Computer programs calculate potential and charge distributions in a plasma

Computer program determines the potential and charge distributions between two electrodes in a plasma. Solutions of the Vlasov equations for plane, cylindrical, and spherical geometries are determined and density distributions are found for each of these configurations over a range of conditions

From market games to real-world markets

This paper uses the development of multi-agent market models to present a unified approach to the joint questions of how financial market movements may be simulated, predicted, and hedged against. We examine the effect of different market clearing mechanisms and show that an out-of-equilibrium clearing process leads to dynamics that closely resemble real financial movements. We then show that replacing the `synthetic' price history used by these simulations with data taken from real financial time-series leads to the remarkable result that the agents can collectively learn to identify moments in the market where profit is attainable. We then employ the formalism of Bouchaud and Sornette in conjunction with agent based models to show that in general risk cannot be eliminated from trading with these models. We also show that, in the presence of transaction costs, the risk of option writing is greatly increased. This risk, and the costs, can however be reduced through the use of a delta-hedging strategy with modified, time-dependent volatility structure.Comment: Presented at APFA2 (Liege) July 2000. Proceedings: Eur. Phys. J. B Latex file + 10 .ps figs. [email protected]

Crowd-Anticrowd Theory of Multi-Agent Market Games

We present a dynamical theory of a multi-agent market game, the so-called Minority Game (MG), based on crowds and anticrowds. The time-averaged version of the dynamical equations provides a quantitatively accurate, yet intuitively simple, explanation for the variation of the standard deviation (`volatility') in MG-like games. We demonstrate this for the basic MG, and the MG with stochastic strategies. The time-dependent equations themselves reproduce the essential dynamics of the MG.Comment: Presented at APFA2 (Liege) July 2000. Proceedings: Eur.Phys.J. B [email protected]

Mixed population Minority Game with generalized strategies

We present a quantitative theory, based on crowd effects, for the market volatility in a Minority Game played by a mixed population. Below a critical concentration of generalized strategy players, we find that the volatility in the crowded regime remains above the random coin-toss value regardless of the "temperature" controlling strategy use. Our theory yields good agreement with numerical simulations.Comment: Revtex file + 3 figure

Theory of Networked Minority Games based on Strategy Pattern Dynamics

We formulate a theory of agent-based models in which agents compete to be in a winning group. The agents may be part of a network or not, and the winning group may be a minority group or not. The novel feature of the present formalism is its focus on the dynamical pattern of strategy rankings, and its careful treatment of the strategy ties which arise during the system's temporal evolution. We apply it to the Minority Game (MG) with connected populations. Expressions for the mean success rate among the agents and for the mean success rate for agents with $k$ neighbors are derived. We also use the theory to estimate the value of connectivity $p$ above which the Binary-Agent-Resource system with high resource level goes into the high-connectivity state.Comment: 24 pages, 3 figures, submitted to PR

Multiplpe Choice Minority Game With Different Publicly Known Histories

In the standard Minority Game, players use historical minority choices as the sole public information to pick one out of the two alternatives. However, publishing historical minority choices is not the only way to present global system information to players when more than two alternatives are available. Thus, it is instructive to study the dynamics and cooperative behaviors of this extended game as a function of the global information provided. We numerically find that although the system dynamics depends on the kind of public information given to the players, the degree of cooperation follows the same trend as that of the standard Minority Game. We also explain most of our findings by the crowd-anticrowd theory.Comment: Extensively revised, to appear in New J Phys, 7 pages with 4 figure

Generalized strategies in the Minority Game

We show analytically how the fluctuations (i.e. standard deviation) in the Minority Game (MG) can be made to decrease below the random coin-toss limit if the agents use more general behavioral strategies. This suppression of the standard deviation results from a cancellation between the actions of a crowd, in which agents act collectively and make the same decision, and an anticrowd in which agents act collectively by making the opposite decision to the crowd.Comment: Revised manuscript: a few minor typos corrected. Results unaffecte