to next-to-leading-order calculations from BlackHat + sherpa. The differential cross sections are found to be in agreement with the predictions, apart from the pT distributions of the leading jets at high pT values, the distributions of the HT at high-HT and low jet multiplicity, and the distribution of the difference in azimuthal angle between the leading jet and the muon at low values.United States. Dept. of EnergyNational Science Foundation (U.S.)Alfred P. Sloan Foundatio

Severe early onset preeclampsia: short and long term clinical, psychosocial and biochemical aspects

Preeclampsia is a pregnancy specific disorder commonly defined as de novo hypertension and proteinuria after 20 weeks gestational age. It occurs in approximately 3-5% of pregnancies and it is still a major cause of both foetal and maternal morbidity and mortality worldwide1. As extensive research has not yet elucidated the aetiology of preeclampsia, there are no rational preventive or therapeutic interventions available. The only rational treatment is delivery, which benefits the mother but is not in the interest of the foetus, if remote from term. Early onset preeclampsia (<32 weeks’ gestational age) occurs in less than 1% of pregnancies. It is, however often associated with maternal morbidity as the risk of progression to severe maternal disease is inversely related with gestational age at onset2. Resulting prematurity is therefore the main cause of neonatal mortality and morbidity in patients with severe preeclampsia3. Although the discussion is ongoing, perinatal survival is suggested to be increased in patients with preterm preeclampsia by expectant, non-interventional management. This temporising treatment option to lengthen pregnancy includes the use of antihypertensive medication to control hypertension, magnesium sulphate to prevent eclampsia and corticosteroids to enhance foetal lung maturity4. With optimal maternal haemodynamic status and reassuring foetal condition this results on average in an extension of 2 weeks. Prolongation of these pregnancies is a great challenge for clinicians to balance between potential maternal risks on one the eve hand and possible foetal benefits on the other. Clinical controversies regarding prolongation of preterm preeclamptic pregnancies still exist – also taking into account that preeclampsia is the leading cause of maternal mortality in the Netherlands5 - a debate which is even more pronounced in very preterm pregnancies with questionable foetal viability6-9. Do maternal risks of prolongation of these very early pregnancies outweigh the chances of neonatal survival? Counselling of women with very early onset preeclampsia not only comprises of knowledge of the outcome of those particular pregnancies, but also knowledge of outcomes of future pregnancies of these women is of major clinical importance. This thesis opens with a review of the literature on identifiable risk factors of preeclampsia