Subsidized Jobs for Unemployed Workers in Slovakia

This paper uses an administrative dataset from the Slovak Republic on durations of individual unemployment spells. The focus of the analysis is on the effect of the duration of temporary subsidized jobs on the job finding rate of unemployed workers. It appears that the duration of the temporary jobs is an important determinant of the speed by which unemployed workers find regular jobs. In this sense shorter temporary jobs are more effective than long temporary jobs. The main reason for this is probably that temporary jobs with a long duration induce workers in the first period on the temporary job to search less intensive for a regular job than temporary jobs with a short duration do.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39695/3/wp311.pd

Has the Dutch Miracle Come to an End?

In the past decades unemployment in the Netherlands has gone down substantially. The main suspects responsible for this decline are the growth of part-time labor, the reform of the benefit system and wage moderation. Nevertheless, in 2002 the unemployment rate in the Netherlands has increased somewhat. However, since the huge decline in unemployment was due to structural improvements in the functioning of the labor market there is not a lot of reason to worry about the recent rise in unemployment. The current structure of the labor market is a lot ‘healthier’ than it was in the early 1980s. Therefore, the upward movement of the unemployment rate is bound to be a mild one.unemployment, employment.

Subsidized Jobs for Unemployed Workers in Slovakia

This paper uses an administrative dataset from the Slovak Republic on durations of individual unemployment spells. The focus of the analysis is on the effect of the duration of temporary subsidized jobs on the job finding rate of unemployed workers. It appears that the duration of the temporary jobs is an important determinant of the speed by which unemployed workers find regular jobs. In this sense shorter temporary jobs are more effective than long temporary jobs. The main reason for this is probably that temporary jobs with a long duration induce workers in the first period on the temporary job to search less intensive for a regular job than temporary jobs with a short duration do.unemployment, active labor market policy, temporal subsidized jobs, duration models

Will You Still Need Me – When I'm 64?

For various reasons the relationship between age and productivity is a matter of policy concern. I present new empirical research showing how productivity is affected by age. I study age effects at the individual level by analyzing data on running and publishing in economic journals. Furthermore I present empirical evidence at the firm level on the relationship between age, wage and productivity. In particular I address the potential wage-productivity gap that might occur at higher ages. I conclude that the productivity of older workers indeed decreases with their age. Nevertheless, the decline is limited. Furthermore, I find no evidence of a pay-productivity at higher ages.age, productivity, matched worker-firm data

Do We Need Crisis-Specific Labor Market Policies? Lessons from Dutch Miracle - Part II

Arbeitslosigkeit; Arbeitslosenversicherung; Arbeitsmarktpolitik; Wirkungsanalyse; Vergleich; Niederlande; Welt

Do Active Labor Market Policies Help Unemployed Workers to Find and Keep Regular Jobs?

This paper uses an administrative dataset to analyze to what extent active labor market policies in the Slovak Republic have been beneficial for unemployed workers. The focus is on two types of temporary subsidized jobs and on training. Short-term subsidized jobs seem to be the most efficient active labor market policy. Workers that are or have been on a short-term subsidized job have a higher job finding rate than other unemployed workers have and once they find a job they have a lower job separation rate than workers that have not been on a short-term subsidized job. Long-term subsidized jobs have a negative effect on the job finding rate and no effect on the job separation rate. The positive effect of training on the job finding rate of unemployed workers may have to do with reversed causality: some workers enter a training program only after they are promised a job. Training does not seem to affect the job separation rate.unemployment, active labor market policy, duration models

Modeling Financial Incentives to Get Unemployed Back to Work

We model how unemployment benefit sanctions - benefit reductions that are imposed if unemployed do not comply with job search guidelines - affect unemployment. In our analysis we find that not only micro effects concerning the behavior of individual unemployed workers are relevant, but also macro-spillover effects from the additional creation of vacancies, which originates from the increased effectiveness of labor supply. We advocate that for a given loss in welfare for the unemployed benefit sanctions are more effective in reducing unemployment than an across the board reduction in the replacement rate.

Why Is There a Spike in the Job Finding Rate at Benefit Exhaustion?

Putting a limit on the duration of unemployment benefits tends to introduce a "spike" in the job finding rate shortly before benefits are exhausted. Current theories explain this spike from workers’ behavior. We present a theoretical model in which also the nature of the job matters. End-of-benefit spikes in job finding rates are related to optimizing behavior of unemployed workers who rationally assume that employers will accept delays in the starting date of a new job, especially if these jobs are permanent. We use a dataset on Slovenian unemployment spells to test this prediction and find supporting evidence. We conclude that the spike in the job finding rate suggests that workers exploit unemployment insurance benefits for subsidized leisure.unemployment benefits, spikes

Why is there a Spike in the Job Finding Rate at Benefit Exhaustion?

Putting a limit on the duration of unemployment benefits tends to introduce a “spike” in the job finding rate shortly before benefits are exhausted. Current theories explain this spike from workers’ behavior. We present a theoretical model in which also the nature of the job matters. End-of-benefit spikes in job finding rates are related to optimizing behavior of unemployed workers who rationally assume that employers will accept delays in the starting date of a new job, especially if these jobs are permanent. We use a dataset on Slovenian unemployment spells to test this prediction and find supporting evidence. We conclude that the spike in the job finding rate suggests that workers exploit unemployment insurance benefits for subsidized leisure.unemployment benefits, spikes